A🧵 with some of the major revelations in the Afghanistan Inquiry Oversight Panel. Initially so much of the criticism seems to be directed against the strategic decision makers from about 09 onwards, most significantly then CDF and now GG David Hurley
The ‘wavering moral compass and declining psychological health’ was well known within the command but, as BRS said to JTF 633 Commander Maj. Gen. John Cantwell in 2012 the SASR ‘weren’t allowed’ to have mental health problems…
The SASR unit psych told me there were ‘red flags’ all over the place, including widespread alcohol abuse, DV, obsessions with death, inc sharing of gruesome imagery and snuff porn. Guys were holding it together and then completely falling apart…
It’s so gratifying to see the report identified ‘an increased number of deployment waivers’ as a significant issue. I’ve been banging on about this…
…since I found out the circumstances around the death of Sgt. Ian Turner. He was a wreck when he was sent off on Op Okra, having recently come out of a psych ward. He was issued a waiver so he could deploy- one of hundreds- then took his own life.
This waiver paper trail should be a significant part of the Royal Commission I think should follow. Where ever it goes (GG, Gen Campbell), a review of medals and honours should follow.
Interesting passage here about replacing the ADF’s ‘ethics doctrine’ which allows utilitarian decision making. This reminds me of a speech given by the man who commanded an SOTG that allegedly committed a large number of murders…
Ian Langford discusses ‘situational ethics’ here which relates to the above. This raises the question of objective situational awareness- how many stories did you hear about Australian teams and platoons ‘almost being wiped out’ in Afgh?
This piece about super and benefits is interesting. Soldiers feared they’d lose super and benefits if they had a war crimes conviction. This fear would have stopped disclosure and assistance the OSI…yet the fear isn’t based in law. Why didn’t Defence tell them it wasn’t?
This is incredibly significant. Counter-insurgency? Shaping, strategic, integrated. Counter-terrorism? Whack-a-mole, endless killing, constant sense of emergency. And wrong. Primarily the Australians fought local afghans in their own villages.
Defence and government owed troops a strategic vision for victory. It’s in the ADF’s own leadership doctrine of jus in bello. They failed in that obligation.
More on the preference to kill suspected insurgents over detaining them or just walking past them, as the SASR did in Afgh in 2002
And speaking of the preference to kill. Read about the admirable (but abandoned) SOTG Rule of Law Cell in my book Find Fix Finish.
And yep, NCOs like Ben Roberts-Smith ran the joint, with junior officers cucked.
Real all about this in my book too. No adequate psych screening pre of post deployment, waivers for psych issues...command did not GAF about whether someone was psychologically or morally fit for deployment in Afgh
Yep. Brits and Americans have been accused of the same crimes, on the same mission set, using the same cover up and it's been revealed British officers knew their SAS was in a 'extra judicial killing competition' with either us or the Americans.
So..people knew. Those 'issues arising from operation reporting' would have been enough. The patrol reporting was clearly fabricated, yet nothing was done about. In the UK Inquiry they've uncovered emails between officers...
...talking about the patrol reporting mass delusion that they're all meant to accept. The grab above probably relates to the Sola killings, and if people like Stephen Smith did an audit of patrol reporting then, they may have stopped the Darwan murders.
Shout out to my guy Abdul Gafar Stankzai, formerly the head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission in TK and now living in Adelaide. He had so much of this right at the time, and when he tried to bring it to command, he was ignored.
This may be the reason the report was considered to be prejudicial. The standard for war crimes command responsibility is 'should have known.' This may mean the Australian Head of State could have committed war crimes.
Afterwards, a swipe at Brereton. If you really wanted to know what happened, you would have ordered a civilian review. We still could...an RC.
The panel says defence didn't assume the command responsibility that a private company or a not for profit would. Let's keep in mind the wrongdoing here is mass murder.
The Panel finds that Defence STILL does not accept culpability beyond the patrol level and that this affects veterans, soldiers and families.
Wow, the panel says Defence's enabled omerta in Afghanistan existed before the conflict, resulting in the allowance of sexual and physical abuse for 'decades'
This is absolutely damning to me. The Panel finds the ADF's ethics doctrine excludes natural law theory (which says ever human has inherent rights).
Again, absolutely damning IMO.
I included a whole section in my book about Ian Langford's discussion of just war theory, and how I didn't believe the SOTG's and Australia's war in Afgh were consistent with just war theory principles.
FIN. I will come back to this. This report is consistent with my Find Fix Finish conclusions. I feel incredibly vindicated, but also infuriated. The ministers, the department and major media orgs could have found all this out more than a decade ago by just asking around.
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Alan Jones was a key figure when Australian soldiers were first accused of war crimes in Afghanistan in 2009, and he's part of the reason Australia has not been able to settle the war crimes question since.🧵...
In Feb 2009 an Australian element, mostly reservists, were tasked with doing a night raid on an Afghan home just north of Tarin Kot. Finding nothing, they decided to raid an adjacent home while there.
They broke a lock and crept in. An Afghan man heard them and, in the pitch dark, he assumed a home invasion. He picked up his AK-47 and he was fired at. Aussies also posted grenades in the room he was in. He was killed and many of his family members, including two babies.
For mine, the most interest part of the Afghanistan report was the section on military ethics, and how failures in ADF ethics training may have contributed to war crimes. 1/10
Reading it I was reminded about this 2007 New Yorker piece about the ongoing US military torture scandal and how it was caused (partially) by Jack Bauer. Yes, that Jack Bauer, from 24.
24 was hugely popular among people who were conducting interrogations in Iraq and Afghanistan and, with little or no training in interrogation, they did what the show did, which was torture detainees. The show assumed two facts about torture that weren't true in real life:
Some of Ben Robert-Smith's more coherent and intelligent supporters are taking about the ROE mess in Afghanistan, and how it may complicate any potential criminal war crimes trials. 🧵
The @MusorianDigger of YouTube/FOI fame posted this (provenance unknown) detailing the two main offensive Rules of Engagement used by ISAF: ROE 429-A and 429-B.
Here's a further clarification from a UK infantry platoon commander's pre-deployment course. ROE 421 and 422 are standing, meaning you can employ them at any time, but 429a (and b) needed to be authorised.
The 2013 ROE amplification, mentioned in the piece as the ‘seven steps required before shooting’ had to be understood. At its face, it’s a document of restraint stopping the SASR from killing the wrong people and this is the way 4 Corners characterised, but…
The document was just to protect commanders. It was issued in 2013 after some highly visible SASR murders- Sola and Darwan come to mind. The patrol reporting about these murders were fabrications, and command likely knew they were…
In the wake of the David McBride verdict, a 🧵 with context around some of the leaked material that made it into the press thanks to @MurdochCadell . First up: Jalbay.
These killing were covered in my book Find Fix Finish and by 4Corners. The SASR were hunting a man named Mullah Ismail, who left behind 'VRI' (a mobile phone signature) after attending a funeral. The McBride disclosures included information an investigation in the killings.
The investigation appears to be undercooked. It doesn't identify the killed men and mentions two conflicting sources of intel, neither of which indicated the men could be automatically killed. The author of the Jalbay report also wrote this OpEd.
Hastie was in Afghanistan in October 2012 basically on a short familiarisation tour. He'd been in country before as a cavalry officer, but not with the SASR. He was sent out to the village of Syachow on a kill/capture mission with Ben Roberts-Smith.
Hastie flew in on 'turn two' meaning he flew in after BRS had already done his clearance. Hastie testified that he saw BRS walk away from the compound with prisoners and another SASR members then heard two shots.