đź§µNew interview with "Karl," the Estonian military analyst whose insights on the war in Ukraine have proved remarkably acute. With @holger_r:
"Let’s start from the frontlines where changes over the last months have been completely minimal. Russia has slight success south of Kupyansk and allegedly also south of Avdiivka, but it is only on a very operational level."
"While Ukraine didn’t achieve much during their 3-month offensive in the summer, Russia achieved even less now over the last 3 months. It’s a stalemate."
"Ukraine's problem is the increasing shortage of specific ammunition. It’s not yet totally dire but the limits are getting close."
"There is increasingly more information coming from different sections on the frontline that Russia’s superiority in artillery fire is getting critical."
"If the situation doesn’t improve, it will start affecting the frontline. No matter how much smarter you are or how much more accurate and efficient your weapons are, if the ratio is 10:1 for Russia, it will affect the frontline."
"Ukraine’s big achievement is that they have continuously weakened Russia's positions at and around the Black Sea. Hitting the A-50 and IL-22 planes impedes Russia's missile attacks coming from that direction."
"The intensity of Russia's missile attacks is clearly lower than it was last year. Then they had weekly attacks with more than 100 missiles, now the number of missiles is more around 40 and attacks are not weekly."
"In the beginning of winter last year Russia even carried out such large scale attacks twice a week."
"Ukraine's air defense is significantly better than a year ago. Last winter there were several regions which were without electricity for days. We don’t see this now. I think we can say that from the energy point of view, Ukraine will survive the winter."
"Ukraine doesn’t have the capability to shoot down S-300/S-400 and Kh-22 rockets. But their radius is small. Russia can target Kharkiv, Kherson, smaller towns in Sumy and maybe Zaporizhzhia with them."
"Those missiles were intended for air defense and anti-ship purposes but Russia is using them on land targets. Their accuracy is really off and that’s why Russia can’t hit military targets with them. They will miss. That is why we see random residential houses hit in Kharkiv."
"The percentage of shot-down cruise missiles is very high but with Iskander’s it was at 50% yesterday. Ukraine has started to emphasize that they are using increasingly more REB (radio electronic combat) methods in air defense."
"Rockets are not being shot down but jammers lead them off the targets. If Ukraine can successfully use REB, it is good news because it saves air defense rockets and is also cheaper."
"The biggest problem continues to be the West’s inability to fund and equip Ukraine. The EU’s decision to fund Ukraine [with €50bn] will come next week one way or another. But there is no assurance whatsoever that the U.S. will approve its package."
"Reportedly the Senate will agree on aid this week but it doesn’t guarantee that House Republicans will tag along. The Senate has been quiet on this topic this week but that might not be so bad. Often a lot of noise is worse than quiet."
"The Biden administration doesn’t consider Ukraine an absolute priority problem. They’re playing their political games so that they could blame the GOP for blocking aid. The Republicans in turn can blame Dems for not taking the U.S southern border seriously enough."
"Because neither issue is a top priority for either side, there is no decision and political games continue. Then there’s also the U.S. "fear of escalation." All in all, the administration hasn’t set a goal of Ukraine beating Russia and chasing them out of their territory."
"Their maximum goal is that Russia doesn't win the war. It is a long-term strategic mistake which stems from the lack of courage in decision-making."
"The U.S aid package has been coming since October. Now we are really running out of time. Even when the decision is eventually made, there will be a gap in Ukraine's capabilities on the frontline because supplies take time to arrive."
"There will be very difficult weeks ahead. Ukraine will not lose the war in just a few weeks and Russia will not gain a massive advantage. But in a matter of a few months, the situation can become critically worse."
"Europe is getting better in this but in the short term Europe’s contributions will not be able to replace America's. There are also considerable problems getting Ukraine's own military industry up and running."
"Historically, Ukraine’s military industry has been located either on currently occupied areas or close to the frontlines."
"It’s unrealistic to do it there now. Restoring the industry anywhere on Ukraine’s territory requires a very high level of air defense capabilities. Otherwise it will be a pointless investment."
"If the West’s aid returns to the “Biden minimum” level, it is highly probable that the frontline will remain stable in the coming months. Some decisive factors will be who will be better at developing drone capabilities, REB etc." /END
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
I've been emphasizing lately the unintended consequences of Trump's headlong embrace of Russia -- consequences not wholly undesirable for Russia. While it's wonderful for Moscow to see an American president so eager to realign with Russia's strategic interests, and so keen to denigrate and alienate American allies in that re-alignment, smarter figures in the Kremlin realize the hazards of such an embarrassment of riches. A helpful constant in this administration's rush to give Putin everything all at once is that the worst capitulationist ideas are being stress-tested in the media and in the GOP almost as soon as they're invented -- and often *before* the Trump administration has agreed on whether or not they're feasible. One of ideas these is that the U.S. will recognize Crimea as Russian territory.
As you might expect, this was Steve Witkoff's proposal, which is to say it was Vladimir Putin's. Dim Philby isn't so much an envoy as an unblinking relay of Putin's maximalist demands, all of which he presents to Trump as eminently reasonable, if not accomplished facts. (Recall Witkoff's lie that Russia was in full control of the Ukrainian regions it "annexed," regions Witkoff doesn't know the names of, when it is in full control of none of them.) The "Krym Nash" brain fart, I'm told, happened without any inter-agency coordination or buy-in from the principals, least of all Marco Rubio, who is at odds with Witkoff on this and on much else, regardless of the flattering tweets he is obliged to post about his scandalous colleague. Now notice this little nuance in the WSJ story cited above:
"Senior State Department official," indeed. You can almost hear the whirr of the backpedal in that paragraph. Giving up Crimea in a de facto or de jure capacity is a non-starter for Ukraine, as any junior State Department official can tell you. Zelensky could never sell it domestically even if he wanted to (and he doesn't) because the the political blowback would be severe and almost certainly unite opposition to both the policy and his presidency in a way that would make the resistance he experienced over the Steinmeier Formula look coy. (This might even result in a far more nationalistic and hawkish political figure to emerge as frontrunner for the Ukrainian presidency; exactly the opposite of what the Putin-Vance-Carlson triumvirate has been angling for.)
