π¨π§΅ @EMPOWR_us has confirmed from whistleblowers that @TulsiGabbard was under Quiet Skies surveillance on not just one, or two, or even three flights... She has had Air Marshals there to monitor her on EIGHT FLIGHTS since her July 23 interview with @IngrahamAngle.
Furthermore, TSA is mobilizing a retaliatory investigation into who made these protected whistleblower disclosures. I wrote to @DHSOIG this morning asking him to ensure these whistleblowers are protected.
Our letter to IG Cuffari highlights that just because TSA considers some information "Sensitive Security Information," or SSI, does not trump the Whistleblower Protection Act.
The Supreme Court considered this exact issue in 2015 in DHS v. @rjmaclean. MacLean made disclosures to the media of information he reasonably believed was a "substantial and specific danger to public health or safety." TSA argued its regs on SSI prohibited the disclosures, but the Supreme Court ruled the whistleblower protections Congress established in law took priority over TSA regs. If an agency could simply erase statutory whistleblower protections by creating its own rules or regulations to circumvent them, every agency would do that.
Here, whistleblowers reasonably believed that assigning three Air Marshals and countless other in-airport resources to EIGHT FLIGHTS of @TulsiGabbard's is a gross waste of funds and an abuse of authority--especially after they surely realized after the first flight that she poses a threat to no one. (Except America's enemies--she is, after all, a colonel in the Army Reserves! πͺπ½)
The Whistleblower Protection Act doesn't limit who most federal employees can make their protected whistleblower disclosures to, so they can go to the OIG (as we have), to Congress, to a professional association like @FAMS_AMNC, or to the press (as @rjmaclean did).
Rather than opening a "leak" investigating to try and intimidate whistleblowers, TSA should be trying to figure out how on earth @TulsiGabbard got added to their Quiet Skies list--and why they haven't taken her off after EIGHT FLIGHTS.
We will be meeting with @DHSOIG imminently to ensure they help protect these whistleblowers. More to come!
The whole Quiet Skies program seems like a civil liberties nightmare anyway.
Over four years the OIG examined, the found Quiet Skies confirmed precisely zero passengers as aviation security threats. I can think of far better uses for the hundreds of thousands of dollars DHS puts into this. (Like, say, ensuring a major party's political nominee is protected from attempted assassination the day after an Iranian asset is arrested for plotting a murder-for-hire?)
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π¨ One thing that didn't receive much attention in connection with yesterday's @Weaponization hearing is that @JusticeOIG Michael Horowitz released several new pieces of information corroborating what @EMPOWR_us has previously disclosed to @Jim_Jordan and @JudiciaryGOP. (You can find a list of some here: .)
Based on that new info, below are the top questions I would have asked IG Horowitz at yesterday's hearing if it were me... π§΅
β‘οΈ Mr. Allen wrote to a coworker of the COVID-19 vaccine that he was "waiting until the opening rounds are finished and more data is available." But as you noted in your statement to the Committee, Mr. Allen's "hesitation about taking the COVID-19 vaccine" meant to the FBI's Insider Threat Office that Mr. Allen "may pose" an "insider threat" to the FBI. You found that focus on vaccination status played a role in suspending Mr. Allen's clearance, but many other employees whose security clearances were suspended by the FBI also expressed reservations about the COVID-19 vaccine, and the questionnaire asking FBI employees to rat out coworkers' views on the vaccine comes from another case than Mr. Allen's altogether.
β What kind of atmosphere existed in the FBI's Insider Threat Office such that "vaccine hesitancy" was viewed as making an FBI employee a possible "insider threat"?
β Have you examined how many other Insider Threat assessments referenced views on the COVID-19 vaccine? If not, why not?
β What kind of atmosphere existed in the FBI's Security Division such that vaccine views were taken into account when making security clearance decisions?
β Have you examined how many other security clearance suspension or revocation memos referenced views on the COVID-19 vaccine? If not, why not?
β‘οΈ According to your statement to the Committee, Investigator 1 told your office that "edits made to the suspension memorandum 'grossly mischaracterized' Mr. Allen's communications."
βWho made these edits? His supervisory special agent, Sean Clark? His assistant section chief, Dena Perkins? His section chief, Jeffrey Veltri?
β What was their motivation for mischaracterizing Mr. Allen's communications? Was it simply whistleblower animus, or was it also animus against Mr. Allen's political, religious, or medical views?
π¨ This afternoon I transmitted a 22-page letter to @Jim_Jordan putting the lie to the FBI's claim that "[t]he FBI has not and will not retaliate against individuals who make protected whistleblower disclosures."
As our press release on the letter outlines, one of the key retaliators pushing the politicization of the FBI was Jeffrey Veltri, now SAC of the FBI's Miami Field Office and running the investigation into the second Trump assassination attempt: .
Not only did Veltri improperly politicize the FBI's Security Division, we've now learned he was under investigation for retaliating against whistleblowers who objected to his heavy-handed tactics and disregard of the law surrounding security clearance adjudications.
This investigation delayed his appointment as the Miami SAC.
These issues will be the subject of hearing next Wednesday @JusticeOIG Michael Horowitz will testify at along with me and FBI whistleblower Marcus Allen.
Yesterday @EMPOWR_us submitted a detailed 29-page retaliation complaint to the @JusticeOIG on behalf of a second whistleblower from within the FBI's Security Division, who saw firsthand the FBI's improper actions against FBI whistleblowers--and then suffered them herself.
She is the second Security Division employee we've filed a retaliation complaint with the OIG about.
This article details some of the whistleblower disclosures our client made about the political bias of FBI official Jeffrey Veltri, who is now the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Miami Field Office and spoke at today's press conference. nypost.com/2024/07/02/us-β¦
𧡠@US_OSC is proposing a new process by which it will make disclosure referrals and retaliation findings public with the consent of the whistleblower, which is an excellent proposal.
But something OSC should do immediately is to stop requesting that the whistleblower keep disclosure referrals confidential.
Why should a whistleblower refrain from publicizing the referral of their own whistleblower disclosure, regardless of whether OSC chooses to?
By using the very broad phrase "information...related to this matter," OSC's restraining language could even be misconstrued to constrain their communications about even the underlying information, and not just the fact of OSC's referral.
In other words, it could suggest to a whistleblower that they shouldn't make further protected disclosures--even to entities like Congress.
This could be interpreted as contradicting the spirit of the Grassley anti-gag rider which has restricted appropriations since FY 1989 (including today: ).
Back in 2021 and 2022, @EMPOWR_us helped a Federal Air Marshal disclosure to the DHS Inspector General that that TSA was improperly targeting Americans for surveillance.
Because the Air Marshal's wife was falsely accused of being at the Capitol on J6, she was placed on a watchlist and given surveillance and additional screening when she flew.
Senator @RonJohnsonWI even wrote to TSA and the FBI asking about the case of this TSA whistleblower. But neither TSA nor the DHS OIG did anything about it.