π° Here's the basic case for turning property taxes into a land value tax (LVT), as presented to the Colorado Commission on Property Tax back in January π§΅
LVT shifts:
π° boost business activity & construction of multifamily housing
π° are neutral for the typical homeowner, tend to increase tax bills on vacant/underutilized land, provide tax relief for multifamily housing
π° are strictly better for tenants as a tax which does raise rents is replaced by one which does not.
* LVT is a recurring tax charged to property owners in proportion to the value of the land they own (which includes its location value).
* LVT shifts involve a revenue-neutral increase in LVT used to fund tax cuts for homes & other buildings.
π° What is the impact of a LVT shift on housing? π°
* As the old saying goes "if you want less of something, tax it"
* Traditional property taxes penalize development by taxing the new buildings.
* Not so for an LVT shift, which rewards construction.
(Data on this below)
π° What is the impact of a LVT shift on tax bills? π°
It depends
Rule-of-thumb: calculate a property's Intensity Ratio (IR) by taking Improvement Value divided by Total Value
β¬οΈ Properties with an above-average IR get a tax cut from an LVT shift
β¬οΈ Below-average IRs pay more
The upshot of the above is that typically LVT shifts cause tax bills to:
β¬οΈ for vacant land/car parks
β¬οΈ for industrial uses
β¬οΈ for multifamily housing
β¬οΈ for commercial buildings
β¬οΈ/β¬οΈ have a range of effects for single family homes (depending on the intensity ratio):
π° What is the impact of LVT on rents? π°
Answer: Unlike taxes on buildings, land taxes do not get passed on to tenants. Full explanation in the QT.
Shifting the tax base from improvements to land will increase housing supply and reduce rents.
For the Colorado context (which has fairly strict legal constraints on the property tax system), we recommended a few specific approaches to an LVT shift.
Patrick Condon's housing model is wrong. But it's wrong in some pretty interesting & pseudo-Georgist ways.
So let's go through them. π§΅
First, let's steelman him:
@pmcondon2 says that when you upzone a single family home to allow apartments, you a) gift land value to the property owner, because the additional redevelopment option immediately makes their property more valuable.
His model also claims b) that even if you build the apartments, their internal per sqft price will be unchanged, and thus that there's no affordability gains.
From this, he argues that you should not upzone without a tax on the gifted land value, and that affordability can not be improved by YIMBY, only public housing.
The first way Condon is wrong is pretty trivial but it can be distracting, so let's get it out of the way:
Construction costs per sqft increase as you build taller, so residual land value captured by landowners declines with each additional storey of legal capacity.
A more realistic version of Condon's diagram would look like the second image here.
(Note that I've set up my diagram to keep Condon's core claims a) to d) intact. So let's tackle them:)
Homeownership is a lumpy, non-diversified investment asset, whose value derives in large part from rents, whose owners become fanatically devoted to lobbying government to limit their taxes, ban competing supply or poor people living nearby.
It's a garbage thing to promote.
"But homeownership is a great mechanism for forced savings"
a) only for people who can get a downpayment together,
b) if forced savings is a policy goal, let's just do Singapore-style mandatory savings accounts.
"But homeownership creates good citizens interested in building their community"
"Why are YIMBYs only concerned with upzoning and never with cutting immigration?!"
One simple answer to this question is that, while you *can* reduce prices either by reducing demand or expanding supply, the latter *increases* wellbeing while the former reduces it:
There are other reasons of course, such as a principled belief that it's good when people are free to move to locations which give them better opportunities in life, and that it's bad when govt force is used to privilege incumbents instead.
Wanted to share my Prop 13 lit review from last night's @CACommonGround event.
Details in π§΅ below, but basically Prop 13 led to:
π° worse taxes instead
π people moving less
ποΈ fewer houses built (=β¬οΈprices & β¬οΈrents)
βΉοΈ welfare loss
βοΈ iniquity
π°οΈ Quick history lesson: California passed Prop 13 in 1978 and had five key features:
1β£ Property taxes capped at 1% of assessed value
2β£ Assessed value of property is pegged to purchase price, not its current market value
3β£ Assessed values grow at max 2% per year
5β£ 'Ad valorem' taxes are banned (which makes a land value tax in CA very difficult π’)
5β£ Tax increases require a 2/3rds majority to pass
This triggered a 'tax revolt' against property taxes throughout the US, resulting in similar policies all-over.
Cory: these dumb Georgists don't know that LVT is identical to a 99-year lease because Price=NPV(Ξ£Rents)
ADB (2010): China should shift from leases to annual taxes
Purves (2023): Singapore should shift from leases to LVT
Poon (2011): Hong Kong should shift from leases to LVT
I think there's some confusion about Land Value Tax (LVT) charged as a percentage of the *sale price* of land, versus those charged as a % of the *annual ground rent* the land generates (which I'll call LRT, Land Rent Tax).
So let's compare π§΅
Imagine a property that's rented out for $3,333 a month, half of which is generated by the building, and half by the land & location. We can say that the land is generating rent of ($1,667 x 12 =) $20,000 per year.
This land rent is what Georgists really want to capture. πΈ
π° Land Rent Tax (LRT) π°
LRT is straightforward: the govt taxes a percentage of the land rent each year.
A 1% LRT on the above property is $200. Tenants still pay $20,000, leaving $19,800 profit for the landlord.