SUMMARY OF WHAT SCOTUS HELD IN IMMUNITY CASE (NO EDITORIALIZING UNTIL END)
Think three buckets:
First, absolute immunity for official acts that are core presidential functions (pardon, removal of executive officers);
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Second, presumptive immunity for official acts that are NOT core presidential functions (everything official that is not in (1)).
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That presumption is overcome by a showing that “applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.”; and
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Third, no immunity for unofficial (private) conduct.
Then move on to how the Court classified each set of allegations in the indictment – i.e. what bucket each set of allegations belongs in.
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Pressure on DOJ officials (Jeff Clark) is absolutely immune b/c control of AG is core function.
Pressure on Pence is official conduct may only get presumptive immunity, so remanded for determination of whether it’s a core function.
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Remaining allegations – communication with various state and party officials, and public communication around January 6 – remanded for determination if official or unofficial.
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In each case on remand, if determination is that some indicted conduct is official, Judge Chutkan will also have to decide whether the conduct is “core” or “non-core,” and if the latter whether the presumption of immunity is overcome.
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Finally, the prosecution can’t rely on immunized conduct as evidence for something else.
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So, for example, Trump’s conversations with DOJ officials, because he has absolute immunity, cannot be used to corroborate his state of mind or show his awareness of the scheme proven through other conduct alleged in the indictment.
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NOW, FOR SOME THOUGHTS:
(1) There will not be a trial before the election; there will be an immunity hearing and an interlocutory appeal.
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(2) Unlike trial, which would have had to wait three months – based on Judge Chutkan’s declared preferences – the immunity hearing might come sooner.
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(3) This is a win for Trump relative to expectations, and with respect to timing, but unless the prosecution is dismissed (a big if, see November) then he will likely stand trial.
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(4) In terms of what’s actually immunized, nobody is surprised about the DOJ intimidation. The biggest surprises are the idea that the convos with the Veep might be “core” functions and that some of the other allegations might be “official acts.”
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(5) I don’t really understand some of the logic in Part III-C of the opinion, for wonky reasons. But if official acts can’t be used to prove anything, I don’t understand how a bribe-for-pardon scheme could be proven by pointing to the “public record” of the pardon.
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(6) As expected from yesterday's Fischer opinion, the Court leaves it to Judge Chutkan to decide whether the prosecution can go forward on the two counts under 18 USC 1512(c) - highlighting the language that she would need to use to adjudicate the question.
/e
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TEXAS WANTS TO EXECUTE RAMIRO GONZALES ON WEDNESDAY
The death sentence was based on a prediction of future danger that has proven wrong. That’s a big constitutional problem, but no court can hear his claim – unless SCOTUS does something.
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Austin Sarat:
TX is the only state that bases death sentences on predictions of “future danger.” The leading clinical body long ago explained that affirmative findings of future danger are wrong about 2/3 of the time.
Gonzales was 18 in 2006, when he was sentenced and predicted to be a danger. His character arc, however, has been extraordinary. Turning to faith, he’s never been violent or threatened anyone, and is widely considered a force for good in the prison community.
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I've written a major article on this specific form of jurisdiction, & in so doing coded 1,673 original petitions. I've studied this particular power more than anyone else alive. ()
(1) even for cases in the right procedural posture, SCOTUS hasn't granted a prisoner original habeas relief since 1925 (ex parte grossman);
but this case isn't even in the right procedural posture because
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(2) federal habeas law requires state prisoners to exhaust state remedies before asking for habeas relief from a federal court, and Trump hasn't even started his state appeals;
It's stylized scenario b/c in this case, the 175.10 object offense was not a federal crime, but another state offense (15-172) that could be committed by unlawful means that included a federal crime (FECA).
But let's exaggerate it in Vivek's favor for illustrative purposes.
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Vivek is saying that the the President has the power to pardon the state offense in both scenarios because the state offense is logically premised on the federal offense.
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If a law says NO VEHICLES IN THE PARK & list of vehicles includes mopeds and motorcycles, all the instruction means is that you need unanimous conclusion of vehicle but not unanimous on whether vehicle was moped or harley.
175.10 offense is fraudulent instrument to commit/conceal another crime, and one of the other crimes is state 17-152 offense for "influencing" election through "unlawful means." That also has to be unanimous,
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just don't have to be unanimous on which of the unlawful means are used to exert the influence. As long as you've concluded it's either a moped or a harley, it still counts as a unanimous finding of the offense.
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As we await jury instructions, let’s be clear about one thing: whatever you think of the New York law at issue (175.10) or the DA Bragg’s decision to use it,
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it’s pretty silly to suggest that JUDGE MERCHAN is somehow stretching the law to accommodate a Trump conviction.
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In other words, maybe you think that there shouldn’t be a law capable of being stretched like this, or maybe you think Bragg shouldn’t have prosecuted under a stretch-able law. But if you take those things as given because Bragg did in fact prosecute under 175.10,
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It's reasonably clear that EK, SS, ACB, and ACB are the most hostile to the Trump position in immunity. I've seen very different opinions about what CJR was up to today. Let's look at every moment he spoke substantively
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PAGES 6-8: Involves circulating hypo that official immunity would mean that a POTUS that took bribes for appointment/pardon would be immunized. DJT lawyers try to get out of this by saying that accepting bribe part wouldn't actually be immunized so hypo wouldn't happen.
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CJR clearly doesn't buy this, thinks that an official acts rule would preclude prosecution for something like this, which shouldn't be precluded.
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