On Friday, @navalny died (most probably killed) in prison. This is a good time to discuss the prospects of Russian opposition and the future transition of political power, once Putin is gone. This is also a good occasion to debunk some pervasive myths on the mechanics of power🧵
First, getting rid of @navalny was probably a correct decision on behalf of Kremlin. Execution of this murder may have been suboptimal (unprofessional, etc.). But the very idea to eliminate him was reasonable and makes total sense. There is nothing crazy or irrational about it
This remark may sound as cynical or paradoxical. So let me present you another paradox, which is yet to be fully processed by the political theorists. And the paradox is:
Bloody tyrants rule longer
The Russian history may possibly demonstrate this better than any other
Ivan the Terrible's rule was a demographic and socio-economic catastrophe. By the end of his rule, tax documents draw a picture of desolation. Entire regions devastated, farmland grown with thick forest. Regime stands as a rock 💪
50 years reign 👑
Nobody ever ruled longer 😎
If Ivan the Terrible ruled longer than any other Tsar, Stalin ruled longer than any other dictator. 26 years of reign. The longest non hereditary rule in Russian history.
That is absolutely amazing. He did something right
What that could be?
This is a very interesting paradox. The very same rulers dismissed as bloody maniacs, as crazy, paranoid people have actually ruled longer than anyone. So, were they that crazy after all?
Let me introduce you one basic concept necessary for the further discussion
The Kronos Principle
To keep the power you must eliminate competition. Best of all, you must eliminate competitors preventively, before they could ever challenge you. Just like the Good Old Kronos did
Once again, the Kronos Principle doesn't suggest you must eliminate those who already challenge you. That goes without saying. It suggests you must eliminate those who might potentially challenge you in the future. Eliminate even the possibility of a successful competition
When you Kronosmax, you weed out the seeds of a potential competition (and growth). And you must Kronosmax to stay in charge in longer. That is why optimising for the length of rule you necessarily degrade the society/institution you happen to lead
Long rule = Kronosmaxer
If you have been overthrown, you were probably not kicking the ladders away hard enough
And vice versa, if you were kicking them carefully & attentively, you will probably never ever be ousted out
Eliminating the competition is reasonable, rational and makes total sense
So once again, eliminating a threat is not crazy. To the contrary, that means that the ruler is sane, ruthless and willing to do what is necessary to guard his power for as long as possible
The real question is who are these competitors? How to identify and prioritise them
Navalny being kept alive for so long suggests that taking him out was relatively deprioritised. Which means that neither support of the West, nor sympathies of the urban youth counted much in the eyes of Kremlin
You can't do a coup with the urban youth
(or support of the West)
Don't take me wrong, I respect those who protest. I just point out that the people can never win against the army. Like, if I were to make up a stupid idea, I couldn't come up with anything stupider than that
If you don't believe me, consult the recent footages from Levant
That's why Prigozhin could not be kept alive for long. He harnessed a very dangerous energy: the discontent of boots. What was scary about his revolt, is the very wide sympathy, non resistance or even active collaboration by much of the military, including the elite troops
Urban youth is not scary
Western support is not too scary either
The Boots are extremely scary
95% of your concern must be how to prevent any potential or hypothetical threat from the Boots. Because all the other threats are made up
The "Opposition" is toothless and inconsequential. The central political problem of Russia is how to keep the Boots down. It is very important to fully interiorize that the Boots present the only external threat to the regime. For that reason, they have to be kept very, very low
Preventing the Bonabartism of the military has been the central concern of Kremlin through the entire Soviet to Russian era. Again, all the other threats are largely made up. The Rise of the Boots, however, is real. It took extreme effort to prevent it from materializing
Keeping the power requires eliminating the threats, both external or internal. Now what makes one dangerous is not so much an intention as the capacity. For this reason, if I were to name a particular personality I see as in potential danger, that would be Dmitry Medvedev
As a person of above average intelligence, Medvedev sees this and self eliminates himself preventively. That is a smart thing to do. Reputational self damage made him less of a threat -> allowed him to live. I wonder whether this little trick will suffice in the future
The end
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Growing up in Russia in the 1990s, I used to put America on a pedestal. It was not so much a conscious decision, as the admission of an objective fact of reality. It was the country of future, the country thinking about the future, and marching into the future.
And nothing reflected this better than the seething hatred it got from Russia, a country stuck in the past, whose imagination was fully preoccupied with the injuries of yesterday, and the phantasies of terrible revenge, usually in the form of nuclear strike.
Which, of course, projected weakness rather than strength
We will make a huuuuuuge bomb, and drop it onto your heads, and turn you into the radioactive dust, and you will die in agony, and we will be laughing and clapping our hands
Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable