On Friday, @navalny died (most probably killed) in prison. This is a good time to discuss the prospects of Russian opposition and the future transition of political power, once Putin is gone. This is also a good occasion to debunk some pervasive myths on the mechanics of power🧵
First, getting rid of @navalny was probably a correct decision on behalf of Kremlin. Execution of this murder may have been suboptimal (unprofessional, etc.). But the very idea to eliminate him was reasonable and makes total sense. There is nothing crazy or irrational about it
This remark may sound as cynical or paradoxical. So let me present you another paradox, which is yet to be fully processed by the political theorists. And the paradox is:
Bloody tyrants rule longer
The Russian history may possibly demonstrate this better than any other
Ivan the Terrible's rule was a demographic and socio-economic catastrophe. By the end of his rule, tax documents draw a picture of desolation. Entire regions devastated, farmland grown with thick forest. Regime stands as a rock 💪
50 years reign 👑
Nobody ever ruled longer 😎
If Ivan the Terrible ruled longer than any other Tsar, Stalin ruled longer than any other dictator. 26 years of reign. The longest non hereditary rule in Russian history.
That is absolutely amazing. He did something right
What that could be?
This is a very interesting paradox. The very same rulers dismissed as bloody maniacs, as crazy, paranoid people have actually ruled longer than anyone. So, were they that crazy after all?
Let me introduce you one basic concept necessary for the further discussion
The Kronos Principle
To keep the power you must eliminate competition. Best of all, you must eliminate competitors preventively, before they could ever challenge you. Just like the Good Old Kronos did
Once again, the Kronos Principle doesn't suggest you must eliminate those who already challenge you. That goes without saying. It suggests you must eliminate those who might potentially challenge you in the future. Eliminate even the possibility of a successful competition
When you Kronosmax, you weed out the seeds of a potential competition (and growth). And you must Kronosmax to stay in charge in longer. That is why optimising for the length of rule you necessarily degrade the society/institution you happen to lead
Long rule = Kronosmaxer
If you have been overthrown, you were probably not kicking the ladders away hard enough
And vice versa, if you were kicking them carefully & attentively, you will probably never ever be ousted out
Eliminating the competition is reasonable, rational and makes total sense
So once again, eliminating a threat is not crazy. To the contrary, that means that the ruler is sane, ruthless and willing to do what is necessary to guard his power for as long as possible
The real question is who are these competitors? How to identify and prioritise them
Navalny being kept alive for so long suggests that taking him out was relatively deprioritised. Which means that neither support of the West, nor sympathies of the urban youth counted much in the eyes of Kremlin
You can't do a coup with the urban youth
(or support of the West)
Don't take me wrong, I respect those who protest. I just point out that the people can never win against the army. Like, if I were to make up a stupid idea, I couldn't come up with anything stupider than that
If you don't believe me, consult the recent footages from Levant
That's why Prigozhin could not be kept alive for long. He harnessed a very dangerous energy: the discontent of boots. What was scary about his revolt, is the very wide sympathy, non resistance or even active collaboration by much of the military, including the elite troops
Urban youth is not scary
Western support is not too scary either
The Boots are extremely scary
95% of your concern must be how to prevent any potential or hypothetical threat from the Boots. Because all the other threats are made up
The "Opposition" is toothless and inconsequential. The central political problem of Russia is how to keep the Boots down. It is very important to fully interiorize that the Boots present the only external threat to the regime. For that reason, they have to be kept very, very low
Preventing the Bonabartism of the military has been the central concern of Kremlin through the entire Soviet to Russian era. Again, all the other threats are largely made up. The Rise of the Boots, however, is real. It took extreme effort to prevent it from materializing
Keeping the power requires eliminating the threats, both external or internal. Now what makes one dangerous is not so much an intention as the capacity. For this reason, if I were to name a particular personality I see as in potential danger, that would be Dmitry Medvedev
As a person of above average intelligence, Medvedev sees this and self eliminates himself preventively. That is a smart thing to do. Reputational self damage made him less of a threat -> allowed him to live. I wonder whether this little trick will suffice in the future
The end
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The primary weakness of this argument is that being true, historically speaking, it is just false in the context of American politics where the “communism” label has been so over-used (and misapplied) that it lost all of its former power:
“We want X”
“No, that is communism”
“We want communism”
Basically, when you use a label like “communism” as a deus ex machina winning you every argument, you simultaneously re-define its meaning. And when you use it to beat off every popular socio economic demand (e.g. universal healthcare), you re-define communism as a synthesis of all the popular socio economic demands
Historical communism = forced industrial development in a poor, predominantly agrarian country, funded through expropriation of the peasantry
(With the most disastrous economic and humanitarian consequences)
Many are trying to explain his success with some accidental factors such as his “personal charisma”, Cuomo's weakness etc
Still, I think there may be some fundamental factors here. A longue durée shift, and a very profound one
1. Public outrage does not work anymore
If you look at Zohran, he is calm, constructive, and rarely raises his voice. I think one thing that Mamdani - but almost no one else in the American political space is getting - is that the public is getting tired of the outrage
Outrage, anger, righteous indignation have all been the primary drivers of American politics for quite a while
For a while, this tactics worked
Indeed, when everyone around is polite, and soft (and insincere), freaking out was a smart thing to do. It could help you get noticed
People don’t really understand causal links. We pretend we do (“X results in Y”). But we actually don’t. Most explanations (= descriptions of causal structures) are fake.
There may be no connection between X and Y at all. The cause is just misattributed.
Or, perhaps, X does indeed result in Y. but only under a certain (and unknown!) set of conditions that remains totally and utterly opaque to us. So, X->Y is only a part of the equation
And so on
I like to think of a hypothetical Stone Age farmer who started farming, and it worked amazingly, and his entire community adopted his lifestyle, and many generations followed it and prospered and multiplied, until all suddenly wiped out in a new ice age
1. Normative Islamophobia that used to define the public discourse being the most acceptable form of racial & ethnic bigotry in the West, is receding. It is not so much dying as rather - failing to replicate. It is not that the old people change their views as that the young do not absorb their prejudice any longer.
In fact, I incline to think it has been failing to replicate for a while, it is just that we have not been paying attention
Again, the change of vibe does not happen at once. The Muslim scare may still find (some) audience among the more rigid elderly, who are not going to change their views. But for the youth, it is starting to sound as archaic as the Catholic scare of know nothings
Out of date
2. What is particularly interesting regarding Mamdani's victory, is his support base. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that its core is comprised of the young (and predominantly white) middle classes, with a nearly equal representation of men and women
What does Musk vs Trump affair teach us about the general patterns of human history? Well, first of all it shows that the ancient historians were right. They grasped something about nature of politics that our contemporaries simply can’t.
Let me give you an example. The Arab conquest of Spain
According to a popular medieval/early modern interpretation, its primary cause was the lust of Visigoth king Roderic. Aroused by the beautiful daughter of his vassal and ally, count Julian, he took advantage of her
Disgruntled, humiliated Julian allied himself with the Arabs and opens them the gates of Spain.
Entire kingdom lost, all because the head of state caused a personal injury to someone important.
One thing you need to understand about wars is that very few engage into the long, protracted warfare on purpose. Almost every war of attrition was planned and designed as a short victorious blitzkrieg
And then everything went wrong
Consider the Russian war in Ukraine. It was not planned as a war. It was not thought of as a war. It was planned as a (swift!) regime change allowing to score a few points in the Russian domestic politics. And then everything went wrong
It would not be an exaggeration to say that planning a short victorious war optimised for the purposes of domestic politics is how you *usually* end up in a deadlock. That is the most common scenario of how it happens, practically speaking