On Friday, @navalny died (most probably killed) in prison. This is a good time to discuss the prospects of Russian opposition and the future transition of political power, once Putin is gone. This is also a good occasion to debunk some pervasive myths on the mechanics of power🧵
First, getting rid of @navalny was probably a correct decision on behalf of Kremlin. Execution of this murder may have been suboptimal (unprofessional, etc.). But the very idea to eliminate him was reasonable and makes total sense. There is nothing crazy or irrational about it
This remark may sound as cynical or paradoxical. So let me present you another paradox, which is yet to be fully processed by the political theorists. And the paradox is:
Bloody tyrants rule longer
The Russian history may possibly demonstrate this better than any other
Ivan the Terrible's rule was a demographic and socio-economic catastrophe. By the end of his rule, tax documents draw a picture of desolation. Entire regions devastated, farmland grown with thick forest. Regime stands as a rock 💪
50 years reign 👑
Nobody ever ruled longer 😎
If Ivan the Terrible ruled longer than any other Tsar, Stalin ruled longer than any other dictator. 26 years of reign. The longest non hereditary rule in Russian history.
That is absolutely amazing. He did something right
What that could be?
This is a very interesting paradox. The very same rulers dismissed as bloody maniacs, as crazy, paranoid people have actually ruled longer than anyone. So, were they that crazy after all?
Let me introduce you one basic concept necessary for the further discussion
The Kronos Principle
To keep the power you must eliminate competition. Best of all, you must eliminate competitors preventively, before they could ever challenge you. Just like the Good Old Kronos did
Once again, the Kronos Principle doesn't suggest you must eliminate those who already challenge you. That goes without saying. It suggests you must eliminate those who might potentially challenge you in the future. Eliminate even the possibility of a successful competition
When you Kronosmax, you weed out the seeds of a potential competition (and growth). And you must Kronosmax to stay in charge in longer. That is why optimising for the length of rule you necessarily degrade the society/institution you happen to lead
Long rule = Kronosmaxer
If you have been overthrown, you were probably not kicking the ladders away hard enough
And vice versa, if you were kicking them carefully & attentively, you will probably never ever be ousted out
Eliminating the competition is reasonable, rational and makes total sense
So once again, eliminating a threat is not crazy. To the contrary, that means that the ruler is sane, ruthless and willing to do what is necessary to guard his power for as long as possible
The real question is who are these competitors? How to identify and prioritise them
Navalny being kept alive for so long suggests that taking him out was relatively deprioritised. Which means that neither support of the West, nor sympathies of the urban youth counted much in the eyes of Kremlin
You can't do a coup with the urban youth
(or support of the West)
Don't take me wrong, I respect those who protest. I just point out that the people can never win against the army. Like, if I were to make up a stupid idea, I couldn't come up with anything stupider than that
If you don't believe me, consult the recent footages from Levant
That's why Prigozhin could not be kept alive for long. He harnessed a very dangerous energy: the discontent of boots. What was scary about his revolt, is the very wide sympathy, non resistance or even active collaboration by much of the military, including the elite troops
Urban youth is not scary
Western support is not too scary either
The Boots are extremely scary
95% of your concern must be how to prevent any potential or hypothetical threat from the Boots. Because all the other threats are made up
The "Opposition" is toothless and inconsequential. The central political problem of Russia is how to keep the Boots down. It is very important to fully interiorize that the Boots present the only external threat to the regime. For that reason, they have to be kept very, very low
Preventing the Bonabartism of the military has been the central concern of Kremlin through the entire Soviet to Russian era. Again, all the other threats are largely made up. The Rise of the Boots, however, is real. It took extreme effort to prevent it from materializing
Keeping the power requires eliminating the threats, both external or internal. Now what makes one dangerous is not so much an intention as the capacity. For this reason, if I were to name a particular personality I see as in potential danger, that would be Dmitry Medvedev
As a person of above average intelligence, Medvedev sees this and self eliminates himself preventively. That is a smart thing to do. Reputational self damage made him less of a threat -> allowed him to live. I wonder whether this little trick will suffice in the future
The end
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In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.
Literacy rates in European Russia, 1897. Obviously, the data is imperfect. Still, it represents one crucial pattern for understanding the late Russian Empire. That is the wide gap in human capital between the core of empire and its Western borderland.
The most literate regions of Empire are its Lutheran provinces, including Finland, Estonia & Latvia
Then goes, roughly speaking, Poland-Lithuania
Russia proper has only two clusters of high literacy: Moscow & St Petersburg. Surrounded by the vast ocean of illiterate peasantry
This map shows how thin was the civilisation of Russia proper comparatively speaking. We tend to imagine old Russia, as the world of nobility, palaces, balls, and duels. And that is not wrong, because this world really existed, and produced some great works of art and literature