As far as tactical battles go, Arteta vs De Zerbi is always up there with the most intriguing..
In the past, Arsenal have struggled to gain control against Brighton due to a lack of aggression in the press.
Arteta changed that this year, though, when they met at the Emirates 🚨
In the past, Arsenal have struggled to gain control against Brighton due to a lack of aggression in the press.
Arteta changed that this year, though, when they met at the Emirates 🚨
Arsenal pressed Brighton's central quartet in the build-up in the 'high build' with Jesus, Havertz, & Ødegaard managing 4 players at once (via shadow marking).
Although Brighton have the quality to find the spare man in this moment, Arsenal's aggression was excellent on the day.
Although Brighton have the quality to find the spare man in this moment, Arsenal's aggression was excellent on the day.
Brighton consistently try to lure teams to press them in the build-up so they can create space high.
We can see an example of that here as their #9's into #10 type positions to create space in behind & 1v1 situations for the wingers in the last line.
Arsenal managed this well.
We can see an example of that here as their #9's into #10 type positions to create space in behind & 1v1 situations for the wingers in the last line.
Arsenal managed this well.
Brighton typically build in a standard 4-2-4, but last time out against Arsenal they dropped Gilmour into a left back zone.
This was because De Zerbi wanted to discombobulate Arsenal's press to create an overload deep OR to create space high and between the lines.
This was because De Zerbi wanted to discombobulate Arsenal's press to create an overload deep OR to create space high and between the lines.
Gilmour's dropping movements into left back saw Milner, Brighton's left back on the day, push into more advanced zones where he often inverted into midfield.
Mitoma also made inward movements from the wing into the half space.
Both actions were an attempt to disjoint Arsenal.
Mitoma also made inward movements from the wing into the half space.
Both actions were an attempt to disjoint Arsenal.
We can see what De Zerbi was trying to achieve below. Arsenal matched up in man-to-man fashion from opposition goal kicks so De Zerbi wanted to test Arsenal's adherence to the game plan and co-ordination.
Arsenal's communication and rotations were flawless on the day..
Arsenal's communication and rotations were flawless on the day..
We can see an example of that here as all of Brighton's players are man-marked in the build-up with Gilmour at left back.
We can also see an example of it in the second picture when Brighton try to play over Arsenal's press but Arsenal match up (Saliba/Gabriel are out of shot).
We can also see an example of it in the second picture when Brighton try to play over Arsenal's press but Arsenal match up (Saliba/Gabriel are out of shot).
Ben White was brave to follow Milner inside. Ødegaard and Saka were smart enough to manage the dropping movements of Gilmour. Zinchenko was brave enough to press Adingra who often dropped centrally. Rice, Gabriel, and Saliba often followed Brighton's forwards into their half.
As far as tactical understanding and the adherence to game plans go DESPITE the attempt from De Zerbi to discombobulate Arsenal's press, it was elite from Arteta's men.
They often forced Brighton long and that in tandem with their duel winning qualities saw they have success.
They often forced Brighton long and that in tandem with their duel winning qualities saw they have success.
Brighton, however, are a really effective team out of possession too. Not much emphasis is placed upon it because of De Zerbi's unique approach to the in-possession side of the game, but Brighton press in man-to-man fashion with phenomenal aggression too!
This saw Arsenal reliably use David Raya as a +1 in the build-up. He consistently stepped out to gain yardage before playing over Brighton's man-to-man press.
In theory, it made sense for Arsenal to hit Havertz in these moments, but Havertz and Jesus acted as #10's of sorts.
In theory, it made sense for Arsenal to hit Havertz in these moments, but Havertz and Jesus acted as #10's of sorts.
This was to do what Brighton typically do to other teams! When Jesus and Havertz dropped between the lines, Saka and Martinelli were isolated in 1v1's with Veltman and Milner in physical mismatches in the last line.
As far as tactical plans go, it was exceptional from Arteta.
As far as tactical plans go, it was exceptional from Arteta.
To beat Brighton again, Arsenal must be wary of their potentially fluid build-up structure.
Brighton primarily play their typical 4-2-4 build, but they also mix up between a 3-1 build with Groß receiving on the first line and the centre backs splitting out or with Gilmour at LB.
Brighton primarily play their typical 4-2-4 build, but they also mix up between a 3-1 build with Groß receiving on the first line and the centre backs splitting out or with Gilmour at LB.
To maintain similar aggression away from home will NOT be as easy as the psychological onus on Arsenal in the home game was to dominate.
However, away from home against a top Brighton team, it is not necessarily as demanding on the Arsenal players, but they need to create that..
However, away from home against a top Brighton team, it is not necessarily as demanding on the Arsenal players, but they need to create that..
If Arsenal don't press with relentless aggression (within reason), they run the risk of failing to control the game with and without the ball.
The blue print is there, though. They have already done it this season.
It's time for the players to step up & do it again at the Amex.
The blue print is there, though. They have already done it this season.
It's time for the players to step up & do it again at the Amex.
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