In April 2022, both the IMF and S&P Global forecasted an 8.5% annual decline in Russia's GDP.
Biden administration officials predicted that, due to the sanctions, Russia would go back to "Soviet style living standards from the 1980s."
This has obviously not happened.
2/n
Instead, Russia has become a rare live experiment in whether a major country can replace its reliance on the industrial bases of the U.S.-aligned world of North America, Europe, Japan, and South Korea with the industrial base of China.
So far, the answer seems to be yes.
3/n
Russian imports of Chinese goods have risen across nearly every category, including advanced manufactured goods, and Chinese companies have become market leaders in Russia.
Chinese exports to Russia are up 121% since 2021, compared to 29% with the rest of the world.
4/n
Specific categories show a stark picture:
Chinese car imports grew 8x, tractors 50x, trucks 9x. Household appliances are up 50% or more.
Chinese cars are now 55% of the Russian market, up from 8% in 2021. Chinese smartphone brands are now 70-95% of the Russian market.
5/n
Exports of chemicals, plastics, rubber, even footwear and clothing—all have grown, some by nearly half.
Exports of goods and components needed in military manufacturing, like ball bearings, optics, ceramics, drones, computer chips, and alumina have also all grown.
6/n
Russian trade with both China and the U.S.-aligned world continues to be underestimated due to vast sanctions evasion.
Global trade statistics are now replete with comically suspicious figures, such as that Kyrgyzstan has increased ball bearing imports from China by 2500%.
7/n
Russia's technocrats underestimated the severity of sanctions, but had been preparing for them for years.
Russia has rolled out its own domestic replacements for Visa/Mastercard and SWIFT. Financial engineering has blunted the impact of financial sanctions.
8/n
But at the end of the day, technocratic preparation or sanctions evasion would not have saved the Russian economy and war effort if there was no way to acquire key manufactured goods and components for both consumer and military uses.
China made the difference.
9/n
China offers a vast, increasingly sophisticated, full-stack alternative manufacturing base.
Because of this Western sanctions cannot collapse an economy by denying it modern goods and technology, but only increase its dependence on China, so long as China is willing.
10/n
Such an alternative did not exist as recently as 2008. But it exists enough now, apparently, to stabilize a wartime economy with 150 million people.
In aerospace or high-end chips, China is not yet a perfect substitute. But its sophistication will only grow in the future.
11/n
To read the full analysis of sanctions on Russia and Chinese manufacturing, subscribe to Bismarck Brief here:
As far as I can tell, the most notable political science results of the 21st century is democracy cannot work well with low fertility rates.
All converge on prioritizing retirees over workers and immigrants over citizens escalating social transfers beyond sustainability.
I think this means we should try to understand non-democratic regimes better since they will represent the majority of global political power in the future.
It seems to me that the great graying and mass immigration simply are the end of democracies as we understood them.
Just as failure to manage an economy and international trade were the end of Soviet Communism as we understood it.
Such institutional selection theories are completely wrong.
Corporations don’t evolve through natural selection. That requires heritable variance under differential fitness. The culture, technical knowledge, and structure of organizations is captured by personnel not bylaws.
Unless personnel persists, corporations have nearly no heritable variance. This is perhaps a case for why we should clone exceptional employees but has nothing to do with organizational structure.
The origin of successful companies lies with exceptional founders who know how to assemble these organizations. These founders are the inventors of relevant social technologies.
Does this mean creative destruction doesn't have a role? No, not at all. The personnel and machinery in dysfunctional institutions are indeed wasted. They should be reallocated to functional firms. Everyone is better off when they do!
But it is a conceptual and empirical error to think this is the mechanism that creates such firms in the first place! It isn't.
Regardless of the particular measure we use, exceptional institutions do exist, but they are rare. Most things fail. Things that exist have avoided failure—so far. Institutions that we do see are functional enough to persist.
Those who aren't capable of social technology invention are at best making photocopies of functional organizations. The mistakes they make far outweigh any learning. Failure doesn't teach that much.
Dead organizations of the type Dwarkesh is describing make decisions by committee and try to iterate towards local optima. Live players who found and run functional institutions are capable of seeing, considering, and working toward a much broader range of outcomes and working toward novel global optima.
First principle companies lead by live players like SpaceX will *always* outperform bureaucratic or committee driven organizations like Boeing. We've seen this in hundreds upon hundreds of company case studies at @bismarckanlys.
In fact Apple is an instructive case. It is more profitable than ever. It faces no competition. Remember under perfect competition profits fall to zero. Yet, after the death of Steve Jobs it simply and persistently failed to innovate at the same level. Its vast profits are a market failure not a market success: they represent vast misallocation.
It is in fact a dead player, and a slowly decaying functional institution can keep on winning—until it breaks. Which Apple will one day. Unless taken over by a live player.
No committee ever appoints a live player if they can help it, simply because that's how committees work. It has to be somewhat of a hostile takeover like what happened to old Twitter when Elon took it over or what Carl Icahn did back in the day.
What does this mean for politics?
It is precisely because the stakes are so high, and because there is no inherent check on the sovereignty of great powers, that we must work very hard to avoid dysfunctional and extractive institutions in government.
It means we should have much much more creative destruction in politics. Because in politics too machinery, personnel, and, yes, territory are distributed inefficiently. Here too we should embrace first principles thinking and live players.
Great nations and the peoples of countries like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are today misgoverned in a way very reminiscent of Boeing or RTX or Lockheed Martin or a dozen other companies run on the "portfolio theory of the firm." Those companies and governments are not at all like Nvidia, OpenAI, Anduril, or SpaceX.
And the world is poorer, less technologically advanced, more violent, and less free because of it.
Let's fix all dysfunctional institutions, be they private or public. Out with the portfolio theory of government! In with first principles thinking.
It really is looking like the Russia-Ukraine war permanently knocks Europe out of the running as a 21st century power.
Europe was set on track to be there 2005-2008. Even for much of the 2010s it was plausible it would recover from the 2008 financial crisis after a lost decade.
Now it looks like it would be necessary to have several live players working hard to achieve this. The default forecast is there aren't enough live players.
If you believe in GDP your intuition should be that Americans are much richer than Austrians AND that Austrians are much richer than Japanese. Per capita GDP:
United States 86,601
Austria 58,669
Japan 32,859
Asiapoors.
I'm originally from Slovenia. An Eastern European country.
It's GDP per capita recently surpassed that of Taiwan and Saudi Arabia.
Slovenia 34,544
Taiwan 33,234
Saudi Arabia 32,881
If Americans are the global Upper Middle Class Europeans are the middle class and Asians the working class.
Hungary is a developed liberal democracy that has been continuously ruled by populist, nationalist conservatives for 15 years.
Yet despite this, they have surprisingly not meaningfully changed the country's trajectory.
Read the new, very long @bismarckanlys Brief! (link below)
Long-time Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party have turned repeated large electoral victories since 2010 into institutionalized power.
Orban skillfully empowered parliament over the courts, making it possible to reform Hungarian society by passing laws.
Orban has a reputation as a foreign policy contrarian who is not afraid to make deals with Russia or China, a strong social and fiscal conservative who introduced low taxes, and a visionary who is rejecting immigration and raising Hungarian birth rates with government policy…