1/9 Good piece by Soumaya Keynes on what trade may look like under a Trump administration (and probably under another Biden administration). She mentions the 10% tariff that Robert Lighthizer has proposed, pointing out that Lighthizer "has...
2/9 argued that America’s problem is not necessarily bilateral trade deficits (absent unfair practices), nor even a trade deficit in any single year. Rather, a broader import tax is supposed to tackle America’s pattern of consistent trade deficits, year after year."
3/9 Lighthizer is right. The problem of trade imbalances in general is separate from those of industry-specific protection, and will only be resolved through intervention. I discuss why in a piece that will be published later today on the Carnegie site.
4/9 Keynes mentions in her article an estimate by Capital Economics that a 10% tariff "could lift inflation to between 3 and 4 per cent by the end of 2025."
I haven't read their report, but this simply isn't true.
5/9 Surplus economies produce far more than deficit economies relative to demand, and for what should be obvious reasons (they run surpluses because production is subsidized at the expense of consumption). This is why the major surplus economies have lower inflation rates...
6/9 than advanced economies that run persistent deficits. If the US implements similar policies to boost production relative to consumption (which is what tariffs do), it is likely to be disinflationary, just as it is in surplus countries.
7/9 It is hard to see why anyone would think trade intervention is inflationary when the countries that intervene most heavily almost all have much lower inflation than those that intervene least, in some cases even slipping into deflation.
8/9 The article includes this very important graph, which explains, among other things, why Beijing was shocked by the foreign reaction to policies it has implemented for years.
9/9 China's trade surpluses didn't use to matter too much to the world, but as its share of global GDP rose, so did the burden of its policies to its trade partners. This would have been even clearer if the graph showed surpluses as a share of the rest of the world's GDP.
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1/8 In a piece for Caixin, Wu Ge, chief economist at Changjiang Securities, writes: "The economic fallout from the real estate slump has been masked in part by strong overseas demand for Chinese goods."
2/8 "If foreign demand takes a turn for the worse," he continues, "it will become clear just how important real estate is to stabilizing China’s economy."
He's right, and he makes a very important point.
3/8 In 2021-22 China's property sector, after reaching some of the highest levels in history, began such an extended collapse that in any other economy it would have set off much lower growth and even recession. But there was no associated slowdown in China's GDP growth rate.
1/7 Very good FT article on how China achieved its dominance in manufacturing, along with the cost both to China and to its trading partners: "Using a unique combination of industrial policy, subsidies and other state-support coupled with private sector... ft.com/content/724431…
2/7 entrepreneurialism and ferocious competition in China’s vast market, the country was able to sharply increase the share of Chinese producers domestically and internationally in many of the sectors, in some cases matching or exceeding foreign competitors’ technology."
3/7 Because the subsidies and other state support mostly came in the form of direct and indirect transfers from the household sector, the huge expansion in China's manufacturing sector was also the flip side of the huge contraction in the consumption share of GDP.
1/4 SCMP: "China has become the leading debt collector of developing countries, shifting from a net capital provider, “as bills coming due from its belt and road lending surge in the 2010s now far outstrip new loan disbursements”."
2/4 It may not seem so at first, but this has trade implications. Some analysts have argued that if the US is successful in reducing its trade deficit, China can manage the process by redirecting its exports to developing countries.
3/4 But if developing countries are going to replace any part of the US accommodation of global trade surpluses, they can only do this with rising deficits, which in turn must be financed with rising net capital inflows.
1/7 SCMP: "Xu Lin, who helped draft Beijing’s five-year plan for decades while an official at the National Development and Reform Commission, has called... scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/7 for China’s annual growth target to be lowered for the next five years to 4%, factoring in the likelihood of a protracted rivalry with the United States and the need to solve deep-rooted structural problems in China."
3/7 The country's GDP growth target is not the best estimate of what the economy can deliver in any given period but rather a target designed to achieve a growth rate that satisfies political needs.
1/12
This Liberty Street account of trade makes the same mistakes most mainstream American economists make when it comes to explaining the US trade deficit.
2/12
Thomas Klitgaard notes, correctly, that by definition the US current account is equal to the excess of US investment over US savings.
But then he insists that causality can only run in one direction: from the internal account to the external account.
3/12
In other words, he claims that US savings and US investment are both determined by domestic factors (mainly low US savings), and because the former is less than the latter, the US must turn to foreigners to fill the gap.
1/9 Martin Wolf says the world has three options in considering the future of the hegemonic role of the dollar. One is "continued domination by the dollar". Another is that some other currency, perhaps the euro or even the renminbi, replace it as hegemon.
2/9 And the third is "a world with two or three competing currencies, each dominant in different regions."
The first option means maintaining the existing system, with all it problems, but I suspect that this may be much easier said than done.
3/9 Since the GFC, there has been a transformation of the way in which we think about the global trade and capital regime, along with a growing bipartisan consensus in the US that the costs to the US economy, and especially to its manufacturing sector, have become unsustainable.