Everyone's been sending me the deepfake CFO article. I'm not sure if it's real, so waiting for facts to emerge. But, here's what I'd do if it's accurately reported 🧵 amp.cnn.com/cnn/2024/02/04…
Make sure you follow the four-eyes rule: Use access controls that require two (or more!) person approval for transfers above a risk threshold. Banks like @mercury and @meow make this easy.
Between certain staff (e.g., accountant -> CFO), it may make sense to share a secret passphrase to authenticate each other. If you want to get fancy, share a TOTP seed to reduce the risk further.
PROTIP: Use a generator to make a 16-character alphanum password. Bam, there's your seed.
Invites to the deepfake videocall probably didn't come from the correct addresses: it's still useful to consider mitigating phishing. Great services available from @material_sec, @sublime_sec, and @hoxhunt to pick a few.
Finally, don't give attackers any advantages for stealing valid accounts: require Security Keys for all logins (yes, for everyone). In 2024, it's time.
More: If large transactions are frequent and not out of the ordinary, make a separate process to more strongly authenticate new destinations, likely more rare.
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Here's the most correct recap of what's happening with OpenSea right now.
tl;dr The security of web3 platforms depend entirely on wallets with universally poor security UX, and there's very little the platforms can do about it.
My scooter was stolen last week. Unknown to the thief, I hid two Airtags inside it. I was able to use the Apple Find My network and UWB direction finding to recover the scooter today. Here’s how it all went down:
The theft occurred on Monday night. I went out to dinner and locked it to a grate with motorcycle handcuffs. I find them easier to use than a cable lock, but apparently I forgot to lock one cuff. It was gone after ~2 hours. amazon.com/gp/product/B00…
No fear! The most important part of IR is preparation, and I hid two Airtags inside the scooter: one “decoy” in the wheel well and a second, more subtle, one inside the stem. Covered in black duct tape, they’re hard to see.
MDM is a pain in the ass, and we’ve been looking for a new vendor since Fleetsmith was acquired by Apple (and then disabled 90% of their product). Their agent barely worked, and frequently mishandled security updates.
Fleetsmith had clearly become a burning bridge when they failed, again, to apply 10.15.6 to our machines (one of their few remaining features). We found Kandji and within 3 days, their solutions team helped us plan and execute a one-way migration to their product.
In our last meeting, Kandji provided us a custom package to remove Fleetsmith from all our machines and step-by-step instructions for migrating to theirs. Satisfied with our testing and their help, we began migrating immediately.
We're hired to provide industry-best advice @trailofbits, and that's exactly what we provided to @HegicOptions. How, then, were bugs found in their code mere hours after they deployed it to mainnet? (1/n)
In 3 days earlier this month, we identified 10 critical flaws in @HegicOptions that could harm users. We noted a lack of tests, a lack of documentation, and that the time afforded to review their code was insufficient.
Bottom line: we told them to hold off deploying.
This was the right advice, and we generally expect people listen to us when they're paying for our help.
Instead, Hegic patched the few bugs we found, made no further changes, misrepresented our 3-day code review as an "audit", then immediately deployed.
Most people are now aware that @trailofbits conducted a security review of the Bitcoin Cash client on behalf of @BitcoinSVNode. While we cannot release our report in its entirety yet, I wanted to share a few details of what we found…
First, as far as we are aware, this was the first time a professional services firm reviewed the security of a Bitcoin client. We began with a comprehensive review of the bitcoind attack surface and surveyed previous attempts to fuzz it.
Prior fuzzing efforts appeared ad-hoc, did not share their input sets or report code coverage, and referred to outdated, unworking instructions. We identified surprising gaps in coverage when compared to our attack surface modeling and set about to remedy the situation.
Google sure is good at plagiarizing my work. I released @AlgoVPN, an open-source, self-hosted VPN solution, in 2016. I find it hard to believe @Jigsaw was unaware since I’ve met their engineers more than once. wired.com/story/alphabet…
I’m proud of what we accomplished but taking @AlgoVPN to the next level requires external funding. I have been relentless in trying to obtain it. I started by recording a podcast, then bundled it with my proposals. georgianpartners.com/the-problem-wi…