1/6 This NYT article shows just how confused many economists continue to be about trade. They worry that because in recent years a few economies have been implementing trade and industrial policies, this means an end to free trade and free markets.
2/6 This turning away from free markets, they say, will constrain future growth.
Leave aside that industrial and trade policies have often expanded growth, their worries show just how little they understand what free trade and comparative advantage mean.
3/6 The world turned away from free trade decades ago. The large, persistent surpluses that have characterized global trade since the 1980s are largely the consequences of beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies aimed at boosting domestic growth a the expense of trade partners.
4/6 In a world of comparative advantage and free trade, these large persistent surpluses could not exist. That's because export success would normally lead to wage growth which, in turn, would lead to surging imports.
5/6 The fact that it hasn't is proof that wages have been directly and indirectly suppressed to subsidize manufacturing "competitiveness", with the costs of demand suppression exported to trade partner in the form of the export of excess domestic savings and trade surpluses.
6/6 What these economists see as trade interference, in other words, might better be described as attempts through trade and industrial policies to reverse the impact of beggar-thy-neighbor policies abroad.
1/8 Although Russell Napier is right to identify China's high and soaring debt as a major problem for the economy, he then says: "China needs to not just reflate its economy but to inflate away its debts."
2/8 That would be a terrible mistake, and I think the PBoC understands why.
You cannot just "inflate away" debt. Inflation is just a mechanism for resolving debt by passing on the costs to net monetary savers.
3/8 In China's case, businesses, SOEs and the government are net borrowers, while households are high net savers. Inflating away the debt simply means forcing household savers to subsidize businesses, SOEs and borrowers.
1/5 Chinese GDP grew by 5.3% in the first quarter of 2024, well above expectations, reinforcing concerns that GDP growth in China means something quite different than GDP growth in economies that operate under hard-budget constraints.
2/5 While most economists inside and outside China recognize that sustainable GDP growth in China requires that consumption play a stronger role in driving growth, with investment and the trade surplus playing a declining role, the opposite happened in the past three months.
3/5 Retail sales continued to lag in the first quarter, while much of the period's growth was driven by higher investment in infrastructure and (especially) manufacturing and a large trade surplus. China is still having trouble boosting domestic consumption, in other words.
1/5 FT: "Japan’s central bankers and government officials say the country may finally become a “normal” economy. Companies will be able to pass on increased costs to consumers in the form of higher prices, and workers will demand better pay."
2/5 We've heard this story before, and I think there are at least two reasons to remain skeptical. First, while wage-driven growth in domestic consumption would certainly be a good thing in the medium term, in the short term it runs into the same old problem.
3/5 Manufacturing accounts for 20% of Japan's GDP (versus 16% for the world), and its international competitiveness is still partially underwritten by implicit and explicit transfers from households. Reversing those transfers, which is necessary for any revival in domestic....
1/9 Good Brad Setser piece on Chinese overcapacity. I'd add that the idea overcapacity can be measured on a sector by sector basis, as in a recent Bloomberg article, shows how poorly it is understood. The problem of overcapacity is not incremental. It is systemic.
2/9 From a trade point of view, the problem is that exports are not being exchanged for imports, as they necessarily must in a system of comparative advantage, but rather to externalize the cost of excess savings and weak domestic demand.
3/9 In her brilliant 1937 essay, "Beggar-My-Neighbour Remedies For Unemployment", Joan Robinson put it this way: "When the game of beggar-my-neighbour has been played for one or two rounds, and foreign nations have stimulated their exports and cut down...
1/4 "In meetings with top Chinese officials, Yellen will seek to convey her view that the excess production is unhealthy for China and that there is a growing drumbeat of concern about it in the U.S., Europe, Japan, Mexico and other major economies."
2/4 The problem is not that Chinese officials don't know this, but that they have few other options. They cannot (and don't want to) revive investment in the property sector, and they are reluctant to unleash a 2009-style infrastructure spending orgy.
3/4 Increased investment in manufacturing, in other words, is among the few things that will allow China to reach the 5% growth target. Without that, either it needs a major fiscal boost to consumption (something Beijing decries as "welfarism"), or it has to accept lower growth.
1/7 Atif Mian argues here that "There are two main forces behind the rise of imbalances that have generated the debt supercycle: the saving glut of the rich and the global saving glut."
He is right, and policymakers should understand why.
2/7 In advanced economies (and some developing ones), investment is not constrained by scarce savings but rather by weak demand. In that case excess savings in one sector (a savings glut) doesn't lead to higher investment. In fact it may even lead to lower investment.
3/7 But if investment doesn't rise, total savings cannot rise either, so that excess savings in some sectors of the economy (in the form of a saving glut of the rich, or of large foreign inflows) must lead to lower savings in other sectors.