1/9 Good piece by Soumaya Keynes on what trade may look like under a Trump administration (and probably under another Biden administration). She mentions the 10% tariff that Robert Lighthizer has proposed, pointing out that Lighthizer "has...
2/9 argued that America’s problem is not necessarily bilateral trade deficits (absent unfair practices), nor even a trade deficit in any single year. Rather, a broader import tax is supposed to tackle America’s pattern of consistent trade deficits, year after year."
3/9 Lighthizer is right. The problem of trade imbalances in general is separate from those of industry-specific protection, and will only be resolved through intervention. I discuss why in a piece that will be published later today on the Carnegie site.
4/9 Keynes mentions in her article an estimate by Capital Economics that a 10% tariff "could lift inflation to between 3 and 4 per cent by the end of 2025."
I haven't read their report, but this simply isn't true.
5/9 Surplus economies produce far more than deficit economies relative to demand, and for what should be obvious reasons (they run surpluses because production is subsidized at the expense of consumption). This is why the major surplus economies have lower inflation rates...
6/9 than advanced economies that run persistent deficits. If the US implements similar policies to boost production relative to consumption (which is what tariffs do), it is likely to be disinflationary, just as it is in surplus countries.
7/9 It is hard to see why anyone would think trade intervention is inflationary when the countries that intervene most heavily almost all have much lower inflation than those that intervene least, in some cases even slipping into deflation.
8/9 The article includes this very important graph, which explains, among other things, why Beijing was shocked by the foreign reaction to policies it has implemented for years.
9/9 China's trade surpluses didn't use to matter too much to the world, but as its share of global GDP rose, so did the burden of its policies to its trade partners. This would have been even clearer if the graph showed surpluses as a share of the rest of the world's GDP.
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1/4 Good article on how US tariffs are complicating the relationship between China and the EU. Some analysts argue that US tariffs will force China and the EU closer together as each diverts its exports from the US to the other.
2/4 But that assumes that either the EU is willing to replace the US as consumer of last resort for excess Chinese manufacturing capacity, or that China will play that role for the EU. The former will be extremely painful for the EU, while the latter is all but impossible.
3/4 The point is that what had seemed like a stable global trading regime was in fact based on an unsustainable dependence of the rest of the world on the willingness of the US (along with the UK and Canada) to exchange ownership of domestic assets for large trade deficits.
1/9 Citibank thinks that "the 54% US tariffs on China’s goods announced since the start of Trump’s second presidential term may drag the country’s gross domestic product growth down by 2.4 percentage points in 2025."
via @economicsbloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/9 I don't think this is the right way to think about it. The surge in China's trade surplus contributed 1.5 percentage points (ppt) to China's GDP growth in 2024. This is an extraordinarily high contribution, and there is almost no way it will be...
3/9 achieved again in 2025, but because I don't think Trump's will have much as much of an impact on reducing the US trade deficit this year as many think, the chances are that China's trade surplus will be as big this year as it was last year, or not much smaller.
1/14
It is hard to see much systemic thinking in the new round of tariffs, and because trade can only be resolved on a systemic basis, and not on a bilateral basis, this means that they are unlikely to be very helpful.
2/14
Unfortunately it is also very hard to discuss tariffs in a non-hysterical way. They are neither the panacea that the Trump administration supposes they are, nor are they the instrument of Satan, as most American economists truly believe them to be.
3/14
They are simply one of many industrial policy tools designed to tax consumption and subsidize production, and as such can be expansionary under certain circumstances and contractionary under others. In fact other policies can be much more effective.
1/12
Yicai: "China will further strengthen the role of domestic consumption in driving economic growth this year to offset the impact of weaker external demand caused by higher tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, according to... yicaiglobal.com/news/china-to-…
2/12
Shen Kaiyan, of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences."
"At the same time, we must recognize that consumption stems from effective demand that is backed by purchasing power," Shen said, adding that in the long run, increasing household income is essential.
3/12
Although I don't think China's trade surplus will contract this year because I don't think the Trump administration has yet figured out how to reduce the US trade deficit, there are literally only three ways China can respond to an external contraction in its trade surplus.
1/10
Paul Krugman is right to say that foreign central bank purchases of US bonds are unlikely to be big enough to drive US trade imbalances, but then he sort of misses the main point, which is that the US economy must... open.substack.com/pub/paulkrugma…
2/10
adjust to net inflows whether or not these inflows are driven by central banks or by other entities. What matters is the extent to which countries that need to acquire foreign assets to balance their surpluses acquire these assets in the US.
3/10
Whether trade surpluses show up mainly in the form of rising central bank reserves, as was the case with China two decades ago, or in the form of rising foreign asset accumulation outside the central bank, as has been the case with China since 2017, makes little difference.
1/8 Reuters: "During Sunday's meeting, the countries' trade ministers agreed to speed up talks on a South Korea-Japan-China free trade agreement deal to promote "regional and global trade", according to a statement released after the meeting." reuters.com/world/china-ja…
2/8 This sounds good on paper, but China and South Korea both depend on trade surpluses to resolve their weak domestic demand, and while Japan has been running small deficits recently, it is unlikely to want them to surge by enough to help resolve the net imbalances.
3/8 In the growing global trade conflict, countries that rely on large manufacturing surpluses to resolve their domestic demand weaknesses are not in very strong bargaining positions. Their very large and very competitive manufacturing sectors are...