Thread by @KofmanMichael

Thoughts following a recent field study in Ukraine. Ukraine faces difficult months of fighting ahead, but the situation at the front is better than it was this spring. More worrisome is the state of Ukraine’s air defense, and the damage from Russian strikes to the power grid. 1/

Ukraine’s manpower, fortifications, and ammunition situation is steadily improving. Russian forces are advancing in Donetsk, and likely to make further gains, but they have not been able to exploit the Kharkiv offensive into a major breakthrough. 2/

The Kharkiv front has stabilized, with the overall correlation of forces not favorable to Moscow there. Russian operations are focused on the following directions: Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Ocheretyne-Pokrovsk, and to a lesser extent Kupyansk. 3/

Despite the improved outlook, rectifying manpower deficits will take time. Russian forces are likely to keep advancing over the coming months, especially in Donetsk. The next 2 months will be especially difficult. 4/

A change in US policy on weapons employment enabled Ukraine to push Russian S-300s, used to bombard the city, away from Kharkiv. This bought the city breathing space, and forced Russia to make adjustments, although the offensive had already culminated by that point. 5/

Addressing manpower gaps remains a priority for Ukraine, but the leading problem is increasingly air defense, both short range systems to cover the front line, and long-range air defense to defend cities, critical infrastructure, and rear areas. 6/

Ukraine is very low on ammunition for legacy Soviet systems, whereas Russian drone and missile production rates have increased significantly. A deficit of air defense has led to pervasive Russian UAS reconnaissance behind the front line and increased success rates in strikes. 7/

This has a pernicious effect, suppressing artillery, enabling Russian dynamic targeting in the rear, and makes forward deploy long-range air defense a high risk proposition. AFU units are pursuing novel counters, such as interceptor FPV drones, but need scalable solutions. 8/

Troops arm themselves with spectrum analyzers to detect signals from Zala, Orlan, and Supercam UAS types. Persistent Russian ISR behind the front lines is a growing challenge, especially since there will be less cover to conceal positions come winter. 9/

Russian glide bomb (UMPK/UMPB) strikes have become more accurate, and from greater ranges. They destroy entire positions, and are more psychologically impactful than artillery. Glide bombs level structures in cities that would take days of artillery fire to destroy. 10/

The promise of additional Patriot batteries, NASAMS, and Hawks, plus rerouting of missile exports to Ukraine can make a big difference this year. That said, pushing Patriot batteries forward to tackle Russian air strikes will be risky if they cannot themselves be protected. 11/

Western munitions have reduced the fires disparity. At Kharkiv there is relative parity of 1:1, elsewhere 5:1 and declining. Though there are still issues with having the right charges, forcing Ukrainian artillery to fire closer to the front line. 12/

After the passage of new mobilization laws, Ukraine’s first month of increased mobilization shows significantly higher intake of men. There is a lag effect, mobilized personnel need to receive training, before they are available to refill formations. 13/

The number of volunteers (as a share of those mobilized) has also increased. Ukraine's MoD is working to revamp the image of service, opening recruitment centers, allowing brigades to advertise, and offering volunteers options to choose their unit. 14/

While Ukraine works on improving basic training at home, the West will need to help with collective training abroad. Added manpower can stabilize the front line this fall, expanding existing units, and filling out new brigades to enable rotation. 15/

The West must also come through with equipment packages to replace losses and kit out new units, otherwise these will be mostly infantry, or at best motorized brigades. Ukrainian units need more M-113s, Bradleys, and basic protected mobility. 16/

The Kharkiv offensive did not create the length or depth of buffer Russia sought, but it did pull in Ukrainian reserves to stabilize that front. Consequently, Ukraine’s forces are currently stretched thin, and lateral shifts of units can open gaps. 17/

However, Russian forces have struggled to conduct operations at scale, or overcome well prepared defenses. Most of the assaults employ smaller elements of assault groups and detachments. These vary, sometimes 8-15 men, but in cases have dwindled to 4-6 men. 18/

Russian forces alternate between mechanized, light vehicle, and dismounted infantry attacks depending on availability of equipment. Some units increasingly employ motorcycles, and ATVs. This is partly reduce equipment losses, but also due to a general inability to overcome traditional prepared defenses, covered by pervasive reconnaissance, and strike UAS. 19/

These tactics can yield incremental gains, but they are poorly suited to achieving operationally significant breakthroughs. Larger assaults have proven costly to Russian forces, which cannot afford sustained equipment losses of the kind seen earlier in Avdiivka. 20/

The main challenge for Ukraine moving forward is Russia’s strike campaign. While Shahed type drones have become increasingly easy to intercept, Russian air strikes have become more sophisticated, and Russian missile production rates have notably increased compared with 2022. 21/

Russian strikes have crippled much of Ukraine’s non-nuclear electricity generation. In the summer Ukraine has been getting by thanks to solar energy, with shut offs at night, but looking at expected gigawatt output vs demand, the country faces its hardest winter yet. 22/

Ukraine needs ~16GW this winter, optimistically it will be able to produce 12GW. Getting there will require a combination of increased imports, and numerous gas units in the MW range. More details can be found in articles such as this one here: 23/forum-energii.eu/en/ukraine-des…

Although Ukraine is likely to stabilize the front line, addressing shortages of air defense, power generation, and improving Ukraine's own strike capability should be a priority for the West as it may prove much more significant for the trajectory of this war. 24/