1/9 Good piece by Soumaya Keynes on what trade may look like under a Trump administration (and probably under another Biden administration). She mentions the 10% tariff that Robert Lighthizer has proposed, pointing out that Lighthizer "has...
2/9 argued that America’s problem is not necessarily bilateral trade deficits (absent unfair practices), nor even a trade deficit in any single year. Rather, a broader import tax is supposed to tackle America’s pattern of consistent trade deficits, year after year."
3/9 Lighthizer is right. The problem of trade imbalances in general is separate from those of industry-specific protection, and will only be resolved through intervention. I discuss why in a piece that will be published later today on the Carnegie site.
4/9 Keynes mentions in her article an estimate by Capital Economics that a 10% tariff "could lift inflation to between 3 and 4 per cent by the end of 2025."
I haven't read their report, but this simply isn't true.
5/9 Surplus economies produce far more than deficit economies relative to demand, and for what should be obvious reasons (they run surpluses because production is subsidized at the expense of consumption). This is why the major surplus economies have lower inflation rates...
6/9 than advanced economies that run persistent deficits. If the US implements similar policies to boost production relative to consumption (which is what tariffs do), it is likely to be disinflationary, just as it is in surplus countries.
7/9 It is hard to see why anyone would think trade intervention is inflationary when the countries that intervene most heavily almost all have much lower inflation than those that intervene least, in some cases even slipping into deflation.
8/9 The article includes this very important graph, which explains, among other things, why Beijing was shocked by the foreign reaction to policies it has implemented for years.
9/9 China's trade surpluses didn't use to matter too much to the world, but as its share of global GDP rose, so did the burden of its policies to its trade partners. This would have been even clearer if the graph showed surpluses as a share of the rest of the world's GDP.
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1/9 Interesting SCMP article: "China’s top market regulator is intensifying its crackdown on debt-laden “zombie companies” – rolling out a pilot programme in seven economic hubs to facilitate the forced exit of unprofitable firms." sc.mp/q2aq0?utm_sour…
2/9 Developing a robust bankruptcy framework in China is among the most important steps Beijing can take to reduce the role of non-productive investment in driving the economy. Hard budget constraints are what force economic activity to remain economic value creating.
3/9 But it's not so easy to do this. The fact that China has far more "zombie" companies – highly inefficient businesses that are kept alive only by surging debt – than any other country is not an accident or an oversight.
1/8 Brendan Greeley on the development of the eurodollar. If Beijing truly wants CNY to be more widely used in international finance, the eurodollar market provides one potentially useful model to show how that might happen. ft.com/content/be3459…
2/8 From the 1960s through the early 1980s, the eurodollar was a separate offshore dollar market and not simply an extension of the onshore USD markets. it was a way for dollars to circulate outside US regulation and US control. Its separation was created by...
3/8 a series of frictional costs between the onshore market and the offshore needs of foreigners, including US capital controls, US bank regulation, and the refusal of Soviet bloc nations to hold their badly-needed dollars in onshore US banks.
1/5 It's true that China was able to withstand the effects of the Iran war better than many other countries because it had stockpiled commodities. But it is a little silly, perhaps even a little orientalist, to say that it did so because of strategic thinking. bloomberg.com/news/features/…
2/5 We forget that Japan also stockpiled massive amounts of commodities in the late 1980s, and given the subsequent fall in commodity prices (driven in part by ja[an's own economic slowdown), this later turned out to be an additonal drag on economic performance.
3/5 In both cases, the country was running enormous trade surpluses that had to be recycled, and were causing increasing concern abroad. In both cases, perhaps in order to disguise reserve accumulation, part of the reserve accumulation occurred through state banks.
1/6 Good Steven Barnett piece. He points out that "targeting growth rates inconsistent with productivity trends leads to distortive policies", and argues instead for a "dramatic, permanent payroll tax cut" to boost consumption. ft.com/content/d078c7…
2/6 This would certainly work, as would any other policy that increases the disposable income of average Chinese households relative to GDP. China's extraordinarily low consumption share of GDP is mainly a consequence of the low household income share.
3/6 Notice however that unless the cut in payroll taxes were matched by higher taxes on households or businesses, or by cuts in spending to either sector, a reduction in payroll taxes would have to be balanced dollar for dollar by more government debt.
1/4 Several people have asked for more information about the Maekawa Commission report and its reception. There is a wide variety of sources, but I am attaching three memoranda on the topic written by the CIA in 1986. I find these especially helpful in illustrating perceptions at the time.
2/4 From the summary of the April 9 memo: "A United States request that Japan alter its macroeconomic structure to reduce its propensity to run ever larger trade surpluses will probably bring a claim from Japanese officials that the country has already embarked on a process of structural change. Despite the nod this week's Maekawa Commission report gives to structural adjustment, Tokyo would probably resist major adjustments in savings, consumption, and investment incentives that did not also serve its industrial policy goals. Only the prospect of closed foreign markets or deep recession at home, neither of which Tokyo believes likely in the near term, would change this view." cia.gov/readingroom/do…
3/4 From the October 20 memo: "The impact on Japan's international competitiveness and on workers' spending patterns will depend in large part on whether the reduced hours are accompanied by the same or lower earnings. If wages are cut back along with hours, production costs will not necessarily rise, and Japanese workers might not increase their spending." cia.gov/readingroom/do…
1/9 The Economist discusses the determination of South Korea's president, Lee Jae Myung, to expand RoK industrial policy aggressively. "His plan involves diverting capital from the housing market to... economist.com/finance-and-ec…
2/9 industry, especially chipmakers instrumental to the global artificial-intelligence boom, and supplementing this with government cash."
The Economist describes these industrial policies as "trade-distorting intervention", and wonders how successful they will be.
3/9 They certainly do affect trade. Diverting lending from the housing sector to targeted high-tech manufacturing sectors is likely to reduce the consumption share of total production while diverting production from services and the property sector to manufacturing.