Broader employment data suggests the swift rise in the UE rate is an outlier and that the labor market remains pretty tight with only very gradually cooling.
If labor markets aren't weakening fast, the Fed has little urgency to deliver all those expected cuts.
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While the UE rate gets a lot of attention, it by no means the only read on employment conditions. By this point, we have a pretty good set of data thru Jul.
ADP private jobs data has been in roughly the same range for a year and recent data in line with last summer.
For all the noise about an uptick in claims measures, IC is basically at the same level as last summer and CC is 6bps of labor force higher. This may also be overstated by one-off issues not well captured by seasonal adj (TX hurricane, late MI retooling, MN ed).
Challenger job layoff announcements posted their lowest numbers in a while (and very low on an outright basis).
That's consistent with the layoffs figures that we've seen from JOLTS (a month lagged thru Jun) which moved down to multi-year lows.
And in line with hiring plans from NFIB (thru June) are pretty stable over the last year and ticked up a tad in recent months.
This stability contrasts with other measures of hiring which suggests a bit more weakness. Though if the hiring rate was really this poor, we'd expect to see a much greater rise in continuing claims than we have so far.
Mega bears love the ISM manufacturing employment gauge being down to Sept 2008 levels. While they take it as a true sign of collapse, anyone who lived through '08 knows that this just indicates that the survey doesn't pass the common sense test and should be ignored.
Overall we are also seeing signs of some modest easing of pressure on wages as the incremental bid for employment has slowed. But across most measures, demand and wage growth remains elevated vs. pre-covid levels.
Openings have come down but are above '20 and for a few months:
The most comprehensive measure of wage growth - ECI - had a soft print for 2Q for the important wages and salaries line (most spending happens from income), though its a bit of an outlier relative to stronger quarters before. Either way, clearly above pre-covid.
The ADP pay insights numbers suggest very gradual slowing, with a bit of a tick down in July particularly with lower-income cohorts (here proxied by age). Still above pre-covid levels of growth, particularly for lower income earners.
This suggests that even though labor market demand may be in the ballpark of pre-covid levels, pressures on nominal wage growth may persist given that wage income remains pretty depressed in real terms relative to pre-covid levels. Aways to go on this "catch up" for workers:
Reports today are just one lens into what is going on with labor market conditions and these other reports help triangulate the picture. Like the overall growth measures, most employment measures show only modest cooling. The UE rate may be the outlier:
The Fed responds to the macro data, and typically aggressive easing cycles only come when there is (or a relatively extreme expectation of) deterioration in the labor market. The broad set of data looks consistent with JP's views of gradual cooling and normalization.
Hopes that swift cuts are coming because of a fast labor market deterioration are unlikely to come true given the data and likely trajectory at this point.
And for many investors, hopes of those fast cuts are all that is propping up the stock market at this point.
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The UE rate is rising while comprehensive measures of US growth are steady and running above potential over the same period.
That suggests that policy moves driven by heavily weighting UE rate shifts are likely to result in rates that are too dovish given conditions.
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Conceptually unemployment should fall when the economy grows above its potential and rise in the opposite. Through time, this relationship has held quite strong - with a 90% correlation since 1950.
With any perspective, the last 12m have been quite an outlier.
The payrolls numbers do not show a similar outlier relative to the real growth of the economy over the same time frame.
Payroll growth relative to working ago population growth has been roughly in line with Real GDP growth relative to potential.
Central bankers always have a desire to normalize until faced with macroeconomic constraints.
Markets are taking at face value that the Fed, ECB, BoJ, and BoE will aggressively pursue shifts toward "normal" ahead, but the data that drives these moves suggests caution.
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The post-GFC period highlights this draw where for nearly a decade central bankers rhetoric consistently emphasized a desire to normalize policy and markets agreed, while the macro realities kept easy policy firmly in place. h/t @CrisisStudent
The moves and rhetoric by the BoJ overnight are reminiscent of this dynamic that permeated much of the '10s.
"Governor Kazuo Ueda’s determination to proceed with normalization after years in which the central bank pursued an ultra-easy policy"
While the techno optimists promise an AI-driven productivity boom, the macro reality is little changed.
Productivity growth across the DW remains very weak, suggesting the expected productivity benefit from AI is much more hope than reality for now.
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With LLMs around for 2yrs, you'd expect to see it at least start to show up in the productivity numbers.
But a simple measure of US productivity - RGDP / employment - has been flat since just after covid and best case is its roughly in line with the pre-covid trend thru 2Q24.
The story is similar globally as well.
Eurozone productivity is falling. And the GDP report today was further indication - with growth running about 0.6% y/y while employment growth has been closer to 1% over the last year. Consistent with weak growth & UE rate falling.
With almost half of S&P500 companies reporting so far, the 9.8% earnings growth y/y this quarter (up 0.9% vs. initial expectations) looks pretty good.
That's until it gets compared to the 17% expected y/y earnings growth expected by 4Q24 and the 15% growth for '25 too.
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While in most cases near 10% earnings growth would look pretty good, it is no where near the hockey stick trajectory expected by analysts. Here dark blue is actual reported, 2Q is the first shaded.
Expectations are for near 25% earnings growth from 2Q24->4Q25.
Analysts know that there is no way that can happen through top-line growth given the slowing nominal GDP trajectory in the US and globally. So its got to come from margin expansion, which is expected to surge over the next 18m to all time highs.
The Fed is not going to cut rates because treasury interest expense is too high.
It's not part of their mandate and therefore doesn't influence their decision making.
The reason I wrote the above was how surprised I was at how many people objected to the idea the Fed might be slow to react in response to stronger data with this line of reasoning - that cuts were assured because of interest expense. See comments:
This is an example of the worst kind of "conspiracy" theory that is often promoted around #fintwit which get lots of clicks.
On the surface it sounds plausible and even sophisticated, but in reality it is unsupported by fact or evidence that it will motivate the Fed's actions.
Current monetary policy has been in place for nearly 2 years, and yet the US economy as a whole hasn't slowed much.
The argument that policy is far too restrictive at these levels just doesn't align with the comprehensive macro data or financial market action.
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One of the easiest ways to see how the economy is performing is by looking at the nominal GDP, final sales, and final demand. These are beneficial because it takes out any measurement issues with inflation and fluky stuff like inventories & trade.
Pretty stable at 4-5% here:
Of course consumer demand is most critical in driving the US economy, and here we see not much change recently, running 4-5% pretty consistently (particularly if you avg. Q123 with Q223).