My team has documented the entire Russian missile manufacturing base. That is 28 key ballistic, cruise, hypersonic and air defence missile producing plants associated with four corporations of Roscosmos, Almaz-Antey, Tactical Missiles and Rostec
The link is in the first comment
Our report How Does Russia Make Missiles? is already available for download
By the next weekend, we will be publishing the first OSINT sample, illustrating our methodology & approach. The rest of our materials will be made available laterrhodus.com
Key takeaways:
1. Missile production is mostly about machining 2. You cannot produce components of tight precision and convoluted geometry otherwise 3. Soviet missiles industry performed most of its machining manually
That was extremely laborious and skill-intensive process
4. As a result of the Soviet collapse, Soviet military industry died 5. Supply chains and knowledge ecosystems that used to support it died, too 6. That includes both the domestic machine tool industry 7. And the system of vocational training & apprenticeship
All gone, forever
8. By the year 2000, when Putin came to power, the industry was most literally laying in ashes 9. The tacit knowledge that the Soviet military production relied upon was gone, irreversibly 10. Putin was not to "modernize" the industry. He was to create it anew
11. In the 2000s, Putin brought the industry back from dead with the mass import of automated CNC equipment from Europe, especially Germany 12. That allowed to substitute the skilled manual labor Russia now lacked 13. And reboot the production of sophisticated weaponry
14. As every human decision presented a potential point of failure, Russia had to minimize the human factor in the production process 15. Thus, it became reliant upon the all-in-one, fool proof solutions allowing to largely exclude human decision making from the factory floor
16. Siemens has been the one singular company in the world capable of providing Russia with a sealed chain from the CAD to CNC controller 17. Minimizing the human factor & improving consistency 18. At the cost of low flexibility, and high dependency upon the one single supplier
19. In 2024, the Russian machining capacity relies upon the uninterrupted supply of spares & tooling from, plus software support by the U.S. allies 20. Due to the wide gap in technology, critical supplies from the West are impossible to substitute with the Chinese manufacture
Scope of our investigation
A sample of 28 key enterprises belonging to or associated with Roscosmos, Almaz Antey, Tactical Missiles and Rostec.
We will be publishing an OSINT sample illustrating our method next week. The rest will be available to the public later
This investigation would be impossible to conduct without the financial support of our donors. It started with the outrageously generous donations from our subscribers, of whom I would like to specifically mention @BErickson_BIO and @badita
@BErickson_BIO @badita It continued thanks to the Emergent Ventures grant from the @mercatus Center (George Mason University), obtained through the good graces of @tylercowen
Among our collaborators, we are especially grateful to Sean Byrnes who edited and proofread our original drafts and to Mikhail Beliansky who helped us with processing and visualising the raw data
If you want to support our work, you are more than welcome to donate:
Card payment: (on the website )
PayPal: Galeev.info@gmail.comRhodus.com
Or crypto:
ETH 0xA9FA4454cC3EC0Ff521926BB5F8D4389bA0e665a
BTC 14b3XMVwZqr7xQu5Ck7tfDSU1EG83jUptq
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Today I will introduce one more concept critical for understanding of how the manufacturing industry has evolved over the last few decades. It is the shift of technological knowledge from esoteric to exoteric
In the pre-digital era, manufacturing used to be mysterious, esoteric
To visualize how the manufacturing worked in the pre-computer/early computer age, imagine the atmosphere of magic, mysticism, enigma. That would be not very far from truth.
To illustrate the idea, I will give you one simple, straightforward example. The train car production.
Train production is a very, very rare example of a Russian machinery industry that survived through the post-Soviet collapse. Of course, it contracted. Of course, it suffered losses. Still, it made it through, while most of the Soviet machinery sector was simply wiped out.
As I have already pointed out, general audience, analysts, strategists & decision makers included holds unrealistic notions of how the global economy is organised. Now that is because they never see the back end of industrial civilisation
So let me show you some
There is a major delusion of seeing Europe as a sort of retired continent that "lags in tech" or even "doesn't produce anything". To some extent, it is just American hubris.
But there is more in there than just hubris. There is also some honest, sincere ignorance. The thing with most people is that they see only facade of industrial civilisation. They never ever had a chance to look behind the curtains
Tu-160M, the "White Swan" is the largest, the heaviest and the fastest bomber in the world. Originally a Soviet design, the plane you see today has limited continuity with the USSR. It was created in late 2010s, as a combined project of Putin's Russia and Siemens Digital Factory
Original Tu-160 was created as a domesday weapon of the Cold War. Designed in the 1970s, it was officially launched into production in 1984. And yet, with the collapse of the Soviet Union the project was aborted. In 1992, their production ceased.
No Nuclear War, no White Swans.
With the fall of USSR, Russia suffered a catastrophic drop in military expenditures. As the state was buying little weaponry (and paying for it highly erratically), entire production chains were wiped out. That included some ultra expensive projects such as strategic bombers.
I have repeatedly pointed out that the modern Russian military industry has little continuity with the Soviet one. Destroyed in the 1990s, it was effectively created anew in the Putin's era. Still, it may sound too abstract, so I will zoom in on one specific example:
Stankomash
Located in Chelyabink, Stankomash industrial park hosts major producers for the nuclear, shipbuilding, oil & gas and energy industries. It also produces weaponry, including mine trawls and artillery ammunition (based on the open sources)
All under the umbrella of Konar company
Some examples of the Stankomash manufacture. These photos well illustrate the philosophy of Soviet/Russian dual use industry. In the peace time, you focus primarily on civilian products, in the war time you convert it all to the production of weaponry.
No offence, but this is a completely imbecile, ignorant, ridiculous framing. I have no explanation for all this debate except for a complete & determined ignorance of the foreign policy making class, and their refusal to learn literally anything about the material world.
"Components" framing makes sense when we are discussing drones. Why? Because drones are literally made from the imported components. You buy like 90% of them in China, and may be you make like 10% domestically. For the most part, you just assemble what you bought in China.
Not the case with missiles. Most of what the missile consists of, including its most critical, hard to make parts is produced domestically. Why? Because you cannot buy it abroad. More often than not, you cannot buy it in China. You can only make it yourself, domestically.
Contrary to the popular opinion, Andrey Belousov's appointment as a Minister of Defense makes perfect sense. From the Kremlin's perspective, war is primarily about industry & economy. Now Belousov is the central economic & industrial thinker (and planner) in the Russian gov.
Born into a Soviet Brahmin economist family, Belousov is an exceedingly rare case of an academician making a successful career in the Russian gov. Even more noteworthy, he rose to the position of power through his academic work and publications.
This is unique, ultra rare.
Belousov's career track:
1976-1981 Moscow State University ("economic cybernetics"). Basically, economics, but with the heavy use of then new computers.
1981-1986 Central Economic Mathematical Institute
1986-2006 Instutute of Economic Forecasting
2006-2024 Government