Among the most promising military applications of AI is staff work. Tons of routine products—intel summaries, orders, etc.—can be generated much faster by machine. Does this mean staffs will reverse the historic trend and begin to shrink?
No: they’re about to explode in size.🧵
In the Napoleonic era, a divisional or corps staff was never more than a dozen soldiers, whereas today it’s pushing toward a thousand for formations of about the same size. Part of a general trend in tooth-to-tail ratios.
The reasons are fairly obvious: modern armies are more complicated, requiring more logistical coordination, fire control, etc.
BUT. There’s a subtler effect at play too: Jevon’s paradox. Simply stated, the more efficiently a resource can be used, the greater the demand.
It’s the story of Eli Whitney and the cotton gin. He thought he could reduce the demand for slavery by creating a labor-saving device for processing cotton. But by increasing the cotton each slave produced, he made them much, much more valuable.
Same story with staff work. The more valuable data/products/whatever that each staff member can generate, the greater the demand.
The typewriter, for instance, did not reduce the number of clerks (secretaries); it greatly increased the volume of correspondence.
This came at a convenient time, when more information needed to be sent over greater distances. But typewriters also *enabled* more complex operations, requiring more detailed orders, greater coordination, etc., and thereby fueling demand for larger staffs.
As an example, consider the situational awareness that persistent surveillance gives HQ—often better than the ground troops. Pair it with AI for threat ID, predictive firing solutions, etc., and you have several staff members micromanaging a single squad.
This is just one example, and not an especially good one—the entire point is that it’s hard to predict new uses for technology until its available in abundance. The one certainty is that that abundance will only grow demand, not shrink it.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
The role of cavalry in the Greco-Turkish War is fascinating. It demonstrated the tactical futility of horse against modern weaponry—already seen in World War I—but also proved capable of extraordinary operational results when employed correctly.🧵
Both sides used mounted units extensively for scouting, a complement to aerial reconnaissance—it was Turkish cavalry that spotted the Greek flanking maneuver at the Sakarya, allowing them to reposition forces in time for the battle.
But the Turks had a particular advantage in this arm, which had for centuries been their traditional strength: at Sakarya, their cavalry outnumbered the Greeks over 2 to 1.
Hattin was a singular battle. It’s hard to think of any other where so large an army (~23,000) was so thoroughly destroyed—only a few hundred escaped at most. Yet the Kingdom of Jerusalem endured for another century, showing the limits of straightforward “annihilation”.
In the months after Hattin, Saladin exploited his victory by sweeping up the towns and castles of the Kingdom, including Jerusalem itself.
One major city held out, however: the eminently defensible port of Tyre. Saladin initially bypassed it to pluck easier targets.
This allowed the remnants of the Crusader army and nearby garrisons to take refuge in Tyre, reinforced by the timely arrival of an expedition from overseas. When Saladin finally lay siege in November, it was too late—the garrison was too strong and winter rains soon came.
How the Confederates (of the Grand Alliance) stopped the Union (of the French & Spanish crowns).
The War of the Spanish Succession is known for its battles (Blenheim, Ramillies) & campaigns (Marlborough's march). But most interesting is the strategic relations among theaters.🧵
The WSS was fought by two blocs:
-Bourbons: France, Spain, Bavaria (plus Portugal and Savoy, which defected in 1703)
-Grand Alliance: England, Holland, HRE
Unlike the later wars of Louis XV, these were very coherent coalitions that fought for united ends.
This meant that fighting took place in a huge number of independent theaters of operation, many of which were in close geographic proximity. In Europe alone:
-Low Countries
-Moselle
-Rhineland
-Bavaria
-SE France
-N Italy
-E Spain
-Portugal/W Spain
Louis XIV & Louis XV were very different in character, but both fought 3 major wars that followed a remarkably similar arc:
1. Small war over points of honor that rapidly expanded 2. Large war that saw many victories but no real gains 3. Large war that saw defeats and losses
🧵
1. The Franco-Dutch War (1672-78) & War of the Polish Succession (1733-35)
These were the smallest large wars of their reigns. Both started out limited conflicts over points of honor, then spread to other parts of Europe as natural rivalries with the Habsburgs took over.
Louis XIV invaded the Holland in 1672 to punish it for its lack of support in a brief war with Spain a few years earlier (the War of Devolution). This was coordinated with a naval attack by England, which had already fought two wars with the Dutch in as many decades.
The wars of Louis XIV are criminally neglected in popular anglophone historiography. They were enormous in scope and consequence, shaping the map of modern Europe arguably even more than the Napoleonic wars.
In the American market, the two most popular topics by far are WWII and the Civil War. The reasons are obvious: the scale, personal connection, US involvement, etc. But there's another reason they continue to draw more scholarly and professional military attention...
And that is that they're interesting at every level of war: from the grand strategic to theater strategy, tactics and operations.
Battles affected campaigns, campaigns in one theater affected those in another, so on and so forth. Endlessly fascinating complexity.
The gap between operations and strategy is tough to bridge because it usually overlaps with the civil-military divide. This was even harder when armies were composed of mercenaries.
The Venetians did it by employing officers resembling communist political commissars.🧵
Every Venetian army was accompanied by two officers called provveditori. This is sometimes translated as “commissioner” or “commissary”, as they oversaw army administration of the army. But they also had a political and strategic role.
Perhaps uncoincidentally, this other role is best described by the word commissar—the Russian word for commissary. Proveditors were tasked with ensuring the loyalty of mercenary captains and making sure their operations supported Venice’s overall war strategy.