Dr Graeme Callister Profile picture
May 27 20 tweets 4 min read Read on X
There has understandably been a lot on here over the past couple of days about National Service.

So as a historian who actually studies and writes about compulsory military service, here are a few thoughts on the challenges it poses. A quick 🧵 1/
(N.B. This thread doesn’t give my opinions or deal at all with the politics of it – everyone already has their thoughts on that. This is just a thread of challenges that have historically faced governments imposing universal service.)
Any National Service scheme is vastly expensive. Armies have to feed, clothe, equip, house, transport, pay and of course train the servicemen. Realistically they also need to provide professional services like medical support, support transitioning back to civilian life etc. 2/
Young people taken away from home & put in an alien environment also need a lot of mental health support (even if they essentially opt in - ask any university). This is not ‘wokery’. Suicide rates among conscripts have historically been high, and this needs to be prevented. 3/
Administering annual turnover of conscripts is an enormous task. You need more-or-less instant access to all info about young people so you can make quick decisions on eligibility – alongside basic info you need medical history, aptitude, records of criminality, abuse etc. 4/
The admin alone is vastly expensive and needs major investment in a nationwide network of physical spaces where recruits can be assessed, gathered, and processed. There also needs to be a very rapid but robust system for appeals against recruitment board decisions. 5/
Outsourcing elements of selection to non-military personnel (e.g. GPs passing recruits as fit) always leads to problems, with too many people incorrectly accepted/rejected for service. Doing it ‘in house’ in the military is expensive and time-consuming. 6/
Language is also a major issue. Do you only conscript those who speak the national language? Do you end up with ‘national’ service that excludes a portion of the population? Or do you provide language lessons and interpreters? 7/
No system of ‘universal service’ (military or otherwise) is ever universal. It doesn’t matter what your initial hopes are, there will always be exemptions. Some are obvious, e.g. serious disabilities. Others are less so, and lead to the impression that the system is unfair. 8/
There will have to be exemptions for carers/sole breadwinners. Maybe for young parents. Probably for temporary health/mental health problems. Possibly for cases of extreme hardship where people can’t afford to spend time volunteering instead of in paid work. 9/
Almost every system of conscription has ended up with effective exemptions for a range of opportunities that inevitably favour the wealthy. In this case that might be prestigious foreign uni places, voluntary gap yahs abroad, prestigious internships, reserved occupations etc. 10/
There will also be loud demands for exemption from universal pacifists, those who reject all state service, and those who reject the ideology of the state. Their protests will be loud, public, and deliberately aimed at embarrassing the government by creating martyrs. 11/
What do you do with people who refuse service, or who disappear halfway through? Imprisoning conscripts is usually very unpopular outside major war emergencies, and prosecuting ordinary people for helping them avoid service even more so. 12/
But you still need to ensure service appears to be universal - so you need punishments that target & deter evaders without making martyrs or stirring up more discontent. Society has to support your punishments – which it rarely will if the country is not facing a major threat 13/
Societal acceptance of service is the best way of making sure conscription is broadly adhered to. Societies tend to accept it if there is a clear need, if the cost in time/damage done to young lives is not too high, and if there is an ingrained habit of service. 14/
Presuming you can get all of your conscripts into the army, there is still the problem of what to do with them. Training only to immediately discharge creates real problems in morale and quality of engagement with the training, and real problems of motivation for instructors. 15/
If kept in service, armies always struggle with where to put short-term conscripts. Adding them to existing units is disruptive, compromising morale & quality. If in separate units, it is difficult to find useful roles for them, so service is a countdown to demobilisation. 16/
If the aim is to create a trained reserve of former conscripts, they will need annual/biennial refresher training. This is enormously expensive and difficult to administer, especially as more and more reservists are likely to apply for exemptions as they get older. 17/
Armies also need additional training units, equipment, temporary housing, transport capacity etc for hundreds of thousands of additional potential soldiers in the reserves. There is no point having a trained reserve if you can’t mobilise it quickly due to absence of resources 18/
National service can work – but it is expensive, disruptive, and carries permanent reputational risk for a government. To be useful, it needs overwhelming support of civil society, and a military that has a very clear reason for actively wanting partially conscripted forces. End/

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More from @GraemeCallister

May 25
May 1815. Northern France.

Napoleon’s Armée du Nord is almost assembled. A few more men will continue to drift in before the campaign, but the infantry battalions are almost at fighting strength.

A bigger problem is that there are not enough generals to lead them. 1/ Image
The senior commanders – d’Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Lobau – were all experienced generals, but it is telling that Napoleon could not muster enough marshals to be corps commanders.

