Exclusive: Tatjana Zdanoka, a Latvian member of the European Parliament, has been an agent of Russian intelligence for at least twenty years, @the_ins_ru can reveal, based on emails we obtained between Zdanoka and two of her FSB handlers. theins.press/en/politics/26…
Her two known case officers we have identified as Dmitry Gladey, 74, and Sergei Beltyukov, 53. Both are attached to the FSB's apparatus in St. Petersburg. The FSB is Russia's domestic security service, one of the successors of the KGB.
Gladey has another job: chairman of the International Institute for Monitoring the Development of Democracy, which was formed by the Interparliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 2006 to...
"facilitate the exchange of information, generalization of best practices in the development of democracy and parliamentarism, and observance of citizens’ electoral rights."
He certainly made good on that first objective. He ran Zdanoka from 2004 to 2013, almost a decade, before handing her off to Beltyukov, to whom he began forwarding her agent reports.
We have determined that Gladey is assigned to the FSB Fifth Service, the unit Vladimir Putin tasked with politically destabilizing Ukraine in 2014. Its chief, Gen. Sergei Beseda, advised Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to use lethal force against protesters on the Maidan).
Then, in advance of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Fifth Service was ordered to recruit fifth columnists, weaken the Zelensky government and unity of Ukrainian society -- an operation that, to put it mildly, did not go so swimmingly.
Zdanoka, a Russian who obtained Latvian citizenship in 1996, has long been known in Riga for her naked pro-Moscow views. She was one of 13 MEPs to vote against the European Parliament resolution condemning Russia for its attack on Ukraine two years ago.
She's traveled to occupied Crimea and to Syria for parlays with Assad, a trip European Parliament refused to pay for as Syria was under sanctions. Who knows who paid for this holiday!
She has actually argued against the state of Latvia as a sovereign, independent nation, which might be considered odd for a Latvian politician. Zdanoka routinely rails against the Baltic states for their alleged persecution of ethnic Russians and the Russian language.
She had a hand in organizing "anti-fascist" training camps for pro-Russian actors after the Bronze Soldier incident in Tallinn and concomitant Russian cyberattack on Estonia in 2007.
Zdanoka denied knowing anyone named Beltyukov. That might be technically accurate in the same way GRU spy Alger Hiss told the truth when he said he never knew anyone "named" Whittaker Chambers, who went by "Karl," among other names, in the American underground.
Belytukov's cryptonym in his communication with Zdanoka was "Sergey Krasin."
However, she did admit to knowing Gladey -- for decades. They met "a tourist base in the North Caucasus, where they were learning to ski," she said. Zdanoka said she has no idea either of her interlocutors were spies.
Here she is telling Gladey where to meet in Brussels, at MIDI, the train station that connects the city -- home to NATO and other EU institutions -- to the airport.
In one email, dated Apr. 2010, she asked her erstwhile ski buddy for $6,000 to buy St. George's ribbons (Soviet-era WWII pennants, later repurposed into ultranationalist symbols legitimizing the war against Ukraine) for a Victory Day event in Latvia. We don't know if he obliged.
More generally, she updated her handlers on her ultracaffeinated work on behalf of Russia as an MEP in Strasbourg. Subject lines were titled "report" or "Speech and resolutions" detailing her European Parliamentary activities, particularly as they relate...
...to her two blocs, the Green-European Free Alliance group and the European Russian Alliance. The latter, one Western intel source told us, was "designed as a vehicle for indoctrination and to establish meetings between bosses from Russia, rezidenturas [Russian spy stations]..."
"... in Brussels and compatriots. The best part is the FSB managed to run their operations with European taxpayer money."
She even arranged for a Schengen visa for a third FSB operative, Artem Kureev, whom Estonia's State Security Service identified as "one of seven suspected Russian handlers" of Sergey Seredenko, the self-appointed "human rights ombudsman of Estonia."
Zdanoka told us her "intern" introduced her to Kureev.
Yet another FSB operative Zdanoka has known and been helped by is Georgy Muradov, today the deputy head of Rossotrudnichestvo -- a spy clearinghouse posing as the cultural arm of the Russian Foreign Ministry -- in occupied Crimea.
In 2009, Muradov came to Riga on behalf of the Moscow City Council to campaign for Zdanoka in her election for European Parliament. He even handed out cash to ethnic Russian veterans there.
We located Muradov's home address in Moscow at an FSB residence, Michurihsky Prospect 29/1. Alexei Alexandrov, a member of the assassination team that poisoned Russian opposition leader @navalny, is a neighbor.
