Michael Pettis Profile picture
Feb 23 9 tweets 2 min read Read on X
1/9
Good piece by Soumaya Keynes on what trade may look like under a Trump administration (and probably under another Biden administration). She mentions the 10% tariff that Robert Lighthizer has proposed, pointing out that Lighthizer "has...

via @ftft.com/content/9b6b92…
2/9
argued that America’s problem is not necessarily bilateral trade deficits (absent unfair practices), nor even a trade deficit in any single year. Rather, a broader import tax is supposed to tackle America’s pattern of consistent trade deficits, year after year."
3/9
Lighthizer is right. The problem of trade imbalances in general is separate from those of industry-specific protection, and will only be resolved through intervention. I discuss why in a piece that will be published later today on the Carnegie site.

carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancial…
4/9
Keynes mentions in her article an estimate by Capital Economics that a 10% tariff "could lift inflation to between 3 and 4 per cent by the end of 2025."

I haven't read their report, but this simply isn't true.
5/9
Surplus economies produce far more than deficit economies relative to demand, and for what should be obvious reasons (they run surpluses because production is subsidized at the expense of consumption). This is why the major surplus economies have lower inflation rates...
6/9
than advanced economies that run persistent deficits. If the US implements similar policies to boost production relative to consumption (which is what tariffs do), it is likely to be disinflationary, just as it is in surplus countries.
7/9
It is hard to see why anyone would think trade intervention is inflationary when the countries that intervene most heavily almost all have much lower inflation than those that intervene least, in some cases even slipping into deflation.
8/9
The article includes this very important graph, which explains, among other things, why Beijing was shocked by the foreign reaction to policies it has implemented for years. Image
9/9
China's trade surpluses didn't use to matter too much to the world, but as its share of global GDP rose, so did the burden of its policies to its trade partners. This would have been even clearer if the graph showed surpluses as a share of the rest of the world's GDP.

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More from @michaelxpettis

May 20
1/4
Here is yet another article excoriating the "dangerous logic" of "Chinese excess capacity". There are at least 2-3 of these every day in Xinhua, People's Daily, and elsewhere.
english.news.cn/20240520/f5180…
2/4
Every article points out that excess capacity in a single sector is just the expected way comparative advantage is expressed. This is true, but what's also true is that comparative advantage must be expressed in the exchange of goods, and not in persistent trade surpluses.
3/4
Most Chinese economists do acknowledge separately that China has a problem of very weak domestic demand, but these discussions are never part of the "excess capacity" discussion.

This is one of the reasons why I expect trade conflict to get much worse before...
Read 4 tweets
May 19
1/12
Interesting article on the discussion within Washington on trade, but I disagree with the claim that manufacturing output "as a share of the U.S. economy hasn’t really declined much in the past 70 years, once you’ve factored in inflation."

via @politicopoliti.co/4be2XW9
2/12
That's not true. According to the World Bank, the manufacturing share of the US economy declined in from 16% in 1997 to to 11% today. That's a big drop. Manufacturing in 1997 was more than 50% larger as a share of US GDP than it is today.

data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.I…
3/12
The manufacturing share of global GDP also dropped during that time, but by much less. It went from 19% of global GDP to 16%. Put another way, the manufacturing share of the US economy declined in less than three decades from 85% of the global average to 65%.
Read 12 tweets
May 18
1/8
It's still surprising to me how so few economists have thought this through. Thanks to importing cheap goods from abroad, as the New York Times puts it, "economists knew some American workers would lose their...

nytimes.com/2024/05/18/bus…
2/8
jobs, but they said the economy would gain overall by offering consumers low-cost goods and freeing up companies to invest in higher-value industries where the United States had an innovation advantage."
3/8
This is basically how comparative advantage works. By importing goods in which the US had a comparative production disadvantage, and paying for them by exporting goods in which it had a comparative production advantage, US living standards would automatically rise.
Read 8 tweets
May 17
1/10
We can't make too big a deal out of one month's data, but today's data release does seem to confirm that China's heavily supply-side response to what is mostly a demand-side problem is making the Chinese economy more unbalanced than ever.

stats.gov.cn/english/PressR…
2/10
In April, according to the NBS, the industrial output proxy rose by 6.7% year on year, and by an even heftier 0.97% month on month. These were above last month's numbers and well above market expectations. They suggest that China' strong production is getting even stronger.
3/10
Today's data suggest, however, that China's weak consumption is getting even weaker. Retail sales, the proxy for consumption, were up 2.3% year on year, and up a measly 0.03% month on month. Both number were below expectations.
Read 11 tweets
May 17
1/5
If China is indeed selling off US assets ($53 billion is a little over 1% of its total direct and indirect reserves), this may be a good thing for China, but it's also a good thing for the US.

via @marketsbloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/5
It means fewer foreign savings being dumped into US economy, less strength in the dollar, and a contracting US current account deficit. And contrary to what many believe, it would have no net impact on US interest rates.
3/5
If China were swapping US assets for assets of developing countries (which is unlikely), this would be a win-win-win, as it would likely lead to an increase in domestic investment in those countries.
Read 5 tweets
May 15
1/4
Using Noah Smith's four reasons for protectionist policies, it is important to note that while the Biden tariffs may accomplish points 1 and 4, they will not resolve US trade imbalances (point 2).
2/4
That's because as long as China retains its excess savings, and as long as the bulk of these are directly or indirectly invested in the US, China's overall surplus will be unchanged, as will the overall US deficit.
3/4
One risk is that the protection of the targeted industries comes at the expense of untargeted industries. This would happen mainly through adjustments in the currency or adjustments in domestic demand.
Read 4 tweets

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