America's "washing its hands" of Ukraine-Russia talks can mean several things. First and foremost, it would mean ending this Witkoff/Rubio fandango to attain (or impose) a Russia-favorable peace deal of some kind, which reportedly would include de facto ceding occupied territory to Moscow. But what else does an American walk-away entail? Some unresolved questions below:
1. It is a near certainty that no additional military aid packages will come from this administration once the Biden-era ones run out. But does that mean Trump will refuse to sell weapons and ammunition directly or indirectly to Ukraine? Does it mean he will actively slap end user restrictions on European countries from buying American kit for the express purpose of donating it to Ukraine? (Even Rubio alluded to Ukraine's right to bilateral agreements with other countries.)
Right now, Germany continues to supply Kyiv with Patriot missiles. Long-range air defense is one of three critical areas in security assistance where Europe cannot yet compensate for the absence of American platforms, the other two being rocket artillery and howitzer ammunition. So new European aid packages featuring U.S.-made hardware seriously matter. Does Trump's pivot to Moscow include his limiting U.S. arms exports to Europe, something that would grievously harm the American arms industry beyond the harm Trump already inflicted on it with his attacks on transatlanticism, NATO, etc.? Between 2020 and 2024, Europe overtook the Middle East as the largest region for U.S. arms exports for the first time in two decades. Now, this government is clearly not above economic own goals, but it'll nonetheless be interesting to see how it sells a new dawn with Russia -- one without a concomitant peace -- as the price worth paying for crippling the American military-industrial complex.
2. Does Trump lift some or most sanctions on Russia in the absence of a peace deal? He might in pursuit of rapprochement, but even here he'll find it difficult to give Putin everything he wants with the stroke of a pen. Some of the toughest sanctions, including those on Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, are tied to Congressional notification/approval, thanks to Biden. Trump would also face some headwinds from Republicans on the Hill, who would not be happy with sanctions relief in exchange for nothing.
Moreover, Europe gets a vote.
SWIFT, which Moscow wanted its agricultural bank reconnected to as a precondition for a ceasefire, is based in Brussels. EU sanctions legislation is by consent. So far, there has been *no* indication the EU is considering lifting sanctions on Russia, whatever D.C. says, does or agrees to. The opposite, in fact, is the case: the EU has been discussing ways to increase sanctions on Russia in coordination with the UK: archive.ph/qsVfc
Excellent analysis by Kiel Institute. Some conclusions track with what @JimmySecUK wrote for @newlinesmag here: newlinesmag.com/argument/can-e…
“To replace US aid flows and keep total support at the same level: Europe needs to double its yearly support to an average level of 0.21% of GDP. This is less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are already doing and on a level of what Poland and the Netherlands do.”
“Currently, European governments contribute about €44 billion annually to Ukraine’s defense, or roughly 0.1% of their
combined GDP, a relatively modest fiscal commitment. To replace total US aid, Europe would need to increase its annual support to approximately €82 billion per year, or 0.21% of GDP —essentially
doubling its current financial effort.
the United States allocated just 0.15% of their GDP per year to Ukraine, European states the 0.13%, and the EU institutions just below the 0.1%.”
This is an excellent and timely factsheet on Ukraine, U.S. v. European security assistance, and other misunderstood or lied about aspects of the war, by our friends at @TheStudyofWar. I'll summarize a few main points below, with additional sources of my own: understandingwar.org/backgrounder/u…
Russia's advances have slowed considerably in the last few months. It was taking, on average, 28 sq km per day in November; it took 16 sq km in January. Why is this? Russians are suffering severe manpower and equipment losses and Ukraine is causing them greater pain with its fleet of domestically sourced FPV drones, which now include fiber-optic wire-guided drones to evade electronic warfare. (Drones increasingly compensate for artillery shortages on the Ukrainian side.) Such is the state of Russia's army, its soldiers are now using donkeys to transport ammunition to the frontlines: independent.co.uk/news/world/eur…
Of course, Russia still has its own formidable capabilities and advantages on the battlefield, especially in glide bombs and drones: it, too, deploys fiber-optic wire-guided FPVs. But, as @Jack_Watling, one of the best military analysts of the war has noted, the "Russian military is massively underperforming, largely because of the poor quality of its [third big advantage] infantry and a lack of lower-level command and control." theguardian.com/world/2025/feb…
New: After an eighteen-month investigation, @InsiderEng has uncovered new evidence suggesting that Russia’s GRU paid tens of millions of dollars to the Taliban in Afghanistan to target American, coalition, and Afghan military forces. GRU Unit 29155 was behind this operation. We have unmasked the officers and their Afghan agents. theins.ru/en/politics/27…
The program, per four former Afghan intel (NDS) sources we queried, averaged $200,000 per killed American or coalition soldier. There were smaller allowances for killed Afghan troops. One former official estimated that Russia paid a total of approximately $30 million to the Taliban via the scheme.
We confirmed much of what the NDS told @InsiderEng using data exfiltrated from three different Unit 29155 operatives' email boxes. From there we assessed the travel patterns of the Afghan couriers/liaisons, matching their presence in Afghanistan with several noted Taliban attacks on U.S., NATO or Afghan targets.