This launch follows HMS Vanguard overhaul, and therefore is part of a Demonstration And Shake down Operation (DASO). It aims at certifying a SSBN crew and weapon system for future strategic deployments (patrols). The whole system is tested, culminating with missile launch.
Many tracking assets will be involved, on land, in the air and at sea. Among mobile assets, the most important will be USNS Waters acting as the Launch Area Support Ship (LASS), and USNS Pathfinder at reentry area acting fitted with the Navy Mobile Instrumentation System (NMIS).
The SSBN HMS Vanguard is fitted with special systems in order to collect data on and around SSBN environment during launch.
We can see one of the probable probe on a beautiful pic. taken today while HMS Vanguard was leaving Port Cape Canaveral to go to launch area
Two ways communications, incl. data and voice, with USNS Waters/LASS and aircraft such as P-8 are allowed thanks to Buoyant Cable communication System (BCS). At least two P-8 are currently flying over launch area.
6000 km away (for this test) is station TAGS-60 USNS Pathfinder survey ship, equipped with the NMIS. This set consists of several equipment such as two tracking radars (X & C-band), optics, telemetry and weather systems.
For safety reasons, the ship remains ~25 nm from expected reentry zone. In order to evaluate RV (reentry vehicles, or bodies, or warheads) accuracy, a Portable Impact Location System was developed. It consists of 9 to 12 acoustic buoys + 3 communication relay buoys.
The com. relay buoys can collect RV telemetry from 3 RV (MIRV) spaced 12 sec in time from reentry until splashdown in the ocean. Spectrogram below shows such telemetry from a real test. Signal is lost ~35km (altitude) / 9s before impact due to plasma generated ...
... by hypersonic speed when reaching dense atmosphere.
Signal comes back ~2,6km / 2s before impact.
This gives an average speed of 3,8 km/s, explaining why it's REALLY hard (almost impossible) to intercept such a warhead with point defense systems such as Patriot or SAMP/T.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
🇪🇺 500 reasons why - the European Integrated Deterrence Initiative☢️
Today we'll see why with more than 500 nuclear warheads and thousands of long range missiles, Europe already has all the means to implement a credible deterrence at almost no additional costs.
A thread 🧵
First of all, in order to avoid unnecessary insults from various nationalists, I am NOT suggesting to share French nor UK deterrences, but to EXTEND them and to complete themwith other countries long range weapons.
Each country would remain in full control of its weapons.
Trump's recent reelection and various statements by him and his inner circle on NATO cast doubt on whether or not the US would intervene and use its own deterrence forces in order to protect a European ally under attack.
This seriously armed US extended deterrence credibility.
🚀Tir du missile russe Oreshnik sur Dnipro, symbole de l'échec du chantage nucléaire ? 🇷🇺
L'événement d'hier pourrait témoigner d'un changement de cap des autorités russes, qui acteraient l'échec du chantage nucléaire pour revenir à une dialectique plus rationnelle.
Depuis le début du conflit, le Kremlin agite régulièrement la menace nucléaire de manière plus ou moins explicite à chaque fois que l' "Occident" s’apprête à franchir un cap dans son soutien à l'Ukraine - fourniture d'armes létales, de chars, d'avions de combat etc.
Si ces menaces ont pu fonctionner auprès des populations peu sensibilisées à ces questions, elles n'ont pas empêché les gouvernements des pays visés de passer à l'acte, comme ce fut le cas la semaine dernière avec l'autorisation des frappes dans la profondeur russe.
In today's thread, we will see why Trump or no Trump, 🇪🇺Europe's security can no longer depend on US extended deterrence, not for political reasons but for strategic ones.
And its not a bad thing.
A thread 🧵
Since the 50s, Europe mostly depends on US nuclear weapons for its security, if we exclude the French and to some extend British cases.
This extended deterrence, also sometime called US nuclear umbrella, is made concrete with the deployment of ~100 B61 ☢️gravity bombs...
...hosted in 5 European countries. Those weapons can be loaded on "Dual-Capable Aircraft", both US and European (F-16, F-35, Tornado).
The utility of those weapons in the case of a conflict is questionable, mostly because of the low survivability...
In this thread we will discuss how French deterrence currently works, starting from its doctrine, followed by the means (weapons and carriers) used to enforce it.
A new (very long) thread 🧵
Images from @800Tonnes (🙏)
This follows yesterday's thread on suggestions on how France could extend part of its deterrence to Europe.
My main source was @BrunoTertrais's book 👇 but of course content here only commits myself.
French ☢️ deterrence only purpose is to defend 🇫🇷 "vital interests". Those are deliberately vague in order to deny a potential adversary the possibility to remain just under the nuclear threshold.
🇫🇷 president E. Macron stated on several occasions that those vital interests...
Dear European friends, times are tough and I know we French people can be a pain to deal with (working on it). But here are some ideas on how to work together to build a new nuclear umbrella over Europe.
A thread 🧶
First, in order to remain realistic, let's be honest and clear. French leadership will never share the decision on engaging 🇫🇷 nuclear weapons. So French deterrence will remain 100% French.
Why is this not an issue ? Because this is already the case for the US ☢️umbrella.
However, the nuclear weapon is just small part of many different systems and means that are needed in order to have a credible deterrence. France has all of them (could write a thread on this later), but could greatly benefit from additional capabilities.
🚀 The Worst-Case Scenario - How Russian engineers envisioned last week SARMAT failure 🇷🇺
Thanks to a document found by the talented @La_souris_DA, we have concrete data on what would happen if a SARMAT heavy ICBM exploded during launch.
Let's dig into it 🧶
The source is an environmental study published in 2023 in order to assess the potential dangers of testing SARMAT at Plesetsk test ground. Many different aspects are studied, from stages drop zones to propellant leaks, including impact on Earth's ozone layer.
This is the same document that allowed us to find out Russia plans to test SARMAT as far as the Southern Pacific Ocean.