Thread by @LtTimMcMillan

🧵Having personally worked several Presidential and Vice Presidential security details, here’s some of my thoughts based on the available info of the assassination attempt on Trump.

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1. The Secret Service employ a multi-tiered defense in depth approach to protective missions. An inner tier offer close protection support, these being the agents you see rushing in and surrounding Trump after the initial shots go off.

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A second middle tier is tasked with identifying and defending against mid-range threats, i.g. the crowd, etc. This tier is largely comprised of local and state law enforcement temporarily attached to the security detail. This is the area that I worked on prior details.

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Finally, you have an extend tier, which covers long distance threats. This can include counter sniper details and cyber/SIGINT support and CBRN defense.

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2. People have wondered how could the counter snipers in the videos not have seen the would be assassin prior to him getting off a shot.
This is because the area of responsibility for those counter snipers on the roof behind Trump was very likely in the extend tier

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Essentially they were scanning for threats a great distances well beyond the roughly 150 meters the threat appeared.
This is evidenced by the fact that the elevated counter sniper has to dramatically drop his line of sight to respond to the shooter.

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Secret Service advanced teams would have absolutely pre-scouted the location and identified the building the shooter used as a vulnerable spot in the defense.
Which begs the question, how was this guy still able to climb on the roof and get off a shot?

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Based on limited details at this point, IMO, the security breakdown occurred in the middle tier, which would likely include law enforcement who were supposed to be assigned to the area near the outbuildings.

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How that significant of a breakdown could occur is up for speculation. However, like I said this tier is largely dependent on local law enforcement and not the Secret Service. So speculatively, the local LEOs who were supposed to be in the area and make sure no one with a

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gun climbed up on the roof, f*cked up.

3. People have said that witnesses saw the guy with the gun on the roof, told police, but that they failed to respond and prevent the assassination attempt.
So how does that happen?

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Well, there’s typically limited lines communication between the Secret Service and the local LEOs working the middle tier.
You usually have one or two local LEO liaisons who have direct communication with the Secret Service, which means communications on the ground

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between the local LEOs being told about the shooter are being routed through dispatch, to local liaisons, then to Secret Service.

Compounding the difficulty to rapidly respond is the fact that there’s always some confusion and inefficiency when multiple different LEO

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agencies come together to work a detail. Most of these agencies aren’t used to working with each other and aren’t given much information beyond a few pre-event briefings.

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I actually saw what can go wrong in these scenarios first-hand when President Bush’s Secret Service detail almost engaged a local police SWAT/counter sniper team during the 2004 G8 summit. No one had properly communicated the local SWAT team’s position so all the

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Secret Service saw was heavily armed individuals with a line of sight on the President.
The whole thing was seconds away from being a tragic incident.

In this same vein, there was likely some delay and confusion with the initial reports of a person with a gun on the roof

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as local cops and Secret Service agents would all be trying to confirm the shooter didn’t belong to one of the security support teams.

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So in summary, when looking for blame in this massive security failure, if I was a betting man, I’d say the answer rests with whatever detail (likely local LEOs) were assigned to the area near the outbuildings.

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I’ll also add that I worked 5 Presidential details as a local LEO attachment. Even though I was in close proximity for each detail, in only 2 of them did I actually ever see the President or Vice President. That was Bush, while he was in the limo driving away. And Chaney

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but that was because I was on an inner position, feet away from him.
You’re explicitly trained that your eyes are always on the crowd, surroundings and potential threats.
Never on the President themselves.
For obvious reasons…

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Now my experience is entirely limited to official presidential visits, which are planned at least months and in some cases a year in advance.
It’s likely that some of the breakdowns or issues I mentioned can be exponentially increased when it comes to campaign trips

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as these stops can come up or change on very short notice.

@Aymondo (2) didn’t know where the shooting was coming from or where the threat was.
They basically formed a bulletproof barrier around him.

They didn’t let him stand up until after they knew the shooter was down.

As for letting him pose for the photo-op. There’s always a

@Aymondo (3) degree of conflict between the PPD and the political asset.
One’s entire mission is to protect their asset. The others is to be political.
I also saw this first hand when then Vice President Biden deviated from the pre-planned path to shake people’s hands during a

@Aymondo (4) 2013 visit to Savannah.
The Secret Service was pissed because every single step and path a president takes is pre-determined and calculated.

@mikeyCC5 This also means Trump’s detail would have to rely on local law enforcement more than a sitting President.

@VoxDemosthenes I can’t get into specifics, but likely one of the most significant missing resources for former presidents and candidates that sitting presidents enjoy relates to SIGINT/COMINT support.

@SumOfUs1 (1) local LEOs who work Presidential details are entirely chosen by their local agency. Basically, the SS tells the agency in advance that they need a certain number of officers to help work certain areas and the agencies picks what officers to send.

@SumOfUs1 (2) Depending on where you’re asked to work, such as in very close proximity to the President, officers may have to obtain a federal security clearance. I had to do this.
Now, I was fortunate because of the positions I held in my career that I had a ton of training working

@SumOfUs1 (3) high-risk events and I’d also worked on attachment to numerous other federal agencies, like the DEA, NASA, Customs, ATF…
However, that’s not the case for every officer assigned. Some may have zero extra training on event security or personal protection details.

@SumOfUs1 (4) Likewise, some are going to take the responsibility extremely seriously. However, some just think it’s “cool” to get to see a President up close or get some of the free Secret Service swag. (The Feds love making and handing out coffee mugs, challenge coins, and shirts).