NEW: Jan Marsalek, the fugitive COO of disgraced company Wirecard, wasn't just behind Germany's biggest financial fraud in history. @InsiderEng can now reveal he was also a GRU agent for a decade. theins.press/en/politics/26…
Marsalek been living in Russia for more than four years, using a passport that belongs to an Orthodox priest from Lipetsk, Father Konstantin Baiazov. We have the fake passport.
Marsalek has been busy in Russia. He activated his own agent network of Bulgarian spies in the UK. They've all been arrested. .theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/s…
And his use of former Austrian intelligence officers Martin Weiss and Egisto Ott to spy on Wirecard detractors has also made @InsiderEng one of his targets.
Her character kills her victims with a nerve agent (yes).
Zlobina and Marsalek became lovers around 2013, the time that Wirecard's attempted entry into the Russian market foundered.
They traveled a lot together. A trip to Grozny, to help Kadyrov's family launder money in Hong Kong. A flight aboard a MiG fighter jet. A trip to Kyiv in the midst of Euromaidan. Camping in Chernobyl. They also went into business together, investing in a crypto farm in Yakutia.
Then came Zlobina's birthday in July 2014. Aboard a yacht, she introduced him to "Stas, the general from GRU."
Stas is Stanislav Petlinsky, a former GRU Spetsnaz officer with combat experience in Chechnya. He and Marsalek "fell in love." Petlinsky confirms the yacht meet-cute in an exclusive interview with Spiegel. They found him at a five-star hotel in Dubai.
Life for Marsalek, according to friends, can be divided into two halves. "Before Stas" and "After Stas."
Petlinsky boasted that immediately after meeting Marsalek, he handed him over to the GRU. He also introduced him to lots of colorful people.
There's Anatoly Karaziy, a fellow GRU Spetsnaz operative, who happened to be the intelligence chief of a mercenary group called Wagner.
Andrey Chuprygin, another GRUnik, this one Putin's special representative to Libya, where Marsalek invested in cement factories, at Petlinsky's prompting.
Petlinsky took Marsalek on a trip to Palmyra, Syria. He fired a bazooka.
Petlinsky also tasked Marsalek with hiring a mercenary corps known as RSB Group to safeguard his Libyan investment. Marsalek bought it outright.
One of the co-owners of RSB was Petlinsky's son, Kirill Korobeynikov, who we've also determined led a hacking operation against Wirecard critics, including the FT's @FD. The email Korobeynikov used: FTRaid@gmail.com
We also provide new details of how Marsalek fled Munich upon Wirecard's implosion in 2020. Petlinsky, his GRU handler, arranged his exfiltration.
And used an FSB-affiliated fixer in Russia to help Marsalek with his new identity as a priest. She is Evgeniya Kurochkin and she took Marsalek and Petlinsky to Russian-occupied Crimea after Marsalek's flight to Russia via Belarus.
We have telephone metadata proving they hung around Sevastopol and toured a series of hotels along the Crimean coast.
We also have the results of Marsalek's blood tests (he was worried about HIV and syphilis) from Moscow, where his blood was drawn multiple times from Petlinsky's swank apartment. His cover identity was that of another small-town Orthodox priest.
We tracked down the real priest, who told us he's never been tested for syphilis in his life.
Now here the story takes another bizarre and macabre turn.
Kurochkin, Marsalek's FSB travel agent, was in Berlin several times in the lead-up to the murder of former Chechen soldier and Georgian spy Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in a Berlin park in 2019.
The assassin, Vadim Krasikov, executed Khangoshvili with a special Glok pistol outfitted with a silencer. Kurochkin's number is stored in at least one Russian phone, described as "Glok converter."
German authorities are now investigating her possible involvement.
Putin wants Krasikov back more than any other Russian criminal asset. He described him as a "patriot" in that shambles of an interview with Tucker Carlson.
This investigation puts the Wirecard graft in a new light. Marsalek wasn't just a thief and a con artist -- he was working for Russian military intelligence at the height of Wirecard's fortunes, when it was on the DAX-30.