Here is Zdanoka on the authenticity of her correspondence with Gladey and Beltyukov: "I cannot consider this text to be questions put to me because it is based on information that you supposedly have, which by definition, you should not have."
So where does this leave Zdanoka? Well, here the story becomes even more intriguing.
As a sitting MEP, she retains legal immunity from prosecution. Yet there are only five months left to her last term and, owing to changes in Latvian law prohibiting "pro-Kremlin-oriented persons and political organizations," she isn't eligible to run again.
Another wrinkle is that Latvia's criminal code was such that, prior to 2016, it was illegal to pass classified intelligence to a foreign spy service but not to do work for one. (Don't ask.) So most of Zdanoka's activities on behalf of the FSB technically don't qualify as illegal.
Except that we have another email, dated 2017, in which she asks Krasin/Beltyukov for his "help in finding out whether it's still possible for a group of 8 people from Latvia to join the foreign delegations that will be received in St. Petersburg..."
"...on the anniversary of the lifting of the blockade."
The blockade here refers to the Red Army's breaking of the Nazi siege of Leningrad in 1943.
The verb Russian Zdanoka uses re: the blockade survivors -- курировать -- "to curate," can mean supervising. But in FSB parlance it is more accurately translated as "running," as in running a network of subagents.
We sent this email and the others to Normunds Mežviets, the head of Latvia's counterintelligence service, the VDD. He replied simply: “We will look into it.” /END
Oh, and this investigation was done with our consortium partners: @DelfiEE, @rebaltica, and @Expressen.
UPDATE: Juri Laas, the spokesperson for EP President Roberta Metsola, has commented: "The President takes these allegations very seriously and is referring the case to the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct..."
"... This means that investigations within the European Parliament have been opened. She will also bring the issue to the Parliament´s Conference of Presidents on Wednesday."
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I've been emphasizing lately the unintended consequences of Trump's headlong embrace of Russia -- consequences not wholly undesirable for Russia. While it's wonderful for Moscow to see an American president so eager to realign with Russia's strategic interests, and so keen to denigrate and alienate American allies in that re-alignment, smarter figures in the Kremlin realize the hazards of such an embarrassment of riches. A helpful constant in this administration's rush to give Putin everything all at once is that the worst capitulationist ideas are being stress-tested in the media and in the GOP almost as soon as they're invented -- and often *before* the Trump administration has agreed on whether or not they're feasible. One of ideas these is that the U.S. will recognize Crimea as Russian territory.
As you might expect, this was Steve Witkoff's proposal, which is to say it was Vladimir Putin's. Dim Philby isn't so much an envoy as an unblinking relay of Putin's maximalist demands, all of which he presents to Trump as eminently reasonable, if not accomplished facts. (Recall Witkoff's lie that Russia was in full control of the Ukrainian regions it "annexed," regions Witkoff doesn't know the names of, when it is in full control of none of them.) The "Krym Nash" brain fart, I'm told, happened without any inter-agency coordination or buy-in from the principals, least of all Marco Rubio, who is at odds with Witkoff on this and on much else, regardless of the flattering tweets he is obliged to post about his scandalous colleague. Now notice this little nuance in the WSJ story cited above:
"Senior State Department official," indeed. You can almost hear the whirr of the backpedal in that paragraph. Giving up Crimea in a de facto or de jure capacity is a non-starter for Ukraine, as any junior State Department official can tell you. Zelensky could never sell it domestically even if he wanted to (and he doesn't) because the the political blowback would be severe and almost certainly unite opposition to both the policy and his presidency in a way that would make the resistance he experienced over the Steinmeier Formula look coy. (This might even result in a far more nationalistic and hawkish political figure to emerge as frontrunner for the Ukrainian presidency; exactly the opposite of what the Putin-Vance-Carlson triumvirate has been angling for.)
America's "washing its hands" of Ukraine-Russia talks can mean several things. First and foremost, it would mean ending this Witkoff/Rubio fandango to attain (or impose) a Russia-favorable peace deal of some kind, which reportedly would include de facto ceding occupied territory to Moscow. But what else does an American walk-away entail? Some unresolved questions below:
1. It is a near certainty that no additional military aid packages will come from this administration once the Biden-era ones run out. But does that mean Trump will refuse to sell weapons and ammunition directly or indirectly to Ukraine? Does it mean he will actively slap end user restrictions on European countries from buying American kit for the express purpose of donating it to Ukraine? (Even Rubio alluded to Ukraine's right to bilateral agreements with other countries.)