General Gerard was highly rated. His corps technically formed an independent army until June. 2/
At divisional level matters were worse. The few experienced men like Foy commanded alongside others dragged from administrative posts (e.g. Donzelot), men of uncertain loyalty (Bourmont), or virtually useless political appointees (Prince Jérôme). It was very much a B team. 3/ Image
Read 11 tweets
May 22
I recently looked at a random sample of 300 conscripts from Napoleon’s army (25e Ligne, nos.6601-6900). All were conscripted in late 1808, in the middle of the Napoleonic Wars.

Shockingly, when the regiment re-enrolled in 1814, not a single man of the 300 remained in the 25e. 1/ Image
Of the 300:
77 transferred to other units
62 died of natural causes
58 deserted
54 were lost in Russia
16 were medically discharged
12 became PoW
7 were hospitalised
5 died of wounds
3 disappeared on patrol
3 were pensioned
2 went to Veteran battalions
1 died in an accident
2/
A full quarter of men were transferred to other units (mostly 15e and 81e Ligne in mid-1811) – seemingly because they were in hospital & it was administratively easier to register them in another regiment when 25e moved.

Most died or were quickly discharged after transfer. 3/
Read 13 tweets
Apr 17
In Napoleonic Wars, most of those killed in combat were interred on the battlefield where they fell.

A few though were moved elsewhere or taken home for burial – one of whom was Major the Hon. Frederick Howard, 10th Hussars, killed at Waterloo in 1815. A short 🧵1/ Image
The Hon. Frederick Howard, son of the 5th Earl of Carlisle, was commissioned ensign in 85th Foot in 1801, aged 15.

He became lieutenant in the 10th Light Dragoons in Dec 1802, captain by 1804, and from May 1811 was a major in the regiment – now styled 10th Hussars. 2/
He served in the Peninsula 1808-9 & 1813-14. In 1814 he refused to sign a letter of complaint demanding the court martial of the 10th’s commander, Col Quentin. The colonel was acquitted and most of the 10th’s officers dismissed from the regiment – but the loyal Howard remained 3/
Read 11 tweets
Dec 5, 2023
“Soldiers of the 5th!”

The epic scene of Napoleon winning over the 5th Line in 1815 has come to symbolise the emperor’s appeal in the army. But who were the real men of the 5th? Were they die-hard Napoleonic veterans?

Naturally, I dipped into the records to find out. A 🧵1/ Image
When they met Napoleon in March 1815 there were 1308 men registered in the 5th Line, excluding those on leave or who had deserted or been discharged (1932 men including them).

What follows is compiled from the individual service records of each and every one of those men. 2/
Of the 1308 men, 812 had served all or most of their career in the 5th.

Of the other 496, some 223 came from 114th Line, 34 from Imperial Guard, and the rest from a total of 82 different units, including the navy, the Italian army, & the Naples Guards (1 each). 3/
Read 19 tweets
Jan 9, 2023
Some quite interesting information about casualties at the Battle of Waterloo has come out of the regimental registers of the French 17eme Ligne, which was part of Donzelot’s 2nd Division in I Corps. Here’s a short summary of some findings 1/
Entries in the register record 634 men lost in some way on 18 June 1815:
560 ‘Lost, presumed dead or prisoner of war’
2 disappeared
8 missing, later returned
9 prisoners of war
38 killed in action
17 wounded
The register (very unusually) also gives some details of those wounds 2/
Of the 38 men killed in action, all were recorded as shot (‘mort par suite d’un coup de feu’). In 13 cases no further details were given, but 17 men are listed as shot in the head, 6 in the chest, and 2 shot in the stomach. 3/
Read 11 tweets
Jan 5, 2023
Most regimental register entries give a few scant details of a man’s enrolment, unit, campaigns fought, and demise/discharge. Not so for Felix Dieppedalle, who rose to Adjutant Sous Officier in 17eme Ligne – and whose record tells a fascinating (if fragmentary) tale. 1/ Extract from regimental register for Dieppedalle, listing hi
Felix Dieppedalle (or Jean Felix, on his initial inscription record) was born in Rouen on 4 August 1782. He was conscripted in 1805 and placed in the Company of Reserve of his department of Seine-Inférieure. He was 165cm tall, just above average for the time. 2/
He clearly made an impression; within three weeks he was promoted corporal, and after six months sergeant. He spent 1806-7 on coastal garrison duty.

In May 1811, he transferred to 17eme Ligne, where the good impression continued. He was promoted sergeant major on 16 July. 3/
Read 16 tweets

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