Thread by @EPoe187

1. I wrote about free will and retributive punishment, defending both against increasingly popular attacks from philosophers and public intellectuals such as Sam Harris and Robert Sapolsky.

aporiamagazine.com/p/in-defense-o…

2. First, conceptual analysis, which can be boring and tedious, but is necessary in a debate as complicated and persistent as free will. There are four basic positions on free will: Libertarianism, hard determinism, hard incompatibilism, compatibilism.

3. Libertarian free will is the most metaphysical, asserting that the determinism is untrue and that the self is a kind of uncaused cause, a source of real novelty in the universe. I find this implausible; in fact, I find it incoherent. Nietzsche wrote of it:

4. Not only is libertarian free will incomprehensible, it's also not even really free will. It's randomness, chaos, spontaneity. We should reject it because it is a metaphysical fantasy, and it does not enhance our understanding of humans or of moral responsibility.

5. But, wait. Don't most people believe in a libertarian form of free will? Thus, if that form of free will is false, should we not eliminate free will? Certainly this is what Sam Harris contends. Immanuel Kant as well--he called compatibilism a wretched subterfuge.

6. A large literature has explored the views of ordinary people ("the folk") and the results are mixed, which of course just provokes more debate. Some people think the folk are libertarians; and some people think they are compatibilists. My view is that they are both.

7. The folk often hold contradictory views about complicated concepts because beliefs are tools, not units in a logically coherent network of ideas. The folk are determinists and indeterminists, theists and materialists, romantics and pessimists, et cetera.

8. So, the important question is *Can we preserve a coherent and meaningful concept of free will?* And I think the answer is yes. Free will is a socially constructed, practical concept that helps to distinguish morally sensitive agents from other agents and entities.

9. This may seem academic, but free will is a crucial idea, one with ramifications for punishment, moral responsibility, and existential purpose. It touches almost all aspects of the social world.

10. Some free-will skeptics, for example, contend that the rejection of free will should lead to a radical reconsideration of the criminal justice system. If nobody is truly responsible, then nobody "deserves" (in some ultimate sense) to be punished.

11. Of these skeptics, Robert Sapolsky is perhaps the most prominent and the most tendentious. His book, Determined, is highly readable but also incredibly superficial. In his view, we should not only eradicate retribution, but blame and praise!

12. In general, when philosophers make up a concept such as "really real" or "ultimate responsibility," the concept is probably wrong or misleading. Responsibility is good enough. We don't need "ultimate" responsibility. And we have responsibility because we are moral agents.

13. At time, Sapolsky becomes positively intoxicated with his view of "nothing but" reductionism and "dictatorial" determinism, asserting that hating another human is as sad as hating natural phenomena such as storms and plagues.

14. My initial reaction when I read this was shock, for there is an obvious difference between humans and storming skies: Humans are morally sensitive and skies are not. If you hate a human, he might change his behavior. A sky will not.

15. Our system of blame, praise, and punishment is not based on metaphysical speculations; it is based on emotions, inclinations, and cultural evolution. It may seem irrational to ultra-reductionists, but those who analyze it sympathetically find an impressive logic.

16. Many philosophers who are skeptical of free will, even those who are somewhat supportive of basic features of our criminal justice system, are also skeptical of retributive punishment, which they view as lacking justification (without free will).

17. But in my view, retribution is a perfectly legitimate desire, one that men and women of good character and intellect have found satisfying in almost every civilization and context. As Gottfried Leibniz wrote:

18. This raises a meta question about philosophy: What is the goal? For some philosophers and intellectuals, the goal is to create a rigorous, logically coherent system, often one that derides the benighted masses for their ignorance. But my view is more conservative.

19. Philosophers should make sense of the wisdom of our embedded everyday practices. Sometimes these deserve criticism. But we should attempt to understand them sympathetically. And we should recognize that the world of humans is one of meaning--not one of abstractions.

20. Scientism is an alluring doctrine. Indeed, I found it seductive for many years. But it is wrong. Science is awesome. It has improved our lives. Increased our knowledge. But is only one tool in the toolkit. We should not confuse scientific abstractions for reality.

21. Free will is not mysterious or metaphysical. It is a practical concept used by ordinary people. Dictatorial determinism is not helpful. The world is full of many causes, from colliding billiard balls to powerful emotions. The blueprint is not the building.

22. Love is not just chemicals; a symphony is not just notes; a cake is not just molecules. Moral agents exist. They make decisions. And they deserve to be punished or praised accordingly.