Right now, Germany continues to supply Kyiv with Patriot missiles. Long-range air defense is one of three critical areas in security assistance where Europe cannot yet compensate for the absence of American platforms, the other two being rocket artillery and howitzer ammunition. So new European aid packages featuring U.S.-made hardware seriously matter. Does Trump's pivot to Moscow include his limiting U.S. arms exports to Europe, something that would grievously harm the American arms industry beyond the harm Trump already inflicted on it with his attacks on transatlanticism, NATO, etc.? Between 2020 and 2024, Europe overtook the Middle East as the largest region for U.S. arms exports for the first time in two decades. Now, this government is clearly not above economic own goals, but it'll nonetheless be interesting to see how it sells a new dawn with Russia -- one without a concomitant peace -- as the price worth paying for crippling the American military-industrial complex.
2. Does Trump lift some or most sanctions on Russia in the absence of a peace deal? He might in pursuit of rapprochement, but even here he'll find it difficult to give Putin everything he wants with the stroke of a pen. Some of the toughest sanctions, including those on Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, are tied to Congressional notification/approval, thanks to Biden. Trump would also face some headwinds from Republicans on the Hill, who would not be happy with sanctions relief in exchange for nothing.
Moreover, Europe gets a vote.
SWIFT, which Moscow wanted its agricultural bank reconnected to as a precondition for a ceasefire, is based in Brussels. EU sanctions legislation is by consent. So far, there has been *no* indication the EU is considering lifting sanctions on Russia, whatever D.C. says, does or agrees to. The opposite, in fact, is the case: the EU has been discussing ways to increase sanctions on Russia in coordination with the UK: archive.ph/qsVfc
Excellent analysis by Kiel Institute. Some conclusions track with what @JimmySecUK wrote for @newlinesmag here: newlinesmag.com/argument/can-e…
“To replace US aid flows and keep total support at the same level: Europe needs to double its yearly support to an average level of 0.21% of GDP. This is less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are already doing and on a level of what Poland and the Netherlands do.”
“Currently, European governments contribute about €44 billion annually to Ukraine’s defense, or roughly 0.1% of their
combined GDP, a relatively modest fiscal commitment. To replace total US aid, Europe would need to increase its annual support to approximately €82 billion per year, or 0.21% of GDP —essentially
doubling its current financial effort.
the United States allocated just 0.15% of their GDP per year to Ukraine, European states the 0.13%, and the EU institutions just below the 0.1%.”
This is an excellent and timely factsheet on Ukraine, U.S. v. European security assistance, and other misunderstood or lied about aspects of the war, by our friends at @TheStudyofWar. I'll summarize a few main points below, with additional sources of my own: understandingwar.org/backgrounder/u…
Russia's advances have slowed considerably in the last few months. It was taking, on average, 28 sq km per day in November; it took 16 sq km in January. Why is this? Russians are suffering severe manpower and equipment losses and Ukraine is causing them greater pain with its fleet of domestically sourced FPV drones, which now include fiber-optic wire-guided drones to evade electronic warfare. (Drones increasingly compensate for artillery shortages on the Ukrainian side.) Such is the state of Russia's army, its soldiers are now using donkeys to transport ammunition to the frontlines: independent.co.uk/news/world/eur…
Of course, Russia still has its own formidable capabilities and advantages on the battlefield, especially in glide bombs and drones: it, too, deploys fiber-optic wire-guided FPVs. But, as @Jack_Watling, one of the best military analysts of the war has noted, the "Russian military is massively underperforming, largely because of the poor quality of its [third big advantage] infantry and a lack of lower-level command and control." theguardian.com/world/2025/feb…
New: After an eighteen-month investigation, @InsiderEng has uncovered new evidence suggesting that Russia’s GRU paid tens of millions of dollars to the Taliban in Afghanistan to target American, coalition, and Afghan military forces. GRU Unit 29155 was behind this operation. We have unmasked the officers and their Afghan agents. theins.ru/en/politics/27…
The program, per four former Afghan intel (NDS) sources we queried, averaged $200,000 per killed American or coalition soldier. There were smaller allowances for killed Afghan troops. One former official estimated that Russia paid a total of approximately $30 million to the Taliban via the scheme.
We confirmed much of what the NDS told @InsiderEng using data exfiltrated from three different Unit 29155 operatives' email boxes. From there we assessed the travel patterns of the Afghan couriers/liaisons, matching their presence in Afghanistan with several noted Taliban attacks on U.S., NATO or Afghan targets.