Wirecard was a colossal money-laundering front, with clients such as Germany's Federal Criminal Police, whose informants used the company's financial services.
Any information Wirecard was privy to was thus easily accessed by Moscow via Marsalek for whatever intelligence purposes Putin and the GRU wanted. /END
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Breaking: The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has released an unclassified report into the IC and its work on Havana Syndrome, or Anomalous Health Incidents. From the first lines of the executive summary: "It appears increasingly likely that a foreign adversary is behind some AHIs."
Last March @InsiderEng and @60Minutes concluded a yearlong investigation pointing at evidence that Russian military intelligence -- specifically GRU Unit 29155 -- was likely behind AHI. You can read that here: theins.ru/en/politics/27…
Rare opportunity for the Tukrs here. IRGC/proxies are a busted flush. Russia is busy elsewhere, in a battle space where Erdogan has quietly armed the opposing side to rather impressive result (while not antagonizing VVP as other NATO allies have). Erdogan and Fidan are thoroughly and utterly fed up with Assad's BS on normalization.
Moreover, Erdogan sees the incoming Trump administration as far more malleable and accommodating than the outgoing Biden one. Brett McGurk ain't coming back this time. If the U.S. withdraws from Syria, the previous plan of handing the American-PKK protectorate in the Jazira over to Russia is now a dead letter. With what fucking army? Prigozhin's Conoco contracts seem a distant memory now, too.
New: Remember "Pablo Gonzalez," the GRU illegal traded back to Russia in August? He posed for years as a Spanish journalist. A #FreePablo campaign was undertaken by various press freedom organizations when he was arrested in Poland on charges of espionage. Well, guess who gave him a big old hug at Vnukovo Airport when Pablo touched down? This guy.👇
Oleg Sotnikov is a GRU officer and team member of Unit 26165, or "Fancy Bear," which is responsible for the 2016 DNC hack. He helped with the close access hacking of the OPCW in The Hague, and also anti-doping organizations, including USADA, for which he was indicted in District Court in PA. Sotnikov was consul in Rio during the Brazil Olympics in 2016, when over a hundred Russian athletes were caught cheating with performance enhancing drugs. Our story below: theins.ru/en/politics/27…
Rather odd for a Spanish correspondent to immediately recognize and embrace an internationally wanted member of Russian military intelligence, isn't it. But there it is (at left), live on Russian TV, right behind you-know-who. We ran facial recognition software to ID Sotnikov.
New "Karl" thread, the first since the U.S. election, with @holger_r:
"RU is pushing hard on 2-3 fronts. On the Kursk front, they have managed to gain control over a third of the territory occupied by UA. I don’t see RU being able to push UA out of Kursk within this year or by the time Trump takes office on Jan 20. Their pace of progress is slow everywhere on the front."
"The second front where UA continues to struggle is the southern part of the eastern front, from Pokrovsk to Vuhledar. There, UA’s progress is happening continuously, even if it is slow."
New insights from "Karl," the Estonian military analyst, as told to @holger_r and me: 🧵
"Last time, we discussed that the situation near Vuhledar had become critical for UA. By now, it has been abandoned. In summary, RU's offensive toward Vuhledar began a year ago with an attack on Novomykhailivka. The situation in Vuhledar itself started to become uncomfortable a few months ago."
"The main reason RU is advancing there—like along the entire eastern front—is that it's hard to defend against Russian bombs. If RU bombers get close and drop glide bombs, sooner or later UA positions are destroyed, and they must retreat."
New "Karl" analysis on the latest in Ukraine, with @holger_r: 🧵
"In Kursk, the UA offensive developed further (since last time we spoke), and in total UA managed to conquer as much territory as RU had conquered in eastern Ukraine since the beginning of the year. This was done in the first 2 weeks of the operation."
"Now there is talk of a possible RU counter-attack. It remains to be seen how strong it will be, but it will certainly come. My guess is that resources that RU currently has in the region will not be enough to kick UA entirely out of the area."