1/ Apparently a lot of people didn't actually read the news article which inspired these sort of comments and was was written by someone not affiliated with the program nor the actual flight test.
https://twitter.com/TeslaAndDoge/status/1803724854580974010
2/ And this article also contains quoted opinions from a person who hasn't been affiliated with the program since CDR over a decade ago (consultant 2009-2014) which was before CCP contracts were awarded nor are they affiliated with this flight test.......
cnn.com/2024/06/19/sci…
cnn.com/2024/06/19/sci…
3/ And the claim in the comment is also essentially refuted elsewhere in this exact same article. 
4/ Here's an additional somewhat erroneous claim ("without a hitch") by the article's author because...
5/ ...post-flight analysis of Dragon's heat shield revealed higher than expected erosion at four points where the capsule bolts to the trunk of the vehicle using tension ties. It was noted that this anomaly was not seen during the Demo-1 mission.
spacenews.com/nasa-and-space…
spacenews.com/nasa-and-space…
6/ But back to the claim from the OP - There was an attempt to back it up with a cherry-picked quote from the CNN article by the aforementioned consultant and is really only valid within the context where there is also the possibility that a...
https://x.com/TeslaAndDoge/status/1803735857804742991
7/ ...critical flaw could be found in the Crew Dragon design or an issue arises during its missions which would require an alternate method of return for the crew that flew up on Dragon. This context is a major factor in the NASA's reasoning for wanting...
8/ ...two independent end-to-end service designs and providers. But OP's claim in no way represents the reality of the current plan for the remainder of the CFT mission nor with what was provided by NASA and Boeing during the press conference on June 18th and elsewhere.
9/ Here is a link to the direct question from CNN's Kristin Fisher during the press conference that is related to the claim and the article:
10/ Kristin Fisher, CNN: "Steve, just want to be really clear here, you said that Starliner was cleared to come home in an emergency, but would it be cleared, now, to come home with a crew?...
11/ Like is this a situation that's actively being discussed whether or not Starliner is safe, right now, to bring a crew home?"
12/ The response from NASA:
Steve Stich, NASA: "Obviously we wouldn't say Starliner is safe to bring a crew home in an emergency if we didn't feel confident in the vehicle's capability. ...
Steve Stich, NASA: "Obviously we wouldn't say Starliner is safe to bring a crew home in an emergency if we didn't feel confident in the vehicle's capability. ...
12/ ...We're taking a little bit of extra time to work through what we've seen and make sure we have all the plans in place to to bring the crew home in a in a nominal situation for the end of mission. So we're just taking a little more extra time to review all the data and...
13/ ...also learn as much as we can while we have this service module in orbit."
14/ Then a follow-up question:
Kristin Fisher, CNN: "So is there any chance that these leaks and thruster issues could lead to a situation where Starliner can't bring Butch and Suni home?"
Kristin Fisher, CNN: "So is there any chance that these leaks and thruster issues could lead to a situation where Starliner can't bring Butch and Suni home?"
15/ And the response to the follow-up question:
Steve Stich, NASA: So far we don't see any scenario where Starliner is not going to be able to bring Butch and Suni home. We really want to work through the remainder of the data. ...
Steve Stich, NASA: So far we don't see any scenario where Starliner is not going to be able to bring Butch and Suni home. We really want to work through the remainder of the data. ...
16/ ...When we talk about looking at the the thruster pulses for the entire flight, for example, some of these thrusters have fired a thousand times. So we want to go back and compare the data all the way across the flight for all the different regimes where we're going to...
17/ ...do some similar maneuvers and so that's just taking some time to pull all that data and make sure we understand the thruster performance. So we're we're taking it one step at a time looking through all the data and when we close these things out,...
18/ ...we'll be ready to return Butch and Suni on Starliner.
19/ I've seen many people on <insert popular social media platforms here> make comments about their "concerns" regarding Starliner and NASA not explicitly and immediately stating they are ready, right now, to bring the CFT crew home and then follow up with...
20/ ...assumptions made around that being because the vehicle is unsafe and NASA isn't confident in Starliner. There is a reason Steve Stich doesn't explicitly say they are ready to return the crew right now - and that is because readiness is not official until...
21/ ...the go/no-go polling which will occur shortly before undocking and is scheduled at that specific spot in the mission timeline after all other planned analysis, in-flight issue analysis, and several program management and readiness reviews have...
