Why are there so few conservative or religious scholars in academia? Two popular theories:
1. They face discrimination on the job market, and a hostile work climate if they are employed 2. They would rather do other things with their lives.
There is some evidence in both directions, but also deep problems with both of these narratives as sufficient explanations.
A new piece in @NationalAffairs provides a more unified and compelling account of what's going on here, and possible responses.
Some baseline facts: as my own work for @HdxAcademy shows, the professoriate is highly unrepresentative of U.S. society overall along many dimensions, including and especially along ideological lines:
This is a problem for knowledge production (as I illustrate here: )
It is also a problem for public trust in our institutions, undermines the impact of our work, and threatens the long-term independence and financial viability of our work.
When people feel like they don't have a voice or a stake in institutions, and especially when they view them as hostile to folks like themselves, their natural and rational response is to delegitimize, marginalize, defund or dismantle those institutions (and it works the other way too, when people do feel like their will and interests are represented, as detailed here: ).musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/professors-a…
As far as explanations for why higher ed institutions are so ideologically parochial, political scientist Steve Teles compellingly argues that the "self-selection" hypothesis and the "discrimination" hypothesis are not contradictory. They're complementary: nationalaffairs.com/publications/d…
There is evidence liberals *would* discriminate against conservatives. Yet, in most cases, there's no opportunity. There aren't even overtly non-left candidates to choose from in most searches. Just varieties of liberals + some closeted centrists: nationalaffairs.com/publications/d…
In other words, actual discrimination against conservatives in academia likely can't explain the patterns observed. There are too few in the pipeline to discriminate against!
We have frameworks to explain how we can have systematic underrepresentation and exclusion even in the absence of actual discrimination. Conservatives tend to hate them.
But, ironically, understanding ideological representation in the academy through the lens of systemic and institutional discrimination can explain the observed patterns far more comprehensively than either of the most discussed hypotheses at present.
In fact, it can help unify those hypotheses -- taking the most compelling evidence for each while addresses their apparent shortcomings: nationalaffairs.com/publications/d…
The systematic discrimination framework can help explain how it is that a perceived/ anticipated hostile climate shapes who selects into and out of institutions, and the extent to which they 'identify' with different careers and life paths: nationalaffairs.com/publications/d…
Analyzing ideological underrepresentation in the academy in systemic or institutional terms also points towards a different (perhaps more effective) responses than the more prevalent narratives do. It's a great essay. Read the full thing here: nationalaffairs.com/publications/d…
Side note: for the folks inclined to say, "the patterns must be because rightwingers are stupid, antiscience, hate scholarship" -- first, note that hard science departments are some of the *least* skewed places in universities:
Finally, for the folks chiming in to say, 'all conservatives and/or religious people would have to add to this discussion is [insert outrageous view here]:
This unwillingness or inability to even *try* to charitably imagine what non-left/ non-secular perspectives might have to contribute to understanding the social world is a nice encapsulation of why it's so important to fold more of "those people" into the enterprise.
It's really hard for us to recognize our own biases and blindspots. Our ignorance and biases about others also undermines our ability to understand what they might have to add to a conversation, as DuBois effectively highlighted.
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My latest for Symbolic Capital(ism) explores why the symbolic professions tend to be highly unrepresentative of the societies they purport to serve, and are often dominated by bizarre beliefs and norms.
tldr: It's because they tend to be comprised of people who are cognitively sophisticated and highly educated. Quick 🧵
One thing that's critical for understanding how intelligence and education relate to political beliefs and behaviors is to recognize that our cognitive and perceptual systems are wired primarily to help us enhance our status and further our goals. We perceive and think about the world in fundamentally self-interested ways: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/smart-people…
The tendencies to perceive and think about the world in ways that flatter our self interest, further our goals, and so on -- these are not necessarily "bad." In most circumstances, they are "life enhancing" in Nietzchean terms, but they do regularly cause problems in the context of knowledge and cultural production: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/smart-people…
For Symbolic Capital(ism), I just published a piece pulling together lots of empirical data to answer questions like:
Did Trump win because of racism?
Did Trump win because of sexism?
Did Trump win because "elites" bought the election?
Did Trump win because of third-party "spoilers"?
Did Trump win because of weak turnout?
Did Trump win because Harris chose the wrong running mate?
As the essay details at length, the answer to all of these questions is "no." It's easy to see how people would be drawn to these questions, but none of these hypotheses do a good job of explaining what actually happened in 2024 (or the previous Trump cycles, for that matter). 🧵
Let's start with race: Democrats saw gains with white people this cycle. Harris did about as well with whites as Democrats typically do. She saw improvement with whites across gender lines relative to 2020: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
So why did she lose? Well, that would be because of shifts among non-whites. Non-whites across gender lines moved away from the Democratic Party. Harris put up weak numbers with Black women (relative to Hillary or Obama). Democrats' margins with Hispanic women shifted dramatically towards the Republicans. They saw losses with Asian women. And non-white men shifted even further (even as white men shifted heavily towards Democrats over Trump's tenure in office).
The preferred narrative on race is helpless to explain the trendlines among whites and the trendlines among non-whites. But put simply, Harris didn't lose because of the whites. She lost despite solid (and growing) support among the whites, because non-white voters had other ideas.
What about gender? This is two female nominees Trump has bested, but he lost to Joe Biden. A clear sexism story, open and shut case, right? Here, again, the voting data beg to differ: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
Gender polarization in the electorate was down since 2016. Harris' voteshare among men was consistent with typical Democrat performance (an outcome driven heavily by white men moving Democrat over the last decade, even non-white men across the board went the other direction). Trump's margins with men were not historic.
The reason Harris lost is because she performed abysmally with women. She got the lowest share of the female vote of any Democrat of the last 30 years other than John Kerry. And it wasn't white women: they actually shifted towards the Democrats this cycle. It was Hispanic and Asian women who shifted most towards the GOP -- although Harris also significantly underperformed Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama with black women too.
Since 2016, men shifted 2 percentage points towards the GOP. Meanwhile, women shifted five percentage points towards the GOP (i.e. more than twice as much!). But rather than analyzing this latter trend -- rather than exploring how women exercise their agency, the focus is intensely on men. Even though they are objectively less important: they are a smaller share of the overall adult population, they are registered to vote at lower levels, among registered voters they turn out at lower levels. Put simply, if we want to understand how any race went the way it did, we need to look at women and how they exercise their agency. But this isn't done. Not even by feminist scholars -- perhaps especially not by feminist scholars in this case -- because the actual data pattern is super inconvenient for the preferred narrative.
Today on Symbolic Capital(ism) I review George Orwell's "The Road to Wigan Pier" which had an immense influence on my thinking about Great Awokenings, but is also highly relevant to understanding many contemporary political dynamics. Quick 🧵
One of the first things that jumps out at you reading the book is how much the first Awokening has in common with the current one: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/book-review-…
We have X. Kendi writing "Antiracist Baby." They had Comrade X writing "Marxism for Infants."
The Oppressor/ Oppressed framework? More than a century old.
Intersectional social justice struggles? Same, same.
I suspect the depictions in the screenshots below would seem immediately familiar to contemporary readers.
One of the most disturbing elements of reading a lot of historical texts is coming to see in stark terms the truth of Ecclesiastes, that there is nothing new under the sun.
A core objective of The Road to Wigan Pier is to understand and explain why the left was deeply unpopular with the working class -- the very people who stood to benefit the most from socialism, and the people who "the revolution" was supposed to be organized around. He came up with three answers: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/book-review-…
Yes, absolutely. Mainstream media is a (*checks notes*) poor helpless victim when it comes to (*double-checks*) influencing public perceptions about culture, world events, and the media itself.
Bezos is definitely *blaming the victim.* Poor widdle mainstream media. 😥
It's sad that they can't even be perceived neutral when journalists are rabidly clamoring for a political endorsement of the Democratic nominee, and the paper itself quite explicitly defined itself in opposition to Trump since 2016.
And the endorsements definitely don't reflect or enhance perceptions of political bias. The fact that the paper has literally never outright endorsed a Republican since 1976 when they started the practice -- this is just a pure coincidence: washingtonpost.com/opinions/patri…
The Democrats are just better, 100 percent of the time. That's not bias, that's fact. And the editorial bones should make no bones about it. And if the public thinks it might indicate bias that over nearly 50 years the paper endorses only one political party for the presidency (and overwhelmingly endorses Democrats for lower seats as well) -- that's just because *those people* have their brains cooked by the Koch Brothers and Trump.
And speaking of facts, the fact that Democrats outnumber Republicans 10:1 in the field likely does absolutely nothing to influence which topics they cover and how they cover them (as I highlight here, we're clearly unbiased: youtube.com/watch?v=o-uS14…).
It's silly that people would even think that. There's no evidence of bias whatsoever with how outlets cover (or ignore) contentious moral and political issues. How would anyone even get this idea, other than by through evil right-wing smear campaigns?
Lots of folks on this site began by smearing McDonalds, showing revulsion for that kind of work, for the food, and disdain towards the kinds of people who would eat there. And then, when the poor class implications of these narratives became undeniable, they tried to retrofit their comments as being about something else... like the staged nature of the event, faux populism, etc.
It's fine to criticize those things! But that wasn't the initial tenor of the conversation at all. And the initial conversation is a good example of why this was a good political stunt for Trump -- provoking the Democrats' core constituency into mocking and deriding "those people" in elitist ways.
The same kind of thing happened when he served up McDonald's to college athletes: cnn.com/2019/01/15/pol…
For his part, Trump famously loves @McDonalds. He's eaten there his whole life, and has a really idiosyncratic go-to order, as highlighted during his initial run for office: businessinsider.com/trumps-mcdonal…
So it's theater. But it's also real passion for the product. And this latter fact is the kind of thing that a certain bloc of America really finds grating about the man. And another part of the population finds endearing.
For my part, I couldn't help but think of @Chris_arnade's book Dignity while watching many who self-identify with the left step onto a rake on this issue.
As Arnade highlights, for many less affluent folks, McDonalds is an important community gathering point.
It's bad politics to bash McDonalds, the people who work there, or the people who eat there. Don't recommend.
Critically, the cause of the gap depicted here is 100% shifts in *women.* Men 18-29 are no more rightwing than any other cohort of men. For men, it's basically a straight line going all the way down the generational ladder (with the exception of 45-64 year olds).
All the action is with *women.* But this is, unfortunately, unlikely to be how the trend is analyzed. We'll likely hear a lot about "right wing young men" after the election, even though they're no more conservative than any other dudes (and are markedly less conservative than 45-64 year olds).
Another example of ironically ignoring female agency in ostensibly "feminist" work. In truth, if we want to understand growing gender polarization in politics, all the "action" is on the female side of the equation.
But because polarization is widely perceived as "bad" and women are "good" scholars tend to ignore the female line, and try to explain "bad" things in terms of men, even if their own data clearly suggest that women are driving the trends.
We see the same type of tendency in analyzing "red" and "blue" lines of political trends, as I detail here:
Anything that is "bad" (e.g. polarization around science, identity, etc.) is explained in terms of the red line, even in cases where all of the "action" is clearly on the blue line.
More on the ironic tendency of scholars/ pundits to ignore female agency in the name of feminism here: