🧵Aside from the headline news, today’s Russian prisoner swap seems to me to include a potentially involuntary limited hangout by the US. It pertains to the release of Vladislav Klyushin and what that suggests about how spies and spy agencies really fund themselves.
The official line is that Klyushin was involved in “hack-to-trade” insider schemes. But why would that be of interest to the Kremlin?
To understand, first watch this suspiciously well produced (given the turnaround time) CNBC mini doc about “Putin’s trader.”
Not only is the doc extremely well produced for something that in theory only became public knowledge today - hinting of tactical embargo terms or pre-positioning of information by the Feds themselves - the access they were given to prosecutors suggests it serves a broader agenda.
There are other tactical if you know you know leaks throughout. For example, the last minute tip off from an anonymous source linking the reporter to a former Russian spy living under an assumed identity after defecting from Russia with US help. That isn’t the sort of source that you just uncover via investigative work.
So we have a former Russian spy telling us very clearly that Russia uses its spying power (both human and cyber) to gain access to insider information to make shed loads of money for spies. Why would Putin allow these individuals to get super rich? Likely because it’s the perfect off the books funding source which allows spies to self finance their work without the annoyance of sanctions.
But it’s not just about sanctions.
If information means power in markets, then it stands to reason that spy agencies - with all their backdoor access points, hacking specialists and general accumulation of privileged info - have possibly one of the biggest advantages in markets of all.
Would they use that privileged information tactically to front run markets to raise money for all sorts of black ops? If they’re already operating illegally in jurisdictions - it would be foolish to think they weren’t.
So the next question you have to consider is: when is an outsized hedge fund return really a genuine outsized return, and when is it the product of traders being fed privileged information from spy agencies - in a sort of hedge fund front collaboration deal - where proceeds are split between the spies and the front companies? Or even where the managers are the spies?
Note also the quip about how Klyushin is supposedly only the tip of the iceberg. There are (according to the former Russian spy) allegedly many more like him embedded across the US financial system. And unlike Klyushin these guys are pros and this discreet. They don’t raise suspicions by buying Lamborghinis or fur coats for their wives. They keep a low profile. [Perhaps even give some of their fortunes away anonymously to civil society organisations?]
What else do we learn from the doc? Well there’s also the fact that the Feds managed to get access to all their encrypted comms. Including on apps previously thought to be unhackable like Threema. Is this a boast by the US or a warning?
If you consider Klyushin’s little op generated about $90m - imagine how much more is being extracted from the financial system as a whole by all the hostile sovereign states that use similar tactics?
Now consider that it’s not just hostile states that stand to benefit from deploying privileged info garnered from spy/surveillance to generate off the books funds for all sorts of black ops.
The point being: the playbook is not unique to Russia.
The formula is simple and highly replicable.
1) Locate and recruit a good front man/mule - who you promise to make very rich. Ideally have it be someone you can trust or who you know you can control.
2) provide him and his team with insider info that lets him outperform the market.
3) Agree that he gets to keep a share of the wealth as long as he forwards the rest to wherever it may be needed. Maybe encourage him to be a vocal effective altruist from the very beginning. For maximum influence and disruption have him “donate” to all sorts of civil society orgs or political causes you want to influence.
4) if he gets sloppy and is found out throw him under the bus. If he refuses to comply (and you realise you’ve accidentally created an uncontrollable monster) panic slowly. If one of his team threatens to walk and spill the beans on all, pay them off until they go away.
5) keep your operations as low key and secretive as possible.
Makes you wonder just how many of the billionaires in this space might not be what they seem, eh?
👉🏅?
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THREAD: Why the private credit crisis is just the West’s version of “involution”
1/ In my latest piece for TBS I argue that the West's growing private credit crisis represents its own version of China's economic "involution" — a liquidity-driven form of economic growth that produces enormous activity and capital deployment but progressively weaker underlying returns.
2/ In China the mechanism was domestic financial repression. Cheap household savings were channeled into low-return industrial investment, producing massive overcapacity and exports sold abroad at razor-thin or even negative margins.
3/ In the West the mechanism looked different but produced a similar outcome. Extremely cheap capital and abundant liquidity fueled a private-equity, venture, and later private-credit ecosystem that allowed large numbers of structurally unprofitable firms to keep expanding.
Nice to see that @HyunSongShin has officially recognized that stablecoins open the door to an "Uber Surge Pricing" type liquidity market. [Actual gas markets also clear in a similar way, notably the NBP balancing point system.]
The below screenshot is from his latest BIS paper "Tokenomics and blockchain fragmentation".
This is something I've been pointing to for years, though I've seen it as eventually leading to dynamic pricing and markets for intraday funds in general.
The paper is more concerned about the fragility and fragmentation risk introduced in systems that rely on many different networks using surge pricing mechanisms to ration entry and exit across systems.
And of course turkeys don't vote for xmas, so the central bank perspective is that all this "congestion" and cost uncertainty can be avoided if programmable money just shifts to cbank ledgers where the cbank balance sheet can absorb congestion shocks in a way that can regulate transaction costs.
The BIS concludes: "These [programmable money] innovations do not require decentralised consensus among anonymous validators. They can be implemented on unified ledgers anchored by central banks, which benefit from the institutional trust of the
traditional monetary system."
THREAD 🧵I know everyone is very excited about aliens this morning, but I ask you, is it really as exciting as super wonky insights on dollar liquidity plumbing, Federal Reserve balance sheet policy, and stablecoin statecraft?
I think not. I interviewed Fed governor Stephen Miran this week and those were just some of the topics we discussed. For those who can't be bothered to wade through the transcript, I thought it might be useful to highlight the wonkiest bits.
1) Top wonky insight for me is that Miran is as perplexed as me about the ongoing role of the Fed Funds Market. "I’m not quite sure why we hold on to the Fed funds rate, but we do. Maybe someday someone will explain it to me," he said.
2) I asked him if the current environment calls for greater awareness of how debt management policy is interacting with monetary policy.
He said that while the two don’t require explicit coordination, because the Fed should be pursuing monetary policy for monetary purposes, and Treasury should be pursuing fiscal policy for fiscal policy purposes, they do require awareness, because what "the one does can depend on what the other does, because the choices from the one can affect conditions that matter for the choices of the other."
And "In theory, you could run up against a time in which there are constraints."
🧵1/ I wonder how many people realise that what's really going on with stablecoins is a massive US statecraft play to re-dollarize the world on its own terms. You could even call it a "re-stablization op" (yep - there's a gag in there).
2/ My analysis is that the reason why many countries are panicking about the upcoming dollar onslaught is because it's a backchannel way to rebase the system, and force 2008-era capital holes to be finally written down.
3/The intent is also to re-establish the supremacy of the dollar in markets where people can't trust their own governments, via a freely floated currency that can actually offer proper price discovery against domestic currencies.
1/ Just a short recap of why it pays to watch your blind spots.
On Feb 23 we argued that the Mar-a-Lago Accord was gearing up to be more of a Bretton Woods 2.0 affair than a Plaza Accord. But also that the real challenge was how to get everyone to the table.
2/ March 1 we explained the real struggle was between two systems, both of which independently believe are liberating the other from oppression. We called it mutual liberation syndrome.
3/ On March 8, we explained that to get everyone to the table a controlled demolition of the stock market was necessary using Xi’s own strategy of shaking down the system to highlight its vulnerabilities and keep wealth imbalances in check.
1/ Amid the endless and breathless commentary today, worth remembering this is a giant game of high stakes Liar’s Poker.
It’s also an exercise in mutual assured economic destruction. MAED.
This means it’s not about markets or valuations, it’s almost exclusively about game theory and who can withstand the pressure longer.
The idea this hasn’t been war gamed is naive though.
A few things to remember: Officially China doesn’t own much long dated paper so it can claim plausible deniability re the long-end sell off. But in reality we have no idea what China really owns, because of its use of offshore proxies.
2/ As I set out in the Great Simplification podcast in March, for “MAED” theory to work you need to present the perception you really are MAD enough to do the unthinkable.
I also argued that there is a paradoxical stability in the game theory equation from having a consistently reliable Liar at the table.
3/ If the objective is creating a steady and stable state or drawing multiple players to a negotiation where trust is the missing variable there is a paradoxical stability associated with the presence of what I would call a “known liar”.
The introduction of a predictably deceptive agent can paradoxically create a common knowledge dynamic. The liar becomes a fixed variable — a strategic constant — whose motivations are well-understood. This transforms higher-order uncertainty into first-order predictability, enabling the formation of a new, more stable Nash equilibrium.
In other words, if there are two negotiations about to take place about how to structure the new financial system and trust is lacking, the preference should be to gather at the table of the known liar.
And who has the world been saying is greatest liar of them all?