1/9 Good piece by Soumaya Keynes on what trade may look like under a Trump administration (and probably under another Biden administration). She mentions the 10% tariff that Robert Lighthizer has proposed, pointing out that Lighthizer "has...
2/9 argued that America’s problem is not necessarily bilateral trade deficits (absent unfair practices), nor even a trade deficit in any single year. Rather, a broader import tax is supposed to tackle America’s pattern of consistent trade deficits, year after year."
3/9 Lighthizer is right. The problem of trade imbalances in general is separate from those of industry-specific protection, and will only be resolved through intervention. I discuss why in a piece that will be published later today on the Carnegie site.
4/9 Keynes mentions in her article an estimate by Capital Economics that a 10% tariff "could lift inflation to between 3 and 4 per cent by the end of 2025."
I haven't read their report, but this simply isn't true.
5/9 Surplus economies produce far more than deficit economies relative to demand, and for what should be obvious reasons (they run surpluses because production is subsidized at the expense of consumption). This is why the major surplus economies have lower inflation rates...
6/9 than advanced economies that run persistent deficits. If the US implements similar policies to boost production relative to consumption (which is what tariffs do), it is likely to be disinflationary, just as it is in surplus countries.
7/9 It is hard to see why anyone would think trade intervention is inflationary when the countries that intervene most heavily almost all have much lower inflation than those that intervene least, in some cases even slipping into deflation.
8/9 The article includes this very important graph, which explains, among other things, why Beijing was shocked by the foreign reaction to policies it has implemented for years.
9/9 China's trade surpluses didn't use to matter too much to the world, but as its share of global GDP rose, so did the burden of its policies to its trade partners. This would have been even clearer if the graph showed surpluses as a share of the rest of the world's GDP.
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2/5 That is exactly how it should be. Tariffs are effectively a tax on consumption and a subsidy to production (of tariffed goods). They work by transferring income from households (net importers) to producers of tradable goods.
3/5 The idea that Trump's tariffs would be paid for by foreigners was always nonsense. If they were, as I have often pointed out, they would have little to no impact on trade flows or on American deindustrialization.
1/7 My latest piece was written for friends who are EU policymakers or advisors. In it I argue that there is a difference between an inefficient manufacturing sector and a globally uncompetitive manufacturing sector. We shouldn't conflate the two. engelsbergideas.com/notebook/europ…
2/7 A country's manufacturing sector is not globally uncompetitive because it is inefficient, but rather because its wages are higher relative to productivity than those of its trade partners.
Efficiency is about how effectively an economy uses resources to create value.
3/7 Global competitiveness, by contrast, depends largely on how income is distributed within an economy.
This leaves the EU with two options if it wants to prevent domestic deindustrialization.
1/4 Very interesting and timely paper. The authors find that "industrial policies lead to trade surpluses if the government pursues an unbalanced policy mix, such that domestic demand does not rise as much as supply. These surpluses are absorbed by the rest of the world, which...
2/4 in response runs trade deficits. Absent policy interventions, trade deficits reduce the competitiveness of the domestic tradable sector, stifling innovation and productivity growth. Innovation policies can help the rest of the world to mitigate these negative spillovers."
3/4 In other words countries whose trade surpluses are caused by manufacturing subsidies (paid for by households) force their trade partners to absorb negative spillovers in the form of trade deficits that undermine their manufacturing competitiveness. bw.bse.eu/wp-content/upl…
1/6 According to Greg Ip, in the US economy today, "rewards are going disproportionately toward capital instead of labor. Profits have soared since the pandemic. The result: Capital is triumphant, while the average worker ekes out marginal gains." wsj.com/economy/jobs/c…
2/6 And as Marriner Eccles, FDR's Fed chairman, explained in the 1930s, this creates a dangerous illusion. The extent of business profits depends almost wholly on the purchasing power of ordinary people, which in turn depends on wages.
3/6 In a rapidly-growing developing economy, with huge unmet investment needs, it may be possible (even necessary) for profits to rise faster than wages because the resulting rise in saving can be deployed to productive investment.
1/5 Reuters: "The EU should consider either an unprecedented 30% across-the-board tariff on Chinese goods or a 30% depreciation of the euro against the renminbi to counter a flood of cheap imports, a French government strategy report said on Monday." reuters.com/world/china/fr…
2/5 I think it's only a question of time before the EU will intervene in its external account to protect its manufacturing sector, just as China has done for decades and the US is increasingly trying to do. It can implement all the reforms that have been proposed to improve...
3/5 the efficiency of its manufacturing, but while these reforms may indeed do just that, they won't improve Europe's competitive position.
This may sound counterintuitive at first, but I have a piece coming out soon in Engelsberg Ideas explaining why.
1/11
SCMP: "China’s potential growth rate could fall to about 2.5 per cent in the coming years unless action is taken, prominent Chinese economist Zhou Tianyong has warned." sc.mp/itwrt?utm_sour…
2/11
“Without a strong turnaround in total factor productivity and a meaningful expansion in household consumption, it will be difficult for China’s economic growth to reach 4 per cent or higher,” he added.
3/11
A 2-3% growth rate is becoming an increasingly popular reference growth rate for Chinese analysts. I'd argue that over the past several years, 2-3% has actually been the upper limit of growth once we strip out the "positive" impact of not recognizing bad investment.