May Shaddel Profile picture
Aug 16 17 tweets 4 min read Read on X
The threads Philip's is replying to contains both polemical and apologetic takes on dhimmi rights in Islam and Islamic law which contain many common misconceptions. I'd therefore like to offer some clarifications concerning some of these. A thread.
First and foremost, we need to make a distinction between what Islamic law requires and what individual rulers who happened to be Muslim demanded of their subjects. The former is (classical, traditional) Islam and the latter a ruler's (arbitrary) decision. As is widely known,
literary source material accuse the Umayyads of discriminating against converts, which I believe is the reason @elicalebon calls converts 2nd-class citizens in Islam. That may or may not be true, but it bears reminding that these sources also call the Umayyads out for not having
adhered to the requirements of Islamic law and for being bad Muslims for not having allowed converts to enjoy the same rights and privileges as other Muslims. In other words, it's not Islamic law discriminating against Muslims but certain rulers who happened to be Muslim and were
considered bad Muslims exactly because of this. I personally believe these narratives impose their understanding of how things 'should have worked' back then on the events and that the real reason the Umayyads turned away (some) converts was because these were social climbers for
whom the Umayyads had no use--but that's for another day. Another common misconception is that the jizya was assessed at an unbearable rate, but the fact is that Islamic law has a fixed rate for the jizya whilst taxes payable by Muslims are assessed in relative terms, and thus
well-off Muslims would end up paying more than others under Islamic law (while poorest Muslims would pay less than poorest non-Muslims). Most legal manuals also emphasise that the jizya ought to be assessed at a fair and bearable rate. But this, again, is legal theory, and in
practice we actually have Christian sources from the early Abbasid period (such as the Chronicle of Zuqnin) not only bemoaning heavy taxation of Christians, but also commiserating with *Muslim* tax payers for the unbearable rates at which they (yes, the Muslims!) were taxed.
Actual data that would enable a comparison of the tax rates for Muslims and non-Muslims, however, is regrettably missing, and thus at the moment there is little we can say about the issue (I am working on an unpublished papyrus fragment that gives the rates for both, however).
Yet another widespread idea is that Miaphysite Christians and Jews welcomed Muslims as liberators. This, as Philip notes, represents a rewriting of history at the behest of Miaphysite leaders in later centuries in the interest of striking a mutually beneficial modus vivendi with
the ruling Muslims. However, in the case of Jews, this is indeed an undeniable reality: Jewish apocalyptic material dating to the Umayyad period all, without a single exception, speak very positively of Islam and early Muslim rulers, celebrate ʿUmar as a saviour and Muʿāwiya and
ʿAbd al-Malik as God-inspired sovereigns. It is only beginning with the Abbasid revolution that Jewish attitudes towards Islam take a turn for the negative, and there even is some evidence for limited Judaeo-Muslim convivencia in this period:
academia.edu/264837
But a final point that I would like to make in respect of @AkyolinEnglish's thoughtful observations is that subjecting premodern phenomenon and practice to modern moral standards is always hazardous and, I would say, even counter-productive. Comparing the dhimma or Ottoman millet
systems to modern liberal democracy would only make sense in a modern context, for instance when comparing the Islamic Republic to European secular states. And while comparing the tolerance of Islamic law in comparison to the supposed intolerance of mediaeval Christiandom can
help one score an apologetic point (and I'm not using the term in a pejorative manner, as this is sometimes needed to provide context), I believe as historians and intellectuals we can actually go beyond these at-times simplistic dichotomies. I am at the moment working on a
monograph on the fiscal regime in the Umayyad and early Abbasid periods, where I hope to map out and contextualise the development of classical Islamic fiscal law and how and why it came to differentiate between the Islamic state's subjects on the basis of their religion, but
only and only so in the Abbasid period. Stay tuned!

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More from @MayShaddel

Aug 11, 2023
Ever since I first came to know of this monumental inscription, I was racking my brains very hard to make sense of it: it is dated to 155 AH, towards the end of the reign of the Abbasid caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr, but it refers to the sovereign as 'the Mahdī, the commander of Image
the believers' (al-mahdī amīr al-muʾminīn). Now al-Mahdī is the regnal title of both al-Manṣūr's predecessor and successor, his brother Abū al-ʿAbbās, better known to posterity as al-Saffāḥ, and his son Muḥammad al-Mahdī. Upon seeing it in the Museum of Turkish and Islamic
Art in Istanbul, it got me thinking again and, for the first time, I paid more serious attention to the fact that the royal formulary used to refer to the sovereign in it doesn't follow any of the established practices of the time: the Umayyad caliphs, as well as the Abbasid
Read 6 tweets
Dec 11, 2021
A couple of weeks ago I had a paper (here: academia.edu/37567967) come out on monetary reform during the reign of the Umayyad caliph Muʿāwiya (r. 661-80 CE), here is a short thread on the implications of my findings in that paper. Scholars had long debated whether Muʿāwiya had Image
issued a new type of gold coin based on the Byzantine solidus as prototype, but which lacked the image of the cross. This is indeed what the so-called Maronite Chronicle famously states: ‘Muʿāwiya minted gold and silver, but it was not accepted because it had no cross on it’, and
indeed we do have seventh-century imitations of the solidus that do not have any crosses on them, whether on the obverse or the reverse (picture). There is a rather appreciable body of literary evidence for this, and I have also identified what seems to be a reference to these
