Thread🧵on Armenia🇦🇲 1/11
The hint statement by Armenian Prime Minister N. Pashinyan about plans to leave the CSTO was predictable: this is another anti-Russian action, which, moreover, coincided with the celebration of Russia Day. The Armenian Foreign Ministry is trying to
The hint statement by Armenian Prime Minister N. Pashinyan about plans to leave the CSTO was predictable: this is another anti-Russian action, which, moreover, coincided with the celebration of Russia Day. The Armenian Foreign Ministry is trying to
2/11
disavow this statement, but this does not change the essence.
There is no talk of Armenia leaving the EAEU yet, but it is obvious that Pashinyan wants to completely change the vector of the country’s development. This desire cannot be confirmed by democratic procedures:
disavow this statement, but this does not change the essence.
There is no talk of Armenia leaving the EAEU yet, but it is obvious that Pashinyan wants to completely change the vector of the country’s development. This desire cannot be confirmed by democratic procedures:
3/11
despite Pashinyan’s apparent tactical successes, the situation resembles an all-in game with dangerous consequences.
Pashinyan, obviously, secured not only the support of France, but also the United States: the news about plans to withdraw from the CSTO overlapped with
despite Pashinyan’s apparent tactical successes, the situation resembles an all-in game with dangerous consequences.
Pashinyan, obviously, secured not only the support of France, but also the United States: the news about plans to withdraw from the CSTO overlapped with
4/11
the statement about raising relations between the United States and Armenia to the level of a strategic partnership. For now, this has rather a symbolic meaning, but with a clearly unfriendly connotation towards Russia.
If protests intensify in the country (which is
the statement about raising relations between the United States and Armenia to the level of a strategic partnership. For now, this has rather a symbolic meaning, but with a clearly unfriendly connotation towards Russia.
If protests intensify in the country (which is
5/11
already happening) and the position of the current government weakens, Pashinyan will appeal to the support of the United States and NATO countries. This, given the complex disposition in the Caucasus, can have very serious consequences.
Pashinyan understands perfectly
already happening) and the position of the current government weakens, Pashinyan will appeal to the support of the United States and NATO countries. This, given the complex disposition in the Caucasus, can have very serious consequences.
Pashinyan understands perfectly
6/11
well that he will no longer be able to establish a trusting relationship with V. Putin, which, however, never existed. What inspires Pashinyan to take such a risky game is not sociology, but the inability of the opposition to realize its advantages and the lack of a common
well that he will no longer be able to establish a trusting relationship with V. Putin, which, however, never existed. What inspires Pashinyan to take such a risky game is not sociology, but the inability of the opposition to realize its advantages and the lack of a common
7/strategy for opponents of the current government. Sociology in Armenia clearly shows that the absolute majority of citizens are pro-Russian. Taking into account the fact that the overwhelming majority of Armenians have relatives in Russia, the situation looks even more obvious.
8/11
In this regard, one can expect cunning maneuvers from Pashinyan. He cannot yet declare his withdrawal from the EAEU, and the preparation of a statement on withdrawal from the CSTO was visible long before Pashinyan, several months ago, accused some members of this
In this regard, one can expect cunning maneuvers from Pashinyan. He cannot yet declare his withdrawal from the EAEU, and the preparation of a statement on withdrawal from the CSTO was visible long before Pashinyan, several months ago, accused some members of this
9/
organization of actively helping Azerbaijan (we are talking about Kazakhstan and, possibly, Belarus). Pashinyan hopes, with this maneuver, to play on the feelings of bitterness of the Armenian people over defeats in the war with Azerbaijan, but this is by no means guaranteed.
organization of actively helping Azerbaijan (we are talking about Kazakhstan and, possibly, Belarus). Pashinyan hopes, with this maneuver, to play on the feelings of bitterness of the Armenian people over defeats in the war with Azerbaijan, but this is by no means guaranteed.
10/11
In the coming weeks, we can expect active opposition to protests from security forces loyal to Pashinyan. However, this loyalty is segmental and many among the security forces are opposed to the current prime minister. The political crisis in the country is worsening and
In the coming weeks, we can expect active opposition to protests from security forces loyal to Pashinyan. However, this loyalty is segmental and many among the security forces are opposed to the current prime minister. The political crisis in the country is worsening and
11/11
the scenario of dissolution of parliament and early elections is quite possible. However, this scenario is not very beneficial for Pashinyan, who, in this case, risks worsening his position.🔚
the scenario of dissolution of parliament and early elections is quite possible. However, this scenario is not very beneficial for Pashinyan, who, in this case, risks worsening his position.🔚
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