We’ve all had some fun with this latest “campaign promise,” but how does it intersect with Project 2025’s agenda about power markets and electric utilities?
A quick look at what Project 2025 says about interstate wholesale electric power markets…
Buried within a chapter about the Dept of Energy, Project 2025 dedicates 7 pgs to FERC, with 2 about natural gas pipelines and LNG facilities.
So I’m focusing on 5 pages here written by former FERC Comm’r McNamee. I'll take what I can get!
Project 2025’s main goal is to raise market prices received by coal, gas, and nuclear and/or raise market costs paid by wind and solar. Project 2025 calls this “reliability pricing” but it has only half-baked ideas (at best!) for how to implement it.
It asserts that “there is a growing problem with the electric grid’s reliability because of the increasing growth of subsidized intermittent renewable generation (like wind and solar)…” and
“Subsidized renewable resources are undermining electric reliability in RTOs.”
What’s the proof? In a footnote, it says that devastation from Winter Storm Uri in 2021 was due to subsidized renewables and “a lack of dispatchable generation.”
There was in fact plenty of dispatchable capacity in TX in 2021. It just didn’t work.
It also cites to a few NERC documents that don’t support the proposition about subsidized wind and solar and notes outages in California in 2020 and 2022.
Of course, it ignores all problems experienced by coal and gas generators. Anyway…
Project 2025 targets RTOs that run power markets. It says RTOs “no longer seem to work for the benefit of the American people.” The “increase in subsidized, intermittent resources is undermining the ability of RTOs’ pricing models to support reliable dispatchable generation.”
The solution: “FERC should direct RTOs to establish reliability pricing for eligible dispatchable generation resources or require intermittent resources to procure backup power for times when they are not available to operate.”
But how would RTOs implement that “reliability pricing”? Well, the prior administration proposed a version of this, and it was panned by every power market participant (except FirstEnergy and PSE&G) and ultimately unanimously rejected by FERC on a bipartisan basis. Also...
Author McNamee's major contribution to FERC was spearheading a version of the third item -- eliminating renewables from capacity markets -- but it was quickly rescinded in 2021.
In targeting RTOs, Project 2025 also props up monopolist, for-profit utilities: “Unlike vertically integrated utilities that are accountable to state elected officials and state public utility commissions, RTOs and their participants are accountable only to FERC.”
Project 2025 wants to reverse FERC’s recent long-term transmission planning rule bc it “socializes costs for customers who do not benefit from the projects.”
Thus far, only Southeastern utilities are advocating for total repeal of FERC's transmission planning rule.
By the way, lest you think it’s pro-nuclear, an earlier section in this chapter says that the Department of Energy/Congress should stop funding the civilian nuclear credit program enacted in the 2021 infrastructure bill.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
The utilities’ goal is to control regional transmission development.
Here’s how: 1) Give the PJM Board authority to change regional planning goals. 2) Gain power to preempt PJM actions or challenge them in secret before PJM acts. 3) Disempower PJM Members and everyone else.
First, PJM covers 20% of the US population and GDP. Only a few companies dominate high-voltage transmission in the region. There's a lot at stake.
(The brown regions in the map include Duke Energy, ConEd, PSE&G, PPL -- each another giant electric utility)
On item 1) on the utilities' wishlist (above), the utilities can’t actually give the PJM Board control over the regional planning rules. Now, PJM Members have that authority bc the utilities gave it them 27 years ago.
PJM has made a separate FERC filing to get this power.
After skimming 50 filings, I've filled in the scorecard. Many other entities are opposing this rule on other grounds. The chart highlights arguments that I see as most damaging to FERC's long-term ability to regulate transmission.
🧵
Quick explanation of the top 3 rows:
Major Questions Doctrine was the product of a 2022 US Supreme Court case, WV v. EPA. Along with @PolicyIntegrity, I rebutted claims about MQD and this rule here - eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/upl…
Row 2:
30 years ago, FERC started to set industry-wide transmission rules. Courts approved. Now, FERC's opponents are resurrecting the claim that FERC can only regulate utility-by-utility (or RTO-by-RTO) and can't set industry-wide rules in a single proceeding.
This meeting is starting with a staff presentation about the siting rule, Order No. 1977, leaving Order No. 1920 for the end. This is clearly an effort to juice ratings.
Scorching hot FERC take from 1976:
The Supreme Court's statement that the purpose of the Power and Gas Acts is to encourage plentiful supplies at reasonable prices is wrong and should be discarded. The Court's conclusion is poorly supported by precedent and history.
Above, the conclusion is repeated by states suing to end DOE's LNG pause and was said yesterday by future Commissioner See at the confirmation hearing.
Here's why it's wrong and why this matters:
Neither law is about maximizing energy production. Both laws are primarily about consumer protection. One element of protecting consumers is ensuring that new gas service (i.e., new pipelines) is needed. Neither law regulates energy production --- states primarily do that.
PJM utilities propose to grant themselves even more control over regional transmission development and elevate themselves over PJM in key regional decisions.
Here is the contract they are presenting to PJM for its acquiescence -- pjm.com/-/media/commit…
PJM is a regional transmission operator premised on a contract between transmission-owning utilities and PJM itself. The contract grants PJM certain rights to operate the transmission system and splits control over regional market and transmission rules/plans bt the parties.
The utilities' changes would: 1. Put PJM officially in charge of regional transmission planning rules, thus transferring control over those rules from PJM's members (generators, utilities, distributors, etc) to the PJM Board/staff.
How is utility control over transmission blocking clean energy and raising costs?
Here’s a look at allegations by renewables or transmission developers that utilities or RTOs are acting anti-competitively.
The complaints are about interconnection, planning, rates, and more!
In some cases, facts are not seriously in dispute. The issue is whether the utility or RTO is violating rules. Ultimately, this is a legal call, and FERC’s answer will not necessarily find that the utility/RTO is not acting anti-competitively.
Alright, let's go!
1. Invenergy v. PSCo [owned by Xcel]
Bottom Line: “Put simply, it very much looks like PSCo [Xcel] is trying to advantage its own generation via its control of transmission and the interconnection process.”