Thread by @Peter52834033

🧵 1/n #tin $AFM.V ...okay, let's talk about the significance of controlling Rubaya, and taking a cut of the (coltan) mining trade there. First of all, these are the Rubaya mines. You can get something similar from satellite imagery. Rubaya mines produce about 1000t

2/n of coltan per year, valued at ~50MUSD/yr. Rubaya mines are 'partially mechanized', and the workers there have endured quite the existence on any time scale.

3/n Armed groups controlling the coltan trade is nothing new for Rubaya. M23 assuming control is nothing foreign. When I say control, I'm talkin in the mafia style of control (they get 'protection money'... we'll get to that). A host of armed groups have controlled the mine,

4/n including the M23 on three separate occasion -see pic in previous post from the original insurgency, the one below (2023), and note the current situation.

5/n In 2023 when this happened the Congolese army required >24hrs to confirm (sounds very strategic) 🤣. So, what is the significance of the coltan trade from Rubaya? Are they generating lot of tax revenue? I'll let you be the judge LMAO.

6/n That said, fighting over control of the mines isn't for nothing. The $50MUSD/yr value - of which the M23 mafioso will skim a generous cut - isn't nothing. It certainly could support arms procurement and furthering of their influence. After all, they're not miners...

7/n They're a militia. With a pretend political objective, that exists to pull cash. There are a variety of interested parties (elements in Rwanda especially, and Uganda), but it's basically a mob operating 'justly' under the guise of 'ethnically motivated injustice'

8/ History is repeating. They're going after all the same territory. This happened in 2013, in the same areas. It happened in 2023 (check out the timelapse associate with the first image below at ) - similar territory taken, and it's happening again. acleddata.com/2023/03/23/act…

Okay, so history is repeating... how does Alphamin $AFM.V get associated with any of this? If you 'know' what's happening in the DRC, perhaps this will be a bore... I have my doubts. Keep in mind the maps of M23 related conflict above... which would've looked similar in a 2013.

9/n Actually, I forgot, some additional evidence for the mafia analogy from 2013 (see pics below). Today, in the news releases, you'll hear them talk about they're not there to interrupt mining in Rubaya, but to 'protect' the miners etc... sound familiar (mob-like)?

10/n Back to some supposed significance w.r.t. Alphamin. Bisie, Alphamin's mines (MS/MN) have their own history of artisanal production. I recommend you read up on it, because I'm not going to re-hash it here, as it never involved the M23. Western people often quote distances

11/n between the conflict and Bisie, as though it's a 90 minute drive up the interstate. So let's look at what's between Bisie and the conflict region (which they don't ship through, and we'll get to that...). First, I posted the M23 position in N. Kivu above and they're all...

12/n within close proximity to the border. Rubaya is a 50km/2hr drive from Goma. It takes so long, partially because the roads are shit, but there's lots of roads in/out. Bisie - I only posted the logistics camp below which is >30km from the mine - is more than 8 hours away...

13/n with MUCH shittier roads. Rubaya is in the usual conflict zone for M23, and you can approach it from many different directions. To get to Bisie, from the areas M23 controls, you have one option: R529 to the N3. And there are many intervening villages along the way...

14/n road upkeep is in proportion to the population, and you can see this pretty clearly in population(@researchremora)/vegetation density(@PythonMaps) maps - see the open black circle in the population map for Bisie, and the red star for the vegetation map:

@researchremora @PythonMaps 15/n Bisie is in a VERY remote location with >>100 km of 100% tree cover from the one access point to Bisie areas from M23 control. What else is in that intervening space? Here's a quote from @Boris_Kamstra from 2017:

16/n [Aside: if M23 is really just another militia... which I'd argue... it's nothing new for $AFM.V]. So... if you have one route of entry to Bisie, and significance recognized at the highest levels of congolese government... you're in a good position to protect that asset...

17/n I won't go on and on about the strategies one might employ (I hope they're obvious). Instead let's talk about why protect Alphamin might be of interest. First of all, $AFM will soon be approaching run rates of 20kt of #tin per year. This represents ~7% of mined tin supply

18/n and 680M USD/yr of value (versus 50M/yr of coltan at Rubaya). The DRC is not only collecting a royalty on this, and taxes, but they are a 5% owner of the mine. As @YellowLabLife already mentioned, this amounts to more than 50% of N. Kivu tax revenue (royalties included).

@YellowLabLife 19/n And what about the IDC (South African government parastatal promoting industrial development)? They've got a big stake. Who's supporting the DRC in N. Kivu again... oh yeah... S. Africa...

@YellowLabLife 20/n Punchline is, if M23 are going to make their way to Bisie is going to happen in slow motion along the single transport route available to them. And there is no comparison to the resistance they faced in Rubaya with what they'll have to deal with. Frankly I think...

@YellowLabLife 21/n they wouldn't attempt it (it would be unprecedented for them - they've be doing this a while), and if they did they'd get fucked up real good in the process. I did mention shipping routes are not in this stretch of roads. It shouldn't be new info - and telling when

@YellowLabLife 22/ when it is to the individual commenting - that $AFM.V takes the N3 to Kisangani before crossing the Ugandan border in Goli (1000km north of Goma) on their way to Kampala. The excerpt below is FROM THEIR 2022 TECHNICAL REPORT! C'mon guys... you can figure this shit out FFS!