As you can see, the Scottish Parliament wants to pass a law banning the sale of glue traps.
In England, under the Glue Traps (Offences) Act 2022 setting a glue trap to catch a rodent is an offence.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/26
But you can be licensed to do so (see s.2) “if there is no other satisfactory solution” to preserving public health or safety.
Presumably for that reason, the sale of glue traps is not banned, in England.
Regulation of methods of rodent control is not a reserved matter in 🏴 (or 🏴). So it’s up to the Scottish Parliament or Senedd to decide the rules. (And the 2022 UK Parliament legislation applies only in 🏴.)
So you might suppose that the Scottish Parliament can simply legislate here without needing UK Government approval, and be wondering what is going on. To understand that, you need to understand the UK Internal Market Act 2020 (UKIMA).
UKIMA was designed to deal with a post-Brexit problem, namely the possibility that devolved legislatures might use their powers to regulate in a way that threw up unjustified barriers to trade.
Most federal systems have (sometimes not very good) ways of dealing with the tension between regional (etc) autonomy and not wanting internal barriers to trade. But in the UK, nothing was done about that at the time of devolution.
Why not? Well, EU law did the job. EU rules on free movement of goods and services limited the extent to which (for example) the Scottish Parliament could regulate in a way designed to favour Scottish products over German ones - or, in practice, over English ones.
Or, indeed, the extent to which it could ban the sale of certain products entirely.
But of course in 2020 those EU constraints vanished.
UKIMA replaced them.
Focusing on the issue of restrictions on the sale of goods, s.2 of UKIMA sets out a “mutual recognition principle” .legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/27/…
That principle is (in relation to an absolute ban on sales) that if a good produced in or imported into one part of the UK (here, England) can lawfully be on sale there, it can be sold in any other part of the UK (here, Scotland).
And s.2(3) means that the Scottish ban doesn’t apply to the English (or foreign) good. If any Scottish official tried to enforce the ban to such a good, the producer or shop could go to court and get the enforcement struck down.
NB s.2 applies not just to outright bans but also other restrictions on sale (see s.3 for a list): so if Scotland banned sales of glue traps save under certain conditions, or required the sale to be registered, that would also be caught.
Now, nothing in UKIMA stops Scotland applying a ban to Scottish-produced glue traps. Scottish producers aren’t helped (in Scotland) by s.2.
But - of course - a ban only on Scottish-produced glue traps is pretty pointless.
Now, and importantly - and in contrast with EU law - there is no broad public interest ground available to the Scottish government enabling it to justify and defend the ban.
Very limited public interest grounds are set out in Schedule 1. . They don’t include rodent welfare. (Or much else: essentially just pest and disease control + a couple of other things.)legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/27/…
Here, the UK minister has refused, because (essentially) he thinks the ban on sale is a bad idea and the English approach is better.
But, you say, isn’t this a devolved matter? Shouldn’t decisions on whether a sales ban in Scotland is a good idea be taken in Edinburgh?
Well, quite.
And also note the asymmetry of this. What if the shoe were on the other foot? What if Scotland had the English ban (restriction on use, no sales ban) but UK ministers, acting for England, put a sales ban for England through Parliament?
It would be pointed out that UKIMA would mean that a Scottish-produced glue trap could be sold in England, notwithstanding the English ban: s.2 UKIMA.
However, for a UK minister acting for England, this isn’t a problem. Two possibilities. 1. Insert something in the Act banning the sale of glue traps in England an extra provision disapplying UKIMA (something the Scottish Parliament can’t do, as UKIMA is a “protected enactment”).
2. Use s.10(2) UKIMA - a power reserved to a UK minister - to add “banning glue traps in the interests of animal welfare” to the Schedule 1 UKIMA list.
That asymmetry - which means, in effect, that UKIMA constrains only the devolved Parliaments and never Westminster acting for England - is a key reason why UKIMA was and is opposed by the devolved governments.
EU law applied equally, and was less restrictive: UKIMA is more restrictive, and though in form applies equally, in practice it doesn’t.
(Final note: if you are wondering how all this applies to Northern Ireland given the Windsor Framework, you really have been paying attention. ⭐️⭐️⭐️. The answer: it’s complicated, but in the end UKIMA yields to the WF and the application of EU law in NI. See Part 5 of UKIMA.)
PS I agree with @AileenMcHarg. More importantly than either of our views is that @WelshGovernment has been unhappy about these aspects of UKIMA from the get-go - and there’s an argument about the compatibility of UKIMA with devolution waiting for an occasion to run it.
@AileenMcHarg @WelshGovernment Here is the argument, as set out in Counsel General for Wales (the appellant) v SoS BEIS . (The CA said it was premature to decide the issue absent an actual example.) bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/…
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1. No plan to “stop the boats” (chase them into French waters, destroy them on (French?) shores) or to send refugees who do land here to other countries (safe, because otherwise UK public opinion, let alone law, won’t wear it) works without cooperation of those countries. Esp. 🇫🇷
2. Those countries won’t do deals or cooperate just because it suits the UK. And France is (and French voters are) well aware that France takes many more refugees than we do.
1. It is of course true that big business (and the professions) can be a bit politically uniform. When I started out in the early 90s, the commercial Bar ( the profession I know best) was pretty much solidly Conservative (and certainly conservative).
To the point that aspiring pupils were sometimes advised not to mention eg chairing their university Labour club in their application.
Full report Windsor Framework (WF) report by @LordsEUCom Protocol sub-committee here . I will concentrate on areas where I gave evidence to the Committee. https://t.co/eyeHRrgNjncommittees.parliament.uk/publications/4…
On State aid. I entirely agree with @jamesrwebber’s points, made separately. And with the conclusions. The basic point: Art 10 remains a serious issue for any major cross-UK subsidy programme (Green New Deal/pandemic subsidies): in practice it will have to be cleared by the EU.
It also remains potentially applicable even to measures that don’t immediately and on their face cover NI: see eg James’ car battery example.
This is a fascinating judgment that contains (in judicial language) pretty savage comments on the government’s (and in particular Kwasi Kwarteng’s) decision-making, and on its compliance with the duty of candour. https://t.co/NmPB017j68judiciary.uk/wp-content/upl…
Also some important public law legal points on the duty to consult and whether a court can refuse to quash the decision on the basis that it’s highly likely that the result would have been the same without the public law error.
Basically, the case is about the government’s decision in 2022 to remove rules that stopped employment agencies from providing workers to replace strikers. It was under a statutory obligation to consult representative bodies before it did so.
The core provision is clause 1(2). Essentially it means that in procurement and investment decisions no public body may be influenced by political or moral disapproval of the conduct of a foreign state.
The Bill extends to the devolved governments and local authorities in the devolved nations: since procurement and investment by public bodies aren’t reserved matters, this would appear to breach the Sewel Convention if the devolved legislatures don’t agree.
The precedent is false anyway (obviously: since this is an MP process and no MP can be immune from perception of bias to another MP).
But Harman’s answer - that she approached the govt (presided over by one Johnson) when concerns were expressed about her tweets and the govt expressed full confidence in her - disposes of the point.