Among the most promising military applications of AI is staff work. Tons of routine products—intel summaries, orders, etc.—can be generated much faster by machine. Does this mean staffs will reverse the historic trend and begin to shrink?
No: they’re about to explode in size.🧵
In the Napoleonic era, a divisional or corps staff was never more than a dozen soldiers, whereas today it’s pushing toward a thousand for formations of about the same size. Part of a general trend in tooth-to-tail ratios.
The reasons are fairly obvious: modern armies are more complicated, requiring more logistical coordination, fire control, etc.
BUT. There’s a subtler effect at play too: Jevon’s paradox. Simply stated, the more efficiently a resource can be used, the greater the demand.
It’s the story of Eli Whitney and the cotton gin. He thought he could reduce the demand for slavery by creating a labor-saving device for processing cotton. But by increasing the cotton each slave produced, he made them much, much more valuable.
Same story with staff work. The more valuable data/products/whatever that each staff member can generate, the greater the demand.
The typewriter, for instance, did not reduce the number of clerks (secretaries); it greatly increased the volume of correspondence.
This came at a convenient time, when more information needed to be sent over greater distances. But typewriters also *enabled* more complex operations, requiring more detailed orders, greater coordination, etc., and thereby fueling demand for larger staffs.
As an example, consider the situational awareness that persistent surveillance gives HQ—often better than the ground troops. Pair it with AI for threat ID, predictive firing solutions, etc., and you have several staff members micromanaging a single squad.
This is just one example, and not an especially good one—the entire point is that it’s hard to predict new uses for technology until its available in abundance. The one certainty is that that abundance will only grow demand, not shrink it.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
How the Confederates (of the Grand Alliance) stopped the Union (of the French & Spanish crowns).
The War of the Spanish Succession is known for its battles (Blenheim, Ramillies) & campaigns (Marlborough's march). But most interesting is the strategic relations among theaters.🧵
The WSS was fought by two blocs:
-Bourbons: France, Spain, Bavaria (plus Portugal and Savoy, which defected in 1703)
-Grand Alliance: England, Holland, HRE
Unlike the later wars of Louis XV, these were very coherent coalitions that fought for united ends.
This meant that fighting took place in a huge number of independent theaters of operation, many of which were in close geographic proximity. In Europe alone:
-Low Countries
-Moselle
-Rhineland
-Bavaria
-SE France
-N Italy
-E Spain
-Portugal/W Spain
Louis XIV & Louis XV were very different in character, but both fought 3 major wars that followed a remarkably similar arc:
1. Small war over points of honor that rapidly expanded 2. Large war that saw many victories but no real gains 3. Large war that saw defeats and losses
🧵
1. The Franco-Dutch War (1672-78) & War of the Polish Succession (1733-35)
These were the smallest large wars of their reigns. Both started out limited conflicts over points of honor, then spread to other parts of Europe as natural rivalries with the Habsburgs took over.
Louis XIV invaded the Holland in 1672 to punish it for its lack of support in a brief war with Spain a few years earlier (the War of Devolution). This was coordinated with a naval attack by England, which had already fought two wars with the Dutch in as many decades.
The wars of Louis XIV are criminally neglected in popular anglophone historiography. They were enormous in scope and consequence, shaping the map of modern Europe arguably even more than the Napoleonic wars.
In the American market, the two most popular topics by far are WWII and the Civil War. The reasons are obvious: the scale, personal connection, US involvement, etc. But there's another reason they continue to draw more scholarly and professional military attention...
And that is that they're interesting at every level of war: from the grand strategic to theater strategy, tactics and operations.
Battles affected campaigns, campaigns in one theater affected those in another, so on and so forth. Endlessly fascinating complexity.
The gap between operations and strategy is tough to bridge because it usually overlaps with the civil-military divide. This was even harder when armies were composed of mercenaries.
The Venetians did it by employing officers resembling communist political commissars.🧵
Every Venetian army was accompanied by two officers called provveditori. This is sometimes translated as “commissioner” or “commissary”, as they oversaw army administration of the army. But they also had a political and strategic role.
Perhaps uncoincidentally, this other role is best described by the word commissar—the Russian word for commissary. Proveditors were tasked with ensuring the loyalty of mercenary captains and making sure their operations supported Venice’s overall war strategy.
The internationalization of wars in the 16th c. made strategy dependent on events far away. This meant that states needed not just accurate information, but effective analysis. But how good was their intelligence?
A 1532 report to the Venetian College gives some indication.
Francesco Maria della Rovere, Duke of Urbino and an experienced condottiere, had just been contracted as captain-general of the Republic’s armies. While he was in Venice that spring to celebrate his confirmation, he was asked about the military situation in Europe.
The Venetians were in particular worried about the Ottomans. They fought two losing wars with them in the past 70 years, losing many valuable ports around the Med to them; as recently as 1499, Ottoman cavalry had raided Venice’s Italian lands.
The takedown of a 2017 London Bridge terrorist could serve as a lesson in combined arms:
-Artillery (fire extinguisher) suppresses
-Cavalry (narwhal tusk) turns his flank
-Infantry closes
Done on the fly by three total strangers using improvised weapons.🧵
Tactics are almost always simple in their essence, an obvious response with the means available—even animals show tactical instinct: ambushes, flanking attacks, swarms, feigned retreats, etc.
The real difficulty lies in executing these maneuvers with large bodies of men.
Even a simple flanking attack is difficult in organized combat: how do you get a group of men around the enemy’s flank while maintaining formation? That’s the REAL challenge of tactics—it may have driven some of the Greeks’ organizational innovations.