Thread by @BrianKerg

This is a good chance to educate folks like Bridge on the fundamentals of a large scale invasion and operational basics.

The short answer is, look at pre-invasion actions of... Well, nearly any modern invasion. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine being a key example.

https://twitter.com/ElbridgeColby/status/1802727593562567083

So, check it. If you want to seize an objective, you put the resources you're going to use to take that objective in place before you conduct the attack. This is true at echelon, from a squad sized attack to an invasion of a country.

The fundamental issue you're tackling is one of mass and relative combat power. You want a decided advantage of combat power hurled at whatever the enemy might have between you and the objective. You want to have a LOT MORE than the enemy does.

Many factors can elevate your desire for a LOT MORE to a HECK OF A LOT MORE. Factors such as the exact mission you've been assigned, the size and capabilities of the enemy force, time available, the terrain, and other situational factors will mean you need EVEN MORE STUFF.

An invasion of Taiwan, for example, has this challenging water obstacle known as the Taiwan strait between mainland China and Taiwan. Chinese forces need to cross it. This is a time when they are highly vulnerable to fires from Taiwan. They must assume they will lose many forces.

So if you want to have a force remaining to establish a lodgment, let alone stabilize it and expand it, and then perhaps attack from it further out into Taiwan - you need to account for those losses, as well as forces to conduct all those follow on tasks. Hence, EVEN MORE STUFF!

So, all of those forces and things that need to hurl themselves across what is essentially an aquatic kill zone, need to be staged in a fashion enabling the ready movement of forces at a sustained rate over time.

You have to move them and mass them to places that matter.

And... drum roll... this takes a long time, and its detectable.

You can mitigate this to a degree - but only to a degree. At some point, if you're serious, you will give analysts a high degree of confidence that the invasion is coming.

Let's go back to Russia. Prior to the 2022 invasion, over 100k Russian troops were placed around the border with Ukraine, including enablers and sustainment to keep the attack going. Everyone could see it coming, and many official agencies called it out.

This problem will be more acute with an invasion of Taiwan because of the requirements to set conditions for an amphib assault, and to conduct and sustain an amphib assault, as well as the follow-on invasion. This will be Normandy 2.0, and conditions still favor the defender.

Can you station the invading forces closer to the point of embarkation? Sure. That might mitigate visibility a bit. But you still have to stage and embark the ships, stage sustainment, break open blood banks (kicking off a shelf life), and other costly things that tip your hand.

Not to mention a host of other factors that are conducted to set conditions for success in space, cyber, spectrum domains IVO Taiwan, and actions by CCP elites for self protection (movement of money and families, for example).

So, the lesson for Bridge and others, is that sound strategic analyses cannot be decoupled from a fundamental understanding of the operations - or ways - that carry out those strategies. Those who aspire to be strategists must also study operational fundamentals. Fin.

Post script: Given some of the responses I'm getting that claim the #CCP is unbeatable, reposting my article that discusses the very trap of #China's cognitive fait accompli.

They want you to think they're unbeatable - this is untrue. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atla…