22/ ...been officially completed and documented for posterity.
23/ I've also seen comments from many spaceflight "enthusiasts" which try to compare Starliner's development and where the vehicle is in developmental testing now to where Crew Dragon is now and tend to conveniently omit the fact that there was a 9 year gap between...
24/ ...Cargo Dragon 1's first flight (COTS Demo Flight 1) and Starliner OFT. During that time frame and after, there were many issues experienced during ground tests, flight tests, and contract flights in the overall Dragon system providing end-to-end mission services, which...
25/ ...includes both Dragon 1, Dragon 2, and the Falcon 9 launch vehicle.
26/ It's important also to keep in mind that Crew Dragon, which may look externally like a completely different design to Dragon 1, actually does retain many of the same subsystems and internal design elements from Dragon 1 and some of these subystems did...
27/ ...experience issues during ground testing and missions which were addressed both mid-mission while on orbit and in preparation for later flights to get to where Crew Dragon is performing today.
28/ NASA's Steve Stich reiterated this from a high-level during the press conference as well, noting the similar learning by SpaceX starting from Cargo Dragon 1, when responding to a question which asked if the issues were frustrating for NASA: ...
29/ ..."I step back and look at Dragon and SpaceX and they were able to learn a lot about flying in space with their Cargo Program ahead of Demo-2. You know they had many cargo flights they flew to learn and develop their system and here we are now on...
30/ ...our third flight still learning. I'm an engineer - I like to learn and I think our team likes to learn - and you know I would not characterize it as frustration, would characterize it as learning."
31/ For comparison, a non-exhaustive list of Dragon anomalies, both minor and major:
- Dragon 1 -
1. COTS Demo Flight 2: Failure of the LIDAR system to maintain tracking during causing two non-planned holds during the docking approach.
spaceflightnow.com/falcon9/003/12…
- Dragon 1 -
1. COTS Demo Flight 2: Failure of the LIDAR system to maintain tracking during causing two non-planned holds during the docking approach.
spaceflightnow.com/falcon9/003/12…
32/
2. CRS-1: While docked to ISS, a suspected radiaton hit shut down 1 of 3 flight computers. Engineers also believe radiation shut down 1 of 3 GPS units, a propulsion computer, and an ethernet switch during the flight. It was unclear from reading sources of these events...
2. CRS-1: While docked to ISS, a suspected radiaton hit shut down 1 of 3 flight computers. Engineers also believe radiation shut down 1 of 3 GPS units, a propulsion computer, and an ethernet switch during the flight. It was unclear from reading sources of these events...
33/ ...whether or not they were concurrent or separate anomalies. For reference, Dragon doesn't use radiation hardened computers that most other spacecraft do, but attempt to make up for it with additional redundancy.
spaceflightnow.com/falcon9/004/12…
spaceflightnow.com/falcon9/004/12…
34/
3. CRS-1: A cargo freezer and three cabin coolant pumps lost power some time after splashdown due to suspected sea water leakage into electrical boxes. The freezer's setpoint was -139°F, but was discovered by the recovery team to be -85°F.
3. CRS-1: A cargo freezer and three cabin coolant pumps lost power some time after splashdown due to suspected sea water leakage into electrical boxes. The freezer's setpoint was -139°F, but was discovered by the recovery team to be -85°F.
35/
4. CRS-2: Failure of the propulsion system to pressurize 3 of the 4 Draco thruster pods causing Dragon to go into Passive Abort Mode early in the mission where it stopped executing any more orbital operations. This occurred before solar array deployment and...
4. CRS-2: Failure of the propulsion system to pressurize 3 of the 4 Draco thruster pods causing Dragon to go into Passive Abort Mode early in the mission where it stopped executing any more orbital operations. This occurred before solar array deployment and...
36/ ...caused off-nominal solar array temperatures while the spacecraft was not in active attitude control. The preplanned flight rules were to only proceed with array deployment when there were at least 2 of 4 pods active and required a decision to issue...
37/ ...an an override of those rules by mission controllers
Loss of control just after launch vehicle sep...... Something, something, analogy to OFT.
space.com/20035-spacex-d…
Loss of control just after launch vehicle sep...... Something, something, analogy to OFT.
space.com/20035-spacex-d…
38/
5. CRS-3: Data buffering issues, operational issues with the new Dragon design, and minor contamination of the shielding blanket caused a slip of the launch date.
