๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ฒ๐ป๐ผ๐บ๐ถ๐ฐ ๐๐ผ๐ฑ๐ฒ - ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ด๐ฒ๐ป๐ผ๐บ๐ฒ ๐ถ๐ป๐๐๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ถ๐ฎ๐๐ฒ๐ ๐ฎ ๐ด๐ฒ๐ป๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ ๐บ๐ผ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐น ๐ผ๐ณ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ด๐ฎ๐ป๐ถ๐๐บ ๐งฌ
very excited to share this new preprint from me and Nick Cheney ๐๐งต arxiv.org/abs/2407.15908-
In which we consider how best to conceptualise the role of the genome in specifying the form of the organism. In other words, how it is that cats have kittens and dogs have puppies.
Clearly, the form of the organism that emerges depends on the genetic material in the fertilised egg (see Dolly, below), but how should we think about this relationship?
There are lots of metaphors that people use for the genome: a blueprint, a program, a recipe, or just a โresourceโ that the cell or organism draws on. But none of these is really apt and all are rather vague and unformalisable.
The most popular ones โ a blueprint or a program โ give a picture of the encoding of form that is too deterministic, direct, decomposable, and isomorphic.
That is, they imply that separate bits of the genome somehow specify or directly encode separate bits of the organism or distinct processes of development. We've known for a long time that this is not the case.
In this paper, we draw inspiration from machine learning and neuroscience to propose a different idea: that the genome instantiates a generative model of the organism, encoded as a compressed representation in a space of latent variables. arxiv.org/abs/2407.15908
We propose a loose analogy with variational autoencoders, which learn from training data a compressed representation of some kinds of entities (say images of horses), and which also learn how to decode this representation to generate a novel token of this class.
That sounds a lot like the job description of the genome, where evolution acts as the encoder, and development acts as the decoder.
Importantly, the encoding of different aspects of organismal form in this latent space is highly indirect, distributed, and largely non-decomposable.
This fits with emerging (or re-emerging) work in developmental biology which models gene regulatory networks as dynamical systems, where the collective interactions constrain the possibility space and channel developmental trajectories towards various attractor states.
In particular, it draws a direct parallel between Waddingtonโs visual metaphor โ the epigenetic landscape โ and the kinds of energy landscapes generated by some machine learning systems.
A key element of this model is what the genome does NOT encode (because it doesnโt have to). The genome doesnโt have to actively direct every developmental process โ it just has to *constrain* the self-organising biophysical processes of morphogenesis.
And of course the genome does nothing by itself. DNA is incredibly inert โ thatโs its whole shtick, really: to be a stable store of information. Itโs the cells that are doing the work.
This generative model has a number of important properties: 1. Compression through a bottleneck layer. 2. Encoding in a latent variable space. 3. Abstract, indirect representations. 4. Intrinsic variability of outputs. 5. Robustness. 6. Evolvability.
The robustness and evolvability are key here and these properties derive from the compressed, distributed, collective encoding
But this leads to a quandary when thinking about effects of genetic *variation* on different organismal phenotypes...
If most traits are highly polygenic (affected by many genetic variants) and most variants are highly pleiotropic (affecting many traits) then how could traits ever change independently? Why isn't there a kind of genetic gridlock?
Here, we may get some useful lessons from machine learning and neuroscience about the emergence of disentangled representations
Machine learning models, like VAEs, can be trained so as to generate independent, disentangled representations of separate features of the training data (like facial pose, age, gender, expression, etc.).
Despite the fact that many individual elements of the model carry some kind of information about many traits, all tangled up, distinct *sets* of elements can encode information about distinct traits in orthogonal subspaces
This is similar to the idea of separate low-dimensional subspaces in neural manifold encodings:
In the genome, we think the same kind of emergent modularity can create orthogonal representations of different traits in latent variable space, explaining how they can be independently selected for
Lots more in the paper, of course! Including thoughts on how this kind of model could be formalised in indirect encodings of artificial life forms (ALife)โฆ arxiv.org/abs/2407.15908
And, sorry, I neglected to tag Nick's twitter account: @CheneyLab above! (messing everything up in this thread... like a rookie!)
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Really excited to have this new preprint out ๐, with @HenryDPotter: ๐๐ฒ๐๐ผ๐ป๐ฑ ๐บ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ต๐ฎ๐ป๐ถ๐๐บ โ ๐ฒ๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ผ๐๐ฟ ๐ฐ๐ผ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐๐ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ถ๐ป ๐ป๐ฒ๐๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ osf.io/preprints/psyaโฆ
In neuroscience, our search for the causes of behavior is often just = a search for the underlying neural mechanisms. Especially when we can use tools like optogenetics to show some activity is "necessary and sufficient" for that behavior to occur
This relies (sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly) on a 'driving' metaphor - both of neural inputs driving activation and of neural activity driving behavior
Autism: The Truth is (not) Out There - I wrote this ten years ago and it is, depressingly, as relevant as ever...wiringthebrain.com/2014/10/autismโฆ
The evidence that autism has genetic origins is overwhelming. But we don't do a good job of communicating that. And that void is readily filled with pseudoscience...
The genetics of autism is genuinely complex - involving both genetic heterogeneity (of rare mutations) and a polygenic background of common variants. pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35654974/
I often get asked where I would draw the line of which kinds of creatures have "agency" or "free will"
I tend to only speak of "free will" in relation to humans, put purely because of the historical baggage that comes with the term. "Agency" I see as co-extensive with life...
Though some creatures have more agency than others, or maybe different kinds that vary along several dimensions. (Like behavioral flexibility, ability to cope with novel situations, time horizons of control, etc)
A lot of people ask me about my daily routine for neuro-optimising well-being and productivity*
*Narrator: no had in fact askedโฆ
So here goes:
I wake up at stupid oโclock and curse the darkness of the Irish winter. Will I be getting direct sunlight in my eyes this morning? I will in me hole. We wonโt see the sun again till February.
I grope my way to the bathroom for a hot shower. Yes, hot. Because itโs 2023 and weโre not fucking cavemen.
One motivator for arguing against free will seems to be the problem of moral luck and its undermining of moral responsibility. 1/n
The idea being that people's behavior is really determined by past events, including their genetic make-up, upbringing, social circumstances, and accumulated experiences... 2/n
...so how could it be right to blame or punish them for doing acts we call "crimes" when all these antecedent causes were really the determinants of their actions? 3/n
The concept of โrepresentationsโ offers a crucial bridge between brain and mind โ a way for physical (patterns of neural activity) to manifest as mental; for organisms to be able to *think about things*. 2/13
But representation talk is controversial and laden with baggage. Are they discrete symbolic objects of cognition or distributed states in a dynamic connectionist network? Are they needed at all to explain cognition? How does the meaning of neural patterns get grounded? 3/13