Whilst #Rovers 🔑 revenue streams, matchday, broadcast & commercial all ⬆️ significantly. However general overheads ⬆️ too which meant no change to op losses. Sale of Armstrong in 21/22 halved losses
Both accounts & audit report reference that there is a material uncertainty over ability of club to trade as a going concern. Should no noted that audit report dated December 2023 & things may have improved since then
Total losses for Rovers now exceed £320 million
Because of difficulties in owners sending cash from India Rovers day to day cash management better than usual. Rovers only borrowed £400k in the year
Main football costs (wages & amortisation) £140 for every £100 of income. Highest paid director package ⬆️ over £40k
Cost of putting together squad ⬇️ from £15m to £13m. Player who left the club originally cost over £7m but sales only brought in £349k.
Rovers only owed £50k from other clubs for transfer fees. Rovers owe over £4m on player purchase instalments. Loan from EFL should now be repaid. Venky’s wrote off £21m due to them by converting into shares.
Rovers may have to pay add ons of nearly £6m if certain conditions achieved.
Since 30 June Rovers have had net player sales of £3.4m
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Bournemouth publish 23/24 accounts: 🔑figs
⚽️Revenue £170m ⬆️19%
⚽️Wages £136m ⬆️36%
⚽️Underlying loss £55m ⬆️155%
⚽️ Player sale profits £0.3m
⚽️ Pre tax loss £66m
⚽️ Player purchases £141m
⚽️ Player sales £2m
⚽️ Total cost of squad £382m
⚽️Original cost of players sold £37m
⚽️ Borrowings £123m
Bournemouth main revenue source is PL broadcast deal. Matchday generates just £4 out of every £100. Commercial includes loan fees for players. Revenue growth almost 3,200% in just over a decade is spectacular. (PL totals for 22/23 unless says otherwise)
Main costs for clubs are wages and amortisation. New owners have invested heavily in players and that comes with a 36% increase in wages to a record £136m. Still low by PL standards though. Amortisation (transfer fees spread over contract length) up by 49% as cost of staying in PL is not cheap.
Bristol City publish 23/24 accounts: 🔑figs:
⚽️Revenue £42.4m ⬆️16% despite only covering 12 months instead of 13 in 22/23
⚽️Wages £34.9m ⬇️3%
⚽️Underlying losses £22.5m ⬇️20%
⚽️Player sale profits £21.7m ⬆️128%
⚽️Player purchases £3.7m
⚽️Player sales £21.7m
⚽️Total losses over the years £224m
⚽️Total Steve Lansdown investment £282.4m
Development at Ashton Gate has been a big driver of ⬆️revenue at Bristol City, with commercial income now 60% of total. This means that City generate more revenue than any other non-parachute payment club. (Most figures are for 2023, except for the clubs that have not published 2024 such as #BCFC, and Reading, who have a rogue owner who thinks the law does not apply to him).
Main costs for clubs are player related. Staff numbers slightly ⬆️but wage bill ⬇️ due to only 12 months period. Average weekly wage of £16K very competitive for a non-parachute team but wages continue to fall as a proportion of income. Other player related cost is amortisation (player transfers spread over contract life) and this is mid table by divisional standards.
Hull City publish 23/24 accounts: 🔑figures
⚽️Revenue £21.2m ⬆️17%
⚽️ Wages £29.6m ⬆️25%
⚽️Average weekly wage £13,700
⚽️Underlying losses £26.4m ⬆️28%
⚽️ Player sale profits £8.3m ⬇️45%
⚽️Player purchases £8.5m
⚽️Player sales £10.4m (plus £30m post season)
⚽️Loans from owner in year £27.9m
Revenue fairly evenly split, rise in year mainly due to better commercial sales and slight rises in matchday and new EFL TV deal. Only a handful of clubs have submitted 23/24 accounts, Reading's owner thinks the laws of the land do not apply to him so has not yet submitted 22/23
Main costs for clubs are player related. Substantial increase in wages and amortisation (player signings spread over contract length) as new owner invested heavily in playing talent resulting in Hull being at top end of non parachute payers.
A history of Premier League transfer spending. First season (1992/93) total spend was £65m and QPR spent just £197k. Newly promoted Blackburn were the biggest spenders due to Jack Walker's investment in the likes of Alan Shearer, Stuart Ripley, Kevin Gallagher & Graham Le Saux.
1993/94 spending up to £78m. Blackburn continue to be the biggest spenders, Champions Manchester United were outspent by...err...Swindon.
First £100m spend season, Everton became the first team to eight figures spent in a season with Ferguson, Samways, Amokachi and Barrett all joining the club on big deals. QPR again smallest spenders. Man City and Chelsea outspent by Wimbledon.
Chelsea FC Holdings submit 22/23 accounts. 🔑 figs
⚽️Revenue £512m ⬆️ 6%
⚽️Wages £404m ⬆️ 18%
⚽️Player costs (wages & amortisation) £119 for every £100 of revenue
⚽️Day to day losses £249m
⚽️Player purchases £745m
⚽️Player sales £203m
⚽️Borrowings in year £428m
Losses ⬆️ from £242m to £249m for day to day running of club but sale of hotel to another part of group, £30m of financial settlements & player sales ⬇️ this to £90m
Chelsea have cash in bank, total losses adding all the years together now £1.135 billion
Burnley publish 22/23 accounts; 🔑 figs
Revenue £65m ⬇️ 47%
Wages £54m ⬇️ 42%
Loss pre player sales £41m
Player purchases £84m
Player sales £21m
Borrowings £101m
Big change in pre tax profit of £36m in 21/22 to a loss of £36m in 22/23. Mainly due to ⬇️ in revenue following relegation and player sale profits ⬇️ from £54m to £11m.
Burnley still have substantial cash but this due to the Club borrowing substantial amounts during the year as liabilities ⬆️. Burnley still profitable over the years.