Eyal Hulata, Israel's national security advisor under the Bennet-Lapid government and an @FDD fellow, was interviewed yesterday by one of the leading podcasts in Israel.
Some interesting points from the interview regarding Biden, Trump, Iran and Hezbollah:🧵
1. On the current American administration: I worked with this administration. I feel like I know Jake Sullivan well personally. I also did not hide from him my thoughts about the way they handle foreign policy.
2. I think the FP of the current administration hasn't brought success in any of the major fronts. They planned to end the Iranian issue quickly with an agreement. They failed and that's good, because the proposed deal was bad. The ME today is less safe, to say the least.
3. On Trump: I Certainly think the Trump era was good for Israel. The Abraham accords are his decision, not some cosmic event. He encourages Kushner and pressured the countries of the region. I think this is one of the wonderful things that happened to Israel in the last decade.
4. Also moving the embassy to Jerusalem was significant, and there is no doubt that the assassination of Qassem Soleimani was an important and correct step. The result was also good - Iran withdrew. We also encouraged the Democrats to continue this policy, and they did not.
5. The Iran-Russia-China axis: I think that this axis is a very bad development for Israel, the USA and the Western world. Unfortunately, unlike 2022, which was a not so good year for Iran, 2023 and 2024 look like years in which they are very successful. This worries me a lot.
6. Israel should stick more closely to the democratic bloc. The coalition that operated together with Israel in April proves this. I am concerned that Israeli politics is taking us away from there. Instead of putting Iran at the top of the agenda, Netanyahu chooses otherwise.
7. The war in Ukraine: the statement that we turned our backs on Ukraine is not true. Israel stood by Ukraine from the first moment, period. We condemned Russia, named the Bucha massacre a genocide, and stood by Ukraine.
8. But despite the very heavy pressure of Ukraine, we couldn't supply them with air defense systems. But it's not because we were afraid of Russia. It was because the air defense systems were part of what Israel maintains for the case of a multi-front war.
9. In 2022 the Americans said "Come on, what war are you talking about", and I can only imagine what would have happened today if we had transferred defense systems to Ukraine.
10. as soon as we understood the depth of Iranian aid to Russia our attitude began to change. I'm not saying that Russia is our enemy, but if the Russians are helping the Iranians, in a way that passes some level that is reasonable, then Israel must act.
11. The fact that Russia allows us some freedom of action in Syria is good. But if with their other hand they are helping Iran in a way that is more dangerous than what is happening in Syria - then this needs to be addressed. We made it clear to the Russians.
12. Iran: To the best of my understanding and knowledge, they are not a minute after a bomb, and they are also not a minute from a bomb in the full sense of the term. But they are arguably the closest to being a threshold state they've ever been.
13. Right now, Iran needs a decision to break out and about two years of development. The amazing thing is that in its dialogue with the International Atomic Energy Agency and with the Western countries, Iran is already flirting with the concept.
14. They are basically telling them: we are already a threshold country. And it goes smoothly. For me, this expresses the desperation of the international community to deal with Iran, but it is also a foreign policy failure of Israel.
15. I will say it out loud and be very direct: Netanyahu for years referred to himself, that he is the only one who can deal with the Iranian nuclear issue. In the last year and a half - we have done the least to sabotage, reduce and roll back the Iranian nuclear program.
16. The end of JCP's strong episodes is happening in about a year from now, and I am no longer sure that there will be a way to save JCP. Is there a way to extract from Iran additional concessions? As the US is currently acting towards Iran in an appeasing manner, I'm not sure.
17. No one is urging the US to go invade Iran. I think Iran will realize long before then that the survival of its regime is in danger. The bunker-penetrating bombs can destroy the facility in Fordo. But the Americans are afraid of getting into another conflict in the ME.
18. The US is making calculations that, in my view, are wrong and too cautious. The US has not left the region, and they have good intentions. But the bottom line is that the Iranians and the Houthis are not afraid.
19. The bottom line of this is that Israel needs to understand that the presence of a significant American military threat is not on the table. But Israel can do a lot of the work on its own. When Israel was seriously training for an attack on Iran, this thing had an effect.
20. Israel has very strong offensive capabilities. We illustrated this on April. The response was measured but effective. We proved that Iran can fire 300 missiles, and nothing will hit; while we fire once and hit, anywhere in Iran. Iran undoubtedly internalized this message.
21. The previous deal succeeded in pulling Iran back, that's the only good thing it did. You can do it again. But Iran will do it only under a credible military threat. This is what we ask of the Americans, and if they won't do it - Israel should be able to do it.
21. On a possible war in Lebanon: it is not right for the State of Israel to open another front. That was true in October, and it is true now. But it may be that there is no choice and Israel will have to go to war with Hezbollah.
22. The likelihood of this is high. I don't see any other political solution that someone is able to impose that is seiuos and robust over time. But we better prepare for it, resupply ourselves, and study from the past months before we go into action.
23. I think we should not slide into war. But it is possible that Hezbollah will decide to drag us into a war, and if that happens then Israel will know how to respond. Nasrallah will regret it if he makes this decision.
24. It will be difficult on the Israeli home front. Yes, the Israeli defense systems are excellent, the best there is. But Israel is prepared to protect its critical infrastructures.
25. But for all of this to work - the government must also take care of a mechanism for a political end to the war. It's critical, and we fail to do it in Gaza.
for the whole interview (Hebrew), initiated by @NadavPerry :
אתמול יצא פרק מעניין במיוחד בפודקאסט של נדב פרי עם איל חולתא, בכיר המוסד לשעבר ומי שהיה היועץ לביטחון לאומי תחת בנט ולפיד.
