We’re often told Gen Z are hyper progressive, but other surveys suggest they’re surprisingly conservative 🤔
But breaking things down by sex provides an explanation: young women are very progressive, young men are surprisingly conservative.
Gen Z is two generations, not one.
In country after country, surveys show a very similar pattern:
Historically the views of men and women in the same generations have been very similar. This is still true for older age-groups, but a gap has opened between today’s young men and women.
Let’s look at some examples:
Here’s South Korea, where the ideology divide between young men and women is famously wide.
Young women have become markedly more progressive on gender norms, but young men have not budged.
The result? An emerging societal rift.
This is having huge impacts, including reducing rates of marriage and births in Korea, whose birth rate has plummeted to become the lowest of any country in the world.
In contrast to the typical relationship between values and age, young American men hold *more conservative views on gender* than older men.
This has huge social implications.
And here’s where it gets most interesting: the divide is not just about issues concerning gender.
This chart for the UK is *remarkable*.
All groups of people, young and old, men and women, have become more liberal on race and immigration *except young men*
And here’s Germany on a similar issue:
Young German women have become markedly more progressive on attitudes to immigrants, while young German men are *more conservative* on this than their elders.
In Poland’s elections last year, 46% of young men voted for the far-right nationalist Confederation party, compared to just 16% of young women.
In the wake of the #MeToo movement, young women have both become more progressive and more vocal about their views.
Many young men feel threatened and have reacted by taking the opposite position.
This could explain how the divide on gender issues bleeds into other spaces.
If some young men think "young women are woke, I am not" (I know it’s an annoying word), then they will instinctively take non-woke (sorry) positions on other topics.
A complementary theory is that these trends are explained by young men and women increasingly inhabiting different spaces.
So much of daily life now plays out online, and young men and women are in different parts of the internet. Algorithmically walled gardens of TikTok.
And this means different — in some cases diametrically opposed — cultures and ideologies can take off quite quickly, and soon you have two halves of a generation who find each other’s views incomprehensible at best, intolerable at worst.
The problem is these theories suggest the divergence will continue, both for today’s young adults and future generations.
Teenagers are growing up in these same ideological bubbles. Hence the popularity of Andrew Tate etc, which is unfathomable to people outside the bubble.
And it’s worth coming back to the original chart:
This trend can not just be palmed off as the sole responsibility of one gender. Young women and young men have both played their part in the divergence.
Korea’s is an extreme situation, but it serves as a warning to other countries of what can happen when young men and women part ways.
Its society is riven in two. Its marriage rate has plummeted, and its birth rate has fallen precipitously to become the lowest in the world.
Where do we go from here? It’s hard to say.
One thing that would help is de-segregating online spaces. If top influencers spoke to both sexes instead of just one, that could begin bridging the divide.
Will this happen? Almost certainly not.
I think it’s true that bridging the gap will have to come more from men than women, but I think diagnoses of "toxic masculinity" only exacerbate the problem, causing further negative polarisation.
Young men need better role models, but it’s not their fault they don’t have them.
It would be easy to say this is all a phase that will pass, but the ideology gaps are only growing, and data shows that people’s formative political experiences are hard to shake off.
People’s political and ideological views at age 30 prove really sticky.
Some shout-outs:
First, to @_alice_evans whose mountains of work in this space were invaluable for my research. You can read her many excellent articles here: ggd.world
@_alice_evans And also to @dcoxpolls whose fascinating exploration of how this divide is playing out in the US prompted my piece
Some are [quite reasonably] asking why I presented charts showing that in the west, the divergence has come mainly from women liberalising, and then said "bridging the gap will have to come more from men than women".
My answer:
Throughout history each generation has had more liberal views than the last on socio/cultural issues (think racism, gender roles etc)
So part of what we’re seeing here is young women continuing on that long-term trend, while young men aren’t.
And on these issues, it is very rare for a generation to reverse back to a previous generation’s views.
