1. Sanctions have had a very significant negative effect on aviation safety in Iran.
But the idea that they contributed to the recent crash and the deaths of Raisi and Abdollahian makes little sense.
Recent reports by FT, NYT, and others taking that line miss some key details.
2. Old aircraft are not *necessarily* unsafe. The helicopter carrying Raisi was built in 1994.
Until a few years ago, the fleet of Marine Helicopter Squadron One, which transports the US president, included old Sikorsky VH-3Ds, including one from late 1970s.
3. The maintenance and refurbishment of the aircraft are what really matter.
Here, sanctions may have had an impact by making it more difficult for Iran to procure parts for the Bell 212, which is an American-made helicopter.
4. But the Bell 212 was widely produced and remains in operation across the Middle East. Parts would be available in the region.
For Iran, a 1990s helicopter is actually going to be easier to maintain and operate given less reliance on complex tech and advanced avionics.
5. The accident history of Bell 212s in Iran supports this view.
There are four accidents to date recorded in the ASN database (same as UAE and Iraq), of which three were fatal.
Weather and human error are the reasons for these accidents.
6. You can actually read the Iran Civil Aviation Organization investigation into the April 2018 accident which killed four people.
7. The aircraft, which was built in 1981, had been inspected and deemed airworthy ICAO that year. The operator was a civilian company.
If a civilian operator can get parts to keep a Bell 212 airworthy in Iran, then surely the Iranian Air Force and HESA can manage to do the same.
8. Notably, one of the four accidents recorded in Iraq was investigated by the NTSB because the aircraft was a Bell 212 operated by the U.S. Department of State.
The cause was pilot error... but the old bird was built in 1971!
That's way older than the helicopter in Iran.
9. We also need to think through what aviation safety means in this context.
When we say sanctions impact aviation safety in Iran, small increases in risk accumulate across large fleets, especially in airplanes.
10. Selecting a helicopter to transport the president is a different proposition. It's a single aircraft.
To suggest sanctions had a role implies that Raisi and Abdollahian were transported in an aircraft known to have technical vulnerabilities and there was no other choice.
11. The FT's own graphic shows that Iran has several Bell helicopters in active service that are less than 5 years old.
This suggests there was no concern about the aircraft used by the president, which had the tail number 6-9207. Otherwise a newer aircraft would've been used.
12. Have sanctions prevented Iran from procuring more modern helicopters, possibly with better safety technology?
Yes. Most of Iran's helicopters are very old.
Did sanctions force the president and foreign minister to be transported in an aircraft with known faults?
No.
13. Finally, there could have been some kind of catastrophic failure with the aircraft that could be connected to some defective part or substandard maintenance.
But we can't ignore the *obvious* reason for the crash.
The Bell 212 is not cleared for low visibility flying.
14. The helicopter got caught in bad weather, there was no visibility, the pilot got disoriented, and the chopper clipped some trees before crashing into the mountainside.
The question is why they were flying in bad weather? Was it negligence? Did the weather suddenly change?
15. Those are the questions that the investigation will need to answer.
There are lots of stories to tell about sanctions making lives harder, more miserable, and more dangerous in Iran.
But the demise of Raisi and Abdollahian in a helicopter accident isn't one of them.
16. Small postscript to say "that year" in Tweet 7 refers to the year of the accident, not 1981.
The Bell 212 in that incident was inspected and deemed airworthy the year it crashed.
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1. Why hasn't China made bigger strides to develop an alternative to the US-led global financial system?
We've been talking about "de-dollarization" for years and the RMB still accounts for a tiny fraction of global trade...
What if China isn't *really* trying to de-dollarize?
2. The general theory of de-dollarization is that the increased use of economic weapons such as tariffs and sanctions by consecutive American administrations is spurring China to take the lead on the creation of an alternative financial system (which Russia, Iran etc. also want).
3. As @daniel_mcdowell and others have detailed, China has certainly worked to develop new payment messaging systems, central bank digital currencies, and swap lines that could amount to the building blocks of a new financial architecture, one that doesn't depend on the dollar.
1. @Brad_Setser's new NYT op-ed argues that China presents a "danger the world economy" because of its enormous trade surplus in manufactured goods.
I think he is identifying an important issue about imbalances.
But his argument and this chart ⬇may exaggerate the problem.
2. At first glance, the chart substantiates the claim that China is exporting a disproportionate volume of manufactured goods to the world, even compared to other big industrial exporters like Germany and Japan.
But the chart presents surpluses as a share of *global* GDP.
3. This is a peculiar choice. If we want to contextualize China's growing exports of manufactured goods, we need to think about China's growing economy.
Setser rightly points out that the total value of Chinese manufactured exports have surged, especially since the pandemic.
1. So Netanyahu came to Washington and what he got is a memo on Iran, not an EO with new sanctions designations.
Trump said he is "unhappy" to sign to memo, and that he hopes it "will hardly have to be used," while also stating he wants a deal with Iran.
Huge shift from 2018.
2. If Trump was really aiming to resume maximum pressure, he would have signed a new EO to widen sanctions on Iran's oil sector, and Treasury would have designated Chinese ports and refiners pursuant to the EO in order to reduce volumes of Iranian crude flowing to China.
3. These ports and refiners are known targets and the Biden administration had almost certainly prepared the designations that are ready on the shelves of OFAC.
Biden didn't enact these sanctions because of concerns of blowback for global oil markets and US-China relations.
1. If there’s any geopolitical logic in the Trump tariffs, this is it:
To sustain the fleeting unipolar order and keep “America first,” the US doesn’t need to confront adversaries. It needs to coerce allies.
Trump is testing how economic coercion can make *allies* obey.
2. US political and business elites increasingly believe that the rules-based order and globalization has served to reduce the hard power gap between the US and its rivals, especially China. This threatens unipolarity.
Biden’s braintrust helped usher in this new consensus!
3. @adam_tooze has written extensively on the striking coherence between the outlooks of the two administrations.
Trump, like Biden, wants to move away from the current international economic order, to put “America first.” lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v46/…
1. Iran is in the midst of a slow-moving energy crisis.
Sanctions are partly to blame. They have prevented investment and access to technology.
But regulation is a bigger challenge. More than 60% energy generation in Iran is undertaken by quasi-private companies.
2. This is a legacy of Iran's long and tortured push for market liberalization, which gained momentum in the early 2000s only to a hit wall when sanctions began to isolate the economy.
Officials knew that liberalization could lead to greater competitiveness and efficiency.
3. But by the time the privatization plan was ready in 2013, financial sanctions had put Iran into a recession. The private sector was on the back foot.
A total of 22 power plants were transferred, mainly to quasi-state companies that had been opportunistically created.
1. The new sanctions targeting key Russian banks have caused a sharp devaluation of the ruble. Russia's central bank isn't going to be able to keep devaluation and inflation in check as FX revenues are interrupted.
Does this mean sanctions are finally working?
Probably not...
2. To know if sanctions are working, we need to be precise about the goals.
The primary goal of sanctions is to create enough economic pain to convince Putin to change his behavior and cease the war in Ukraine. This is the coercive aim.
3. However, if Putin cannot be coerced, then the secondary goal is that the sanctions deprive him of the resources he needs to pursue his war aims.
It is highly unlikely that either goal will be achieved, even if Russia now enters a period of "stagflation."