מצרף כמה מהאמירות המעניינות של חולתא שם, על הממשל האמריקאי, על רוסיה אוקראינה, על איראן ועל לבנון. ממליץ להאזין לפרק המלא:🧵
על הממשל האמריקאי הנוכחי: אני עבדתי עם הממשל הזה. את ג'ייק סאליבן אני מרגיש שאני מכיר אישית טוב. לא הסתרתי ממנו גם את המחשבות שלי על האופן שבו הם מטפלים במדיניות החוץ. אני חושב שמדיניות החוץ של הממשל הנוכחי לא הביאה הצלחות באף אחת מהגזרות שהם טיפלו בהן. /1
את הסוגיה האיראנית הם תכננו לסיים יחסית מהר עם הסכם גרעין. הם לא הצליחו וטוב שכך. המזרח התיכון היום פחות בטוח, בלשון המעטה. כמה ימים לפני ה7/10 סאליבן התראיין והסביר שהמזרח התיכון יציב מאוד. זה בסדר, אין לו כדור בדולח. אבל זו הייתה התחושה בממשל האמריקאי והיא לא הייתה נכונה. /2
In a recent briefing, General (res.) Yaacov Amidror, former head of the Israeli National Security Council, explained the current situation in the Israel-Hamas war and on the Israel-Hezbollah border:🧵
1. Israel is currently operating in two areas inside the Gaza Strip where it hasn't acted before.
2. One is Rafah. Israel is advancing in two different areas of Rafah: from the east towards the center of the city. It's slow, but Israel has managed to relocate almost 1 million Palestinians to designated safe areas. The IDF ensures their safety and provides humanitarian aid.
בסקירה של כשעה, האלוף במיל' יעקב עמידרור עסק במצב הנוכחי ברפיח, בג'באליה, בגבול הצפון, ובסוגיית החימושים.
סיכמתי נקודות עיקריות בשרשור המצורף. לינק לסקירה המלאה, בסוף השרשור:🧵
1. עמידרור מסביר שישראל פועלת כרגע בשני אזורים בתוך רצועת עזה, שניהם איזורים שבהם לא פעלנו בעבר:
2. האחד הוא רפיח, ששם אנחנו מתקדמים משני כיוונים שונים. האחד הוא העיר עצמה, שם אנחנו דוחפים לכיוון מרכז רפיח ממזרח למערב. זה תהליך איטי, אבל הצלחנו להעביר כבר כמעט מיליון פלסטינים מהאזור הזה.
בפרק האחרון של הפודקאסט שלו, העיתונאי היהודי-אמריקאי דן סינור מראיין את פרופ' סקוט גלוואי, לשיחה תחת הכותרת "How Israel Lost the Story".
גלוואי הוא מרצה בביה"ס למנהל עסקים בNYU, ודובר מוכר בנושאים של שיווק, ושל חברות הטק הגדולות בארה"ב.
כמה נק' מעניינות מהשיחה:🧵
1. גלוואי, בן לאם יהודיה, ולאב שהיגר לארה"ב מסקוטלנד, מגדיר את עצמו כאתאיסט, וכמי שלא היה קשור במיוחד לישראל לפני ה7.10. הוא מספר שהוא חשב שהסיפור של אנטישמיות בארה"ב זה משהו שבגדול נגמר, ושהוא היה פשוט המום לראות את ההתעוררות שלה בעקבות ה7.10 בארה"ב ובבריטניה.
הוא מתאר איך האירוע הזה הוביל לשינוי אצלו ביחס לישראל, ולהבנה כמה חשוב לו שישראל תמשיך להתקיים כדי שאם האנטישמיות תצא משליטה – הוא יוכל לקחת את המשפחה שלו ולגור בתל אביב.
בפרק האחרון של הפודקאסט שלהם, הגנרל והיועץ לבטחון לאומי לשעבר ה.ר. מקמאסטר, וההיסטוריון ניל פרגוסון מאונ' סטנפורד, עסקו ביחס של ממשל ביידן לישראל ולנתניהו.
מקמאסטר ופרגוסון -שניהם שמרנים מתונים- מבקרים די בחריפות את ביידן ואת צ'אק שומר.
מביא את הדברים בתרגום וקיצור לעיונכם:🧵
1.מנחה: מה אתם חושבים על הדברים של צ'אק שומר על נתניהו?
2. מקמאסטר: צ'אק שומר לחלוטין חצה את הגבול. זו דמוקרטיה, והישראלים לא צריכים אותו שיגיד להם מה לעשות. אתה יודע, הפוליטיקה הישראלית היא פרסונלית, מפולגת, והתוצאה של הבחירות האחרונות היא סוג של קואליציה מוזרה. אבל זו הממשלה שלהם!
Former Israeli General Yaakov Amidror discusses the Israeli dilemma regarding a potential war with Hezbollah in Lebanon in a recent lecture.
Gen. Amidror served as head of the Israeli NSC and is a respected expert in Israel and abroad. Here are the main points of his speech:🧵
1. On the fourth day of the war in Gaza, the Israeli government had to decide whether to attack Lebanon given a unique operational opportunity.
2. Unusually, there was broad support for the proposed attack among different Israeli security agencies. Netanyahu, with the backing of war cabinet members Gantz and Eisenkot, decided against attacking Hezbollah.