So from a practical perspective it feels much more likely the gap will be closed by men liberalising (in line with historical trends) than women reversing (counter to trends).
So please don’t read a value judgment into my statement that "this will have to come more from men than women".
I simply mean that historical evidence suggests that if this is going to happen, that is the most likely way it will happen.
And I am certainly persuadable by the idea that we may be entering a period where certain progressive shifts *are* susceptible to being reversed.
For example, affirmative action has been repealed in the US, and unlike Roe vs Wade that has not been met with uproar.
So perhaps the gap here will be closed by both sides meeting in the middle. That would be very good! Almost certainly better for solution cohesion than one side doing all the legwork.
Time will tell.
Woops one correction:
The Korean chart should [obviously] have said “disagree”, not “agree”.
Looks like people knew what I meant, but just for confirmation:
Must read:
The brilliant @_alice_evans has written a superb article setting out *why* we are seeing this ideological divergence among young men and women in many countries but not in others
NEW: my column this week is about the coming vibe shift, from Boomers vs Millennials to huge wealth inequality *between* Millennials.
Current discourse centres on how the average Millennial is worse-off than the average Boomer was, but the richest millennials are loaded 💸🚀
That data was for the UK, but it’s a similar story in the US. The gap between the richest and poorest Millennials is far wider than it was for Boomers. More debt at the bottom, and much more wealth at the top.
In both countries, inequality is overwhelmingly *within* generations, not between them.
And how have the richest millennials got so rich?
Mainly this: enormous wealth transfers from their parents, typically to help with buying their first home.
In the UK, among those who get parental help, the top 10% got *£170,000* towards their house (the average Millennial got zero).
American politics is in the midst of a racial realignment.
I think this is simultaneously one of the most important social trends in the US today, and one of the most poorly understood.
Last week, an NYT poll showed Biden leading Trump by less than 10 points among non-white Americans, a group he won by almost 50 points in 2020.
Averaging all recent polls (thnx @admcrlsn), the Democrats are losing more ground with non-white voters than any other demographic.
People often respond to these figures with accusations of polling error, but this isn’t just one rogue result.
High quality, long-running surveys like this from Gallup have been showing a steepening decline in Black and Latino voters identifying as Democrats for several years.
The politics of America’s housing issues in one chart:
• People and politicians in blue states say they care deeply about the housing crisis and homelessness but keep blocking housing so both get worse
• Red states simply permit loads of new homes and have no housing crisis
And if you were wondering where London fits into this...
It builds even less than San Francisco, and its house prices have risen even faster.
That cities like London & SF (and the people who run them) are considered progressive while overseeing these situations is ... something
Those charts are from my latest column, in which I argue that we need to stop talking about the housing crisis, and start talking about the planning/permitting crisis, because it’s all downstream from that ft.com/content/de34df…
NEW: we often talk about an age divide in politics, with young people much less conservative than the old.
But this is much more a British phenomenon than a global one.
40% of young Americans voted Trump in 2020. But only 10% of UK under-30s support the Conservatives. Why?
One factor is that another narrative often framed as universal turns out to be much worse in the UK: the sense that young generations are getting screwed.
Young people are struggling to get onto the housing ladder in many countries, but the crisis is especially deep in Britain:
It’s a similar story for incomes, where Millennials in the UK have not made any progress on Gen X, while young Americans are soaring to record highs.
Young Brits have had a much more visceral experience of failing to make economic progress.
NEW: we don’t reflect enough on how severe the housing crisis is, and how it has completely broken the promise society made to young adults.
The situation is especially severe in the UK, where the last time house prices were this unaffordable was in ... 1876.
My column this week is on the complete breakdown in one of the most powerful cultural beliefs of the English-speaking world: that if you work hard, you’ll earn enough to buy yourself a house and start a family.
The last time houses were this hard to afford, cars had not yet been invented, Queen Victoria was on the throne and home ownership was the preserve of a wealthy minority.
After ~80 years of homeownership being very achievable, that’s what we’ve gone back to.