6. CRS-5 Launch slip due to more time needed for unspecified vehicle testing.
5. CRS-3: Data buffering issues, operational issues with the new Dragon design, and minor contamination of the shielding blanket caused a slip of the launch date.
6. CRS-5 Launch slip due to more time needed for unspecified vehicle testing.
39/
7. CRS-15: Unspecified parachute system anomaly.
7. CRS-15: Unspecified parachute system anomaly.
40/
- Crew & Cargo Dragon 2 -
8. Pad Abort Test: Underperformance of the abort propulsion system leading to a lateral landing distance around 1.1-1.2 km away from the launch pad (I've seen various reports of the actual distance and did not find...
- Crew & Cargo Dragon 2 -
8. Pad Abort Test: Underperformance of the abort propulsion system leading to a lateral landing distance around 1.1-1.2 km away from the launch pad (I've seen various reports of the actual distance and did not find...
41/ ..an official number with a quick DuckDuckGo search), around half of the design specification of 2.3 km. Underperformance traced to a fuel mixture ratio issue in one of the eight SuperDraco abort engines which was detected after the flight.
collectspace.com/news/news-0506…
collectspace.com/news/news-0506…
42/ This looks veeerrryyyy close to shore.
43/ But behold! M̶y̶ ̶S̶t̶u̶f̶f̶ "SpaceX's Dragon pad abort test was a success"
usatoday.com/story/tech/201…
usatoday.com/story/tech/201…
44/
9. In-Flight Abort Test: Spacecraft assigned for this mission destroyed by an internal explosion during static fire testing of the abort thrusters at the LZ-1 facility located on CCSFS, just under 2 months after returning from the Demo-1 mission. A small amount of...
9. In-Flight Abort Test: Spacecraft assigned for this mission destroyed by an internal explosion during static fire testing of the abort thrusters at the LZ-1 facility located on CCSFS, just under 2 months after returning from the Demo-1 mission. A small amount of...
45/ ...dinitrogen tetroxide (NTO) leaked into the helium line used to pressurize the propellant tanks. When the system was pressurized, a liquid slug of NTO was driven back into a helium line check valve, destroying it, and causing the explosion.
46/ Just like Holi except not fun and the orange stuff is toxic and will kill you
47/
10. Demo-2: Post-flight analysis of the heat shield revealed higher than expected erosion at four points where the capsule bolts to the trunk of the vehicle using tension ties. It was noted that this anomaly was not seen during the Demo-1 mission.
spacenews.com/nasa-and-space…
10. Demo-2: Post-flight analysis of the heat shield revealed higher than expected erosion at four points where the capsule bolts to the trunk of the vehicle using tension ties. It was noted that this anomaly was not seen during the Demo-1 mission.
spacenews.com/nasa-and-space…
48/
11. Demo-2: Parachutes deployed at a lower than intended altitude, but still within the allowable range.
12. Crew-1: FOD discovered in the hatch seal after crew ingress, but before launch, after a slight drop in pressure was detected.
11. Demo-2: Parachutes deployed at a lower than intended altitude, but still within the allowable range.
12. Crew-1: FOD discovered in the hatch seal after crew ingress, but before launch, after a slight drop in pressure was detected.
49/
13. Crew-1: After separation from crew module, the trunk reentered and debris from it crashed into a farm in Australia.
abc.net.au/news/2022-10-1…
13. Crew-1: After separation from crew module, the trunk reentered and debris from it crashed into a farm in Australia.
abc.net.au/news/2022-10-1…
50/
14. Crew-2: 1 of 4 parachutes experienced delayed opening during deployment for landing and took about a minute longer than expected to inflate.
15. Inspiration-4: Malfunction of the on-board toilet.
14. Crew-2: 1 of 4 parachutes experienced delayed opening during deployment for landing and took about a minute longer than expected to inflate.
15. Inspiration-4: Malfunction of the on-board toilet.
51/
16. CRS-24: Delayed parachute opening during deployment for landing. A repeat of the anomaly experienced during Crew-2.
17. CRS-25: Launch delayed due to elevated levels of monomethyl hydrazine (MMH) vapor detected in the spacecraft's propulsion system.
16. CRS-24: Delayed parachute opening during deployment for landing. A repeat of the anomaly experienced during Crew-2.
17. CRS-25: Launch delayed due to elevated levels of monomethyl hydrazine (MMH) vapor detected in the spacecraft's propulsion system.
52/
18. Crew-6: Hook 5 of the docking system had a failure where flight controllers had to use a backup system to open the nose cone. Later, the same hook indicated it was not properly positioned when it actually was and a software update was sent to override that data. ...
18. Crew-6: Hook 5 of the docking system had a failure where flight controllers had to use a backup system to open the nose cone. Later, the same hook indicated it was not properly positioned when it actually was and a software update was sent to override that data. ...
53/ ... Dragon had to station keep at the 20m hold point while the 2nd hook problem was addressed.
spacepolicyonline.com/news/crew-6-do…
spacepolicyonline.com/news/crew-6-do…
54/ A similarly non-exhaustive list of Falcon 9 examples filtered by events which happened during or affecting Dragon missions:
19. COTS Demo Flight 1: Two cracks found in Falcon 9's 2nd stage Merlin engines found a few days before launch which required...
19. COTS Demo Flight 1: Two cracks found in Falcon 9's 2nd stage Merlin engines found a few days before launch which required...
55/ ...trimming 6 inches off of the nozzle a few days before flight. This caused measurable, but not critical, booster performance loss.
56/
19. COTS Demo Flight 1: Two cracks found in Falcon 9's 2nd stage Merlin engines found a few days before launch which required trimming 6 inches off of the nozzle a few days before flight. This caused measurable, but not critical, booster performance loss.
19. COTS Demo Flight 1: Two cracks found in Falcon 9's 2nd stage Merlin engines found a few days before launch which required trimming 6 inches off of the nozzle a few days before flight. This caused measurable, but not critical, booster performance loss.
57/
20. CRS-1: A material flaw in one of Falcon 9's main stage engines caused a fuel dome and fairing rupture during ascent and the engine was prematurely shut down requiring compensation by the other 8 engines. SpaceX was not given the go-ahead to perform a...
20. CRS-1: A material flaw in one of Falcon 9's main stage engines caused a fuel dome and fairing rupture during ascent and the engine was prematurely shut down requiring compensation by the other 8 engines. SpaceX was not given the go-ahead to perform a...
58/ ...reignition of the upper stage engine to make up for the underperformance due to analysis pertaining to ISS visiting vehicle safety rules. The secondary Orbcomm OG2-1 satellite payload onboard Falcon 9 was inserted into a suboptimal, unstable orbit lower than desired,...
59/ ...did not have enough onboard propellant to raise its orbit high enough, and deorbitied around 5 days later.
thespacereview.com/article/2168/1
thespacereview.com/article/2168/1
60/
21. CRS-3: A scrub caused by a primary helium supply valve in the stage separation system failing a pre-launch diagnostic test one hour before launch.
21. CRS-3: A scrub caused by a primary helium supply valve in the stage separation system failing a pre-launch diagnostic test one hour before launch.
61/
22. CRS-3: A liquid oxygen leak in the Falcon ground support equipment was detected prior to launch and was mitigated by spraying water from the fire suppression system which froze on contact and plugged the leak. Excess water pooled in the flame trench was...
22. CRS-3: A liquid oxygen leak in the Falcon ground support equipment was detected prior to launch and was mitigated by spraying water from the fire suppression system which froze on contact and plugged the leak. Excess water pooled in the flame trench was...
62/ ...sprayed upwards due to engine exhaust during launch and caused FOD to contact the rocket because of this mitgation. However, danger from this was deemed unlikely and no further anomalies arose from the event.
63/
23. CRS-5: Launch scrub caused by actuator drift in one of the two second stage engine thrust vector control systems.
23. CRS-5: Launch scrub caused by actuator drift in one of the two second stage engine thrust vector control systems.
64/
24. CRS-7: Loss of both Dragon and Falcon 9, as well as the first International Docking Adapter (IDA-1) payload destined for ISS PMA-2, due to a launch vehicle explosion occurring shortly before second stage separation. Root cause of the anomaly was...
24. CRS-7: Loss of both Dragon and Falcon 9, as well as the first International Docking Adapter (IDA-1) payload destined for ISS PMA-2, due to a launch vehicle explosion occurring shortly before second stage separation. Root cause of the anomaly was...
65/ ...the failure of a strut supporting a high pressure helium bottle inside of the second stage liquid oxygen tank causing helium to flood the tank which then overpressurized and burst. A bolt in the strut structure, which was...
66/ ...rated for a load of 10,000 pounds, failed at 2,000 which was later deemed a design error by an independent NASA investigation and concluded that the recommended design safety margin was overlooked.
67/
25. CRS-10: Delayed due to the investigation analysis of a Falcon 9 explosion which occurred on the launch pad during propellant fill operations for a pre-launch static fire test before for the AMOS-6 satellite delivery mission. ...
25. CRS-10: Delayed due to the investigation analysis of a Falcon 9 explosion which occurred on the launch pad during propellant fill operations for a pre-launch static fire test before for the AMOS-6 satellite delivery mission. ...
68/ ...Liquid oxygen got too cold causing it to solidify and ignite with the carbon composite helium vessels.
69/
26. CRS-10: Launch scrub caused by a faulty sensor in one of the the second stage engine thrust vector control systems.
27. CRS-13: Launch delays due to particulates found in the second stage fuel system.
26. CRS-10: Launch scrub caused by a faulty sensor in one of the the second stage engine thrust vector control systems.
27. CRS-13: Launch delays due to particulates found in the second stage fuel system.
70/
28. In-Flight Abort Test: The Falcon 9 booster originally assigned for this mission was lost/destroyed during a failed landing attempt after payload delivery for the Starlink L5 mission. Isopropyl alcohol, used as...
28. In-Flight Abort Test: The Falcon 9 booster originally assigned for this mission was lost/destroyed during a failed landing attempt after payload delivery for the Starlink L5 mission. Isopropyl alcohol, used as...
https://x.com/NASASpaceflight/status/1240259612185702400
71/ ...a cleaning fluid inside the engine during servicing between missions, was not completely removed and got trapped in a "sensor dead leg" and later ignited during ascent. The engine was automatically shut down and...
72/ ...lack of that engine prevented first stage droneship landing. This was the second time a Merlin 1D engine was prematurely shut down on a Falcon 9 flight, the other happening during the CRS-1 mission and subsequent secondary payload loss due to...
73/ ...suboptimal orbital insertion of that payload.
74/
29: Crew-1: Launch delayed because concerns generating from a scrub due to an engine anomaly before the launch of a GPS 3 satellite. A "masking lacquer", used to protect surfaces when aluminum engine components are anodized for corrosion protection and are supposed to...
29: Crew-1: Launch delayed because concerns generating from a scrub due to an engine anomaly before the launch of a GPS 3 satellite. A "masking lacquer", used to protect surfaces when aluminum engine components are anodized for corrosion protection and are supposed to...
75/ ...be removed with a cleaning fluid, blocked a relief valve in the engine's gas generator.
30. Crew-6: First launch attempt scrubbed at T-2:12 due to an issue with TEA-TEB engine ignition fluid.
30. Crew-6: First launch attempt scrubbed at T-2:12 due to an issue with TEA-TEB engine ignition fluid.
76/ So, to put this all in perspective:
- Have there been issues during Starliner development? Yes.
- Is there valid criticism of the program? Sure.
- Have _all_ of the SpaceX flights with Dragon-specific anomalies been ultimately deemed successes? Yes.
...
- Have there been issues during Starliner development? Yes.
- Is there valid criticism of the program? Sure.
- Have _all_ of the SpaceX flights with Dragon-specific anomalies been ultimately deemed successes? Yes.
...
77/ ...
- But is calling a Starliner mission that has any issue or anomaly a failure, comparing it to SpaceX having "flawless" missions, then furiously broadcasting statements like this to every <insert popular social media platforms here> even a remotely rational thing to do?...
- But is calling a Starliner mission that has any issue or anomaly a failure, comparing it to SpaceX having "flawless" missions, then furiously broadcasting statements like this to every <insert popular social media platforms here> even a remotely rational thing to do?...
78/ ... NO! And neither is blatantly ignoring the statements to the contrary from the NASA Commercial Crew Program manager. And neither is speculating on the thoughts and feelings of NASA Astronauts assigned to Starliner missions.
79/ And every time someone proudly p̶r̶o̶c̶l̶a̶i̶m̶s̶ speculates for NASA or Boeing that "they don't know" <something demonstrably false or wildly opinionated> about the future progress of Starliner missions, ...
80/ ..it's an immediate flag for anyone actually knowledgeable about the industry to immediately disengage from any rational discourse about the matter with them.
And yes I know this diatribe thread is extremely hypocritical^
And yes I know this diatribe thread is extremely hypocritical^
82/ end of line
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