Thread by @michaeldweiss

Latest from "Karl," @holger_r's and my favorite Estonian military analyst, on developments in the war:

"Let’s start with the situation on the eastern front as it is still the most painful and problematic for Ukraine. Russian pressure and forward movement toward Pokrovske and Toretsk continue there. Russia has very small daily advances there but it is still worrying that Ukraine hasn’t been able to put a stop to it."

"A week ago it was estimated that since the beginning of the year Russia has gained 750 sq km. This area in itself is very little, nothing dramatic. Ukraine has taken control of 200 sq km in the Kursk oblast in just two days."

"But constant retreat on the eastern front is also a psychological problem. Russia is getting constantly closer to the more significant towns of Konstantinovka and Chasiv Yar. From there, risks towards Kramatorsk and Slovyansk will become more serious. Ukraine needs to close that direction."

"Another concern that has recurred in the last weeks is Russia's superiority in artillery ammunition. Some time ago that superiority had almost been eliminated."

"Ukraine's main concern is still the glide bombs that Russia uses to destroy Ukrainian defensive positions. There is nothing to do but retreat to the next position. It’s not a scare story yet but the trend is worrying."

"Russia's gains this year are already twice as much as what Ukraine managed to regain on the southern front all last summer. But they are small volumes overall compared to what Ukraine liberated in Kherson and Dnipr’s west bank or in Kharkiv in the autumn of 2022."

"If the pressure continues and Russia gets Chasiv Yar and Konstantinovka, the situation will become more critical on the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions. These two are the last major cities in the Donetsk oblast still under Ukraine's control."

"It may also put more pressure on the Vuhledar direction on the south-eastern corner of the front. With time this will become more problematic. Such constant retreat to new defensive positions also means that Ukraine cannot prepare proper defensive lines."

"There is a concern as whether or not the Kursk operation is actually meaningful or if Ukraine should have pushed those reserves to the eastern front. It is difficult to assess this and we will only know in time."

"I don’t think that Ukraine intends to keep Russian territory under their control for a long time. The main objective of this operation is probably to force Russia to move and divert their units away from more difficult positions from Ukraine's perspective. It’s too early to judge if it worked."

"It would be logical for Russia to bring units from the Kharkiv and Vovchansk direction where they are the closest to Kursk. But Ukraine has significantly large units there and it is Ukraine who is applying the pressure, gradually reducing the areas that Russia got under their control in the spring."

"By moving those units away, Russia would risk Ukraine marching into Belgorod oblast. The Kursk operation shows that Russia doesn’t have any meaningful reserves, otherwise they would have been sent to Kursk immediately."

"The attack into Kursk is something unexpected in this war, at least for a while. There has been nothing unexpected since the autumn of 2022. Drones have been used to get early warning if one side was amassing units, was planning counterattacks. This time it seems that Russian intelligence missed the concentration of Ukrainian units. There’s at least a brigade worth of Ukraine's troops, 2-3 battalions, operating on the Russian side or just near the border."

"Russian channels talk about 2-3 Ukrainian brigades but this seems like a typical exaggeration. Ukraine is keeping operational silence on this issue very well. We don’t have any information from them about Kursk. Everything comes from Russian sources and their tone fluctuates between disaster to all being on the best of terms."

"The number of F-16s that Ukraine has finally received is very small and not going to make a huge difference on the front. When the F-16s start to conduct real operations, they might reduce Russian Air Force activity on the eastern front by a bit."

"Ukraine will have to be cautious in their use, plus it is not clear what armament the U.S. allowed to be used. The problem of the last few months –- the Americans' stupid and nonsensical arms restrictions -– has not gone anywhere. There has been much talk about it but no change."

"I am worried about how much pressure is going to come from the U.S. as to why the Kursk operation was necessary. I wouldn't be surprised if the Biden administration voices worries about that or of 'excessive escalation'."

"On the southern front and in Crimea Russia’s operational capabilities continue to steadily diminish. The submarine that got the first hit in the fall last year has now been finally sunk. To repair submarines, Russia has no other site in the Black Sea than Sevastopol. Otherwise it would have been removed long ago. That's why it stayed and got hit again."

"Ukraine has systematically destroyed Russia's air defense, EW and communications systems in Crimea. This creates operating space there for F-16s. On the eastern side it's more complicated. I don’t have info of Ukraine succeeding in systematically destroying air defense and EW systems there."

"Also on the positive side, the Ukraine drone industry is developing at a fast pace. Drones are flying farther and farther. The best example is the hit on the Morozovsk air base. It got attacked by drones in the spring but then the Russians managed to minimize the damage with anti-aircraft and EW."

"This time Ukraine got away with it, destroying one Russian attack aircraft and the entire stockpile of glide bombs. There’s also serious damage to the airstrip and other structures. This is one of the reasons why the major attack with 40-60 missiles that has been expected hasn’t happened."

"Several airfields where Russia's strategic bombers take off are out of order. Olenya airbase hasn't had any bombers taking off since the attack."

"It is also notable that Ukrainian drones have on a couple of occasions taken down Russian planes or helicopters in the air. This is a new thing where a drone attacks a larger object in the air. It is a particularly dangerous trend for helicopters as they operate low and close to the frontline. A very worrying situation for Russia."

"If a full scale war between Israel and Iran were to break out, it would not be good for Ukraine. The Gaza conflict has already taken a lot of attention away from Ukraine in Western media. That war would do it even more."

"The potential consequences, the death toll, would be even higher than in Gaza. Russia would like this conflict. But Russia's ability to help Iran today, despite Shoigu’s visit there, is very limited except for intelligence assistance."

"Iran's biggest shortcoming is in anti-aircraft systems, which Russia also doesn’t have enough to share. This is probably one reason why Iran has started to tone down their posture after the very bellicose rhetoric last week."

"There will be an Iranian attack, but it is not clear if it will be a full force attack or a specific calibrated attack to which Israel will respond to in a calibrated way rather than going for full-blown war. A calibrated attack seems more likely."

"Iran’s own risks are also very high. Israel is capable of repelling most missiles and drones and has demonstrated a strong ability to deliver very accurate strikes on specific targets. Iran's leadership will need to think about their own security."

"There’s constant chattering that maybe a peace process could be triggered. For the time being, I see no grounds to think so. Until it is clear who the next U.S president is and what their attitude to the war is, Russia's leadership is not willing to have any serious conversation about it whatsoever."

"There is no point in talking about negotiations until late next spring, and it's questionable to do so then. The most likely scenario is that after the elections U.S support will continue more or less as it has so far. In that case, the war will continue as now."

"In Harris's case, it is almost certain she may be free of some of the complexes that Biden and his close circle have had. Harris may be more open to escalation."

"In Trump's case, changes in the U.S position to one or the other side are possible but I believe that Russia will not show any real willingness for peace, which still leads to the need to continue U.S aid to Ukraine. The safest bet is that the U.S support will continue in a more or less similar form."

"On the prisoner exchange, let’s not create an illusion that it is possible to negotiate anything and everything with Russia. Negotiations might be possible in specific practical matters, but prisoner exchanges are so much less important than the Ukraine war."

"Ukraine and Russia have also managed to negotiate prisoner exchanges, occasionally even without mediators. It is possible to have talks on narrow issues but not about the future of Europe’s and Ukraine’s security and future."

"It is not possible to reach such an agreement with today’s Putin. Prisoner exchanges and this are totally different things."

"The exchange also shows that we should not place any bets on Russian opposition figures. Their statements are either quite close to the Russian regime's positions on war issues or completely unserious. Ilya Yashin’s quotes were almost 180 degrees different on successive days."

"They will not become the future leaders of Russia. Russia's so-called liberal opposition's relevance is non-existent and betting on them is not justified."

"For now, continue to keep an eye to the east to see if Ukraine can stall Russia’s advance. At some point, climate and nature will start to help. In October roads will get muddier and mobility will be more difficult. But it’s 2.5 months to go."

"This will be Ukraine's main task. We will need to see how the F-16s perform and if/how the Kursk operation will expand and whether or not it's possible to do something more serious on the Kharkiv-Belgorod front." /END