Thread by @OzKaterji

Seeing a lot of analysis about last night's events in the Middle East that I think misses the wood for the trees, so here are a few of my brief thoughts on the situation 🧵:

Firstly, immediately after October 7th I was very vocal about the fact that I did not think Israel's stated war aims were achievable, namely, 1) destruction of Hamas, 2) return of the hostages, and 3) permanent pacification of the Gaza Strip - I do not think that has changed.

I think it quickly became clear to the Netanyahu regime that these objectives were not realistic, and that over the course of the last few months, that strategy has pivoted to securing something he can sell to the Israeli public as a victory - focusing solely on the first aim.

A lot of the analysis today has focused on the fact that taking Haniyeh out endangers a ceasefire and hostage deal. I think any basic analysis of Netanyahu's behaviour over the last few months should show that he & his cabinet have no interest in a deal that preserves Hamas.

Even if that means that there will be no deal to return the hostages, that seems to be a calculation made by Netanyahu - that a diplomatic resolution that returns the hostages is less preferable than risking the safety of the remaining hostages by refusing concessions to Hamas.

That's not to say that Netanyahu does not want to see the hostages freed, and what I am saying is merely my own interpretation of his actions, but that freeing the hostages at the cost of ending hostilities with Hamas still in power in Gaza is not a price he is willing to pay.

With no change to the status quo on the occupation on offer, the underlying conditions in Gaza are highly unlikely to change postbellum. Therefore the 2nd and 3rd aims of the declared war aims following October 7th seem to at the very least no longer be a priority for Netanyahu.

However, by assassinating Deif & Haniyeh, the first & probably most important war aim to Netanyahu in the wake of Oct 7th now seems credibly achievable to a certain extent. Israel is now just one Sinwar assassination away from being able to declare a "victory" over Hamas in Gaza.

Given Hamas' history I do not think liquidating the 3 most senior Hamas figures means the group has been "destroyed". It will have certainly experienced a military defeat, and its current military capabilities have been degraded & exhausted.

If Hamas can replace Yassin & Meshaal, it can also replace Haniyeh, Deif & Sinwar. However, if Israel does eventually capture or kill Sinwar too, it would be hard for even the fiercest of Netanyahu's Israeli opponents to deny that Israel has achieved a strategic victory of sorts.

Leaving aside an escalatory spiral with Iran & its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, Netanyahu would be able to claim a credible victory of sorts over Hamas in Gaza, even without aims 2 & 3 being achieved, even in the face of furious opposition from the hostage families.

The strikes in Tehran & Dahiyeh are hugely dangerous incidents that deserve to be discussed in their own threads, the chance for a prolonged conflict between Israel & Iran's proxies cannot be downplayed. But while they are connected, they are still distinct from the Gaza conflict

IMHO, the view that Israel's actions yesterday show a desperation on Netanyahu's part does not hold water. They are certainly dangerous, and risk increasing incidents of violence in the region, but they seem to me to be calculated towards ending the Gaza war on Netanyahu's terms

So while I do agree with analysis that says a ceasefire deal is dead in the water following Haniyeh's assassination, I do not necessarily agree that it proves Netanyahu wants to prolong the conflict in Gaza.

Rather, in my opinion, it potentially shows that Netanyahu is trying to end the conflict in Gaza (and only in Gaza) on his own terms, regardless of where that leaves hostage negotiations, and at the very serious risk of starting a new wider war with Iran's proxies.

I think those are prices Netanyahu and his cabinet are willing to pay to be able to declare a military victory over Hamas in Gaza. Will it work for him, internationally and/or domestically? I'm not a fortune teller & do not have the answer to that.

Much of that seems to depend on how the Israeli public will react to a declaration of "victory" on those terms & what further price Israel may pay from deciding to double down on escalation with Tehran. It also relies on the not insignificant remaining task of taking Sinwar out.

Major disclaimer, I'm not trying to justify, excuse or downplay the behaviour of any of the actors involved in this multi-front war, I am simply trying to analyse it from my own perspective as a Middle Eastern foreign policy analyst & conflict journalist.

Lastly, whatever Netanyahu declares, the reality on the ground in Gaza is not in his direct control. The Palestinians will not abandon militancy while they remain occupied & stateless, and my opinion remains that the Israel-Palestine conflict will only end with a just settlement.

With regards to Iran’s calculations in this? All bets are off, Iran has been humiliated across multiple states in the same 24 hour period. Tehran doesn’t have to sell anything to its public, but its image of projected regional strength has been shattered.

I expect a response.

https://twitter.com/haningdr/status/1818612649451516071

I am too busy covering the war here in Ukraine to pitch this as an article, but if you’ve found this thread useful, please consider buying me a coffee or two - I much prefer putting this stuff out for free than trying to lock it behind a Substack!

ko-fi.com/ozkaterji