1/9 Good piece by Soumaya Keynes on what trade may look like under a Trump administration (and probably under another Biden administration). She mentions the 10% tariff that Robert Lighthizer has proposed, pointing out that Lighthizer "has...
2/9 argued that America’s problem is not necessarily bilateral trade deficits (absent unfair practices), nor even a trade deficit in any single year. Rather, a broader import tax is supposed to tackle America’s pattern of consistent trade deficits, year after year."
3/9 Lighthizer is right. The problem of trade imbalances in general is separate from those of industry-specific protection, and will only be resolved through intervention. I discuss why in a piece that will be published later today on the Carnegie site.
4/9 Keynes mentions in her article an estimate by Capital Economics that a 10% tariff "could lift inflation to between 3 and 4 per cent by the end of 2025."
I haven't read their report, but this simply isn't true.
5/9 Surplus economies produce far more than deficit economies relative to demand, and for what should be obvious reasons (they run surpluses because production is subsidized at the expense of consumption). This is why the major surplus economies have lower inflation rates...
6/9 than advanced economies that run persistent deficits. If the US implements similar policies to boost production relative to consumption (which is what tariffs do), it is likely to be disinflationary, just as it is in surplus countries.
7/9 It is hard to see why anyone would think trade intervention is inflationary when the countries that intervene most heavily almost all have much lower inflation than those that intervene least, in some cases even slipping into deflation.
8/9 The article includes this very important graph, which explains, among other things, why Beijing was shocked by the foreign reaction to policies it has implemented for years.
9/9 China's trade surpluses didn't use to matter too much to the world, but as its share of global GDP rose, so did the burden of its policies to its trade partners. This would have been even clearer if the graph showed surpluses as a share of the rest of the world's GDP.
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1/16
While Bloomberg is right to say that "a less hegemonic dollar would [adversely] affect America’s geopolitical prowess," it is wrong to assume that it would also adversely affect the US economy, or that it would raise US interest rates. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/16
There is no evidence at all that a country's economy must benefit from the wide use of its currency. To the extent the global use of a currency primarily reflects the extent to which other countries want to acquire local assets in exchange, its only obvious economic impact...
3/16
is that countries like the US (and the UK and Canada), whose currencies play a far larger global role than justified by the size of their economies, must run trade deficits large enough to balance net capital inflows, i.e. to accommodate the trade surpluses of other countries.
1/11
Caixin: "A wave of minimum-wage increases is sweeping across China, with major economic hubs like Beijing and regions such as Hunan province announcing fresh hikes as part of a national push to lift incomes for the country’s lowest-paid workers." caixinglobal.com/2025-08-28/chi…
2/11
This is certainly good news. If raising minimum wages is done in a meaningful way, it will easily be the most effective of all the various ways in which Beijing has tried—without much success so far—to raise the household share of GDP and, with it, the consumption share.
3/11
It will also be an important test of the extent to which China can rebalance. China's low consumption share was largely driven by low wage growth relative to productivity growth in the 1990s and 2000s. This also drove the manufacturing sector's rising global competitiveness.
1/15
This interesting essay by Oliver Kim on Chinese underconsumption was set off by a recent C40 Policy brief that argues, in the words of its title, that "China's consumption is not nearly as low as it appears."
2/15
The C40 essay illustrates some of the confusion that surrounds the issue of Chinese underconsumption. It argues that the Chinese don't underconsume because when corrected for prices or for income, Chinese consumption is more or less "normal". pekingnology.com/p/chinas-consu…
3/15
This misses the point. What matters in the macro context is not the absolute level of consumption but rather the gap between consumption and production. This gap must be balanced either via the trade account of via investment (or both).
1/9 FT: "investors worldwide were already nervous about owning too many US dollar investments. This news only energised a growing conviction by them to seek other places to put their money, including the emerging markets." ft.com/content/85e589…
2/9 I am not sure this is actually happening—it's not what the BoP data suggest—but if it were, it would be a very good thing. Capital should not flow from fast-growing, capital-poor economies to slower-growing capital-rich economies. It should flow in the opposite direction.
3/9 The fact that it isn't suggests that international capital flows do not consist mainly of investment flowing from where it is less needed to where it is more needed, as the proponents of unfettered capital flows claim.
1/15
Very good Bloomberg piece on Beijing’s recent push to curb overcapacity through an “anti-involution” campaign. It is important to remember in this context that while excess capacity has been... bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/15
a problem in China for at least 10-15 years, it's latest manifestation was a direct consequence of the collapse of a property bubble which was itself set off by policies Beijing implemented in order to protect the economy from an earlier case of weak demand and deflation.
3/15
When investment in the property sector dropped sharply after 2021-22, what "normally" should have happened is that the sharp resulting decline in Chinese investment growth should have led to a sharp decline in GDP growth.
1/7 According to Caixin, "China’s rental housing market is facing an unusual squeeze this summer: listings are soaring while rents keep falling, underscoring a supply glut that landlords are struggling to absorb." caixinglobal.com/2025-08-22/chi…
2/7 This is why I've often argued that one of the most common proposals to shore up property prices—getting local governments to buy up empty apartments and funding these purchases offering out cheap rentals—would not help stabilize property prices.
3/7 The problem is that with rental yields in China already so low (below 2% on average), it only made sense to buy an apartment, as opposed to renting one, if you were certain that property prices would rise.