On Friday, @navalny died (most probably killed) in prison. This is a good time to discuss the prospects of Russian opposition and the future transition of political power, once Putin is gone. This is also a good occasion to debunk some pervasive myths on the mechanics of power🧵
First, getting rid of @navalny was probably a correct decision on behalf of Kremlin. Execution of this murder may have been suboptimal (unprofessional, etc.). But the very idea to eliminate him was reasonable and makes total sense. There is nothing crazy or irrational about it
This remark may sound as cynical or paradoxical. So let me present you another paradox, which is yet to be fully processed by the political theorists. And the paradox is:
Bloody tyrants rule longer
The Russian history may possibly demonstrate this better than any other
Ivan the Terrible's rule was a demographic and socio-economic catastrophe. By the end of his rule, tax documents draw a picture of desolation. Entire regions devastated, farmland grown with thick forest. Regime stands as a rock 💪
50 years reign 👑
Nobody ever ruled longer 😎
If Ivan the Terrible ruled longer than any other Tsar, Stalin ruled longer than any other dictator. 26 years of reign. The longest non hereditary rule in Russian history.
That is absolutely amazing. He did something right
What that could be?
This is a very interesting paradox. The very same rulers dismissed as bloody maniacs, as crazy, paranoid people have actually ruled longer than anyone. So, were they that crazy after all?
Let me introduce you one basic concept necessary for the further discussion
The Kronos Principle
To keep the power you must eliminate competition. Best of all, you must eliminate competitors preventively, before they could ever challenge you. Just like the Good Old Kronos did
Once again, the Kronos Principle doesn't suggest you must eliminate those who already challenge you. That goes without saying. It suggests you must eliminate those who might potentially challenge you in the future. Eliminate even the possibility of a successful competition
When you Kronosmax, you weed out the seeds of a potential competition (and growth). And you must Kronosmax to stay in charge in longer. That is why optimising for the length of rule you necessarily degrade the society/institution you happen to lead
Long rule = Kronosmaxer
If you have been overthrown, you were probably not kicking the ladders away hard enough
And vice versa, if you were kicking them carefully & attentively, you will probably never ever be ousted out
Eliminating the competition is reasonable, rational and makes total sense
So once again, eliminating a threat is not crazy. To the contrary, that means that the ruler is sane, ruthless and willing to do what is necessary to guard his power for as long as possible
The real question is who are these competitors? How to identify and prioritise them
Navalny being kept alive for so long suggests that taking him out was relatively deprioritised. Which means that neither support of the West, nor sympathies of the urban youth counted much in the eyes of Kremlin
You can't do a coup with the urban youth
(or support of the West)
Don't take me wrong, I respect those who protest. I just point out that the people can never win against the army. Like, if I were to make up a stupid idea, I couldn't come up with anything stupider than that
If you don't believe me, consult the recent footages from Levant
That's why Prigozhin could not be kept alive for long. He harnessed a very dangerous energy: the discontent of boots. What was scary about his revolt, is the very wide sympathy, non resistance or even active collaboration by much of the military, including the elite troops
Urban youth is not scary
Western support is not too scary either
The Boots are extremely scary
95% of your concern must be how to prevent any potential or hypothetical threat from the Boots. Because all the other threats are made up
The "Opposition" is toothless and inconsequential. The central political problem of Russia is how to keep the Boots down. It is very important to fully interiorize that the Boots present the only external threat to the regime. For that reason, they have to be kept very, very low
Preventing the Bonabartism of the military has been the central concern of Kremlin through the entire Soviet to Russian era. Again, all the other threats are largely made up. The Rise of the Boots, however, is real. It took extreme effort to prevent it from materializing
Keeping the power requires eliminating the threats, both external or internal. Now what makes one dangerous is not so much an intention as the capacity. For this reason, if I were to name a particular personality I see as in potential danger, that would be Dmitry Medvedev
As a person of above average intelligence, Medvedev sees this and self eliminates himself preventively. That is a smart thing to do. Reputational self damage made him less of a threat -> allowed him to live. I wonder whether this little trick will suffice in the future
The end
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If you want to imagine Russia, imagine a depressive, depopulating town. Now on the outskirts of a town, there is an outrageously over-equipped, overfunded strategic enterprise that has literally everything money can buy in the world. It feels like a spaceship from another planet
Strategic industry is extremely generously equipped. Western companies look scoundrels in comparison. That’s why I am so sceptical about the whole “corruption” narrative. Not that it’s wrong. It’s just that it is the perspective of a little, envious bitch.
What needs to be funded, will be funded. It will actually be overfunded and most literally drowned in money. Obviously, overfunding the strategic sector comes at the cost of underfunding almost everything else (like urban infrastructure). That’s why the town looks so grim.
We have successfully documented the entire Russian missiles industry, mapping 28 of its key enterprises. Read our first OSINT sample focusing on the Votkinsk Plant, a major producer of intercontinental ballistic missiles. How does it make weaponry?
The strategic missiles industry appears to be highly secretive and impenetrable to the observers. And yet, it is perfectly OSINTable, based on the publicly available sources. This investigation sample illustrates our approach and methodology (31 p.)
Our first and invaluable source is the state propaganda, such as the federal and regional TV channels, corporate media, social media and so on. It provides abundant visual evidence, particularly on the hardware used in the production of weaponry.
In August 1999, President Yeltsin appointed his FSB Chief Putin as the new Prime Minister. Same day, he named him as the official successor. Yet, there was a problem. To become a president, Putin had to go through elections which he could not win.
He was completely obscure.
Today, Putin is the top rank global celebrity. But in August 1999, nobody knew him. He was just an obscure official of Yeltsin's administration, made a PM by the arbitrary will of the sovereign. This noname clerk had like 2-3% of popular support
Soon, he was to face elections
By the time of Putin's appointment, Russia already had its most favoured candidate. It was Primakov. A former Yeltsin's Prime Minister who broke with Yeltsin to contest for power. The most popular politician in Russia with massive support both in masses and in the establishment.
In Russia, the supreme power has never ever changed as a result of elections. That simply never happened in history. Now that is because Russia is a (non hereditary) monarchy. Consequently, it doesn't have any elections. It has only acclamations of a sitting ruler
Obviously, there has been no elections of Putin in any meaningful sense. There have been only acclamations. And that is normal. His predecessor was successfully acclaimed with an approval rate of about 6%. Once you got the power, you will get your acclamation one way or another
Contrary to the popular opinion, Russia doesn't have any acclamation ("election") problem. It has a transition of power problem. Like Putin can get acclaimed again, and again, and again. But sooner or later, he dies. What next?
My team has documented the entire Russian missile manufacturing base. That is 28 key ballistic, cruise, hypersonic and air defence missile producing plants associated with four corporations of Roscosmos, Almaz-Antey, Tactical Missiles and Rostec
The link is in the first comment
Our report How Does Russia Make Missiles? is already available for download
By the next weekend, we will be publishing the first OSINT sample, illustrating our methodology & approach. The rest of our materials will be made available laterrhodus.com
Key takeaways:
1. Missile production is mostly about machining 2. You cannot produce components of tight precision and convoluted geometry otherwise 3. Soviet missiles industry performed most of its machining manually
That was extremely laborious and skill-intensive process
No one gets famous by accident. If Alexey @Navalny rose as the unalternative leader of Russian opposition, recognised as such both in Moscow and in DC, this indicates he had something that others lacked. Today we will discuss what it was and why it did not suffice 🧵
Let's start with the public image. What was so special about the (mature) @navalny is that his public image represented normality. And by normality I mean first and foremost the American, Hollywood normality
Look at this photo. He represents himself as American politicians do
For an American politician, it is very important to present himself as a good family man (or woman). Exceptions do only corroborate the rule. Notice how McCain defends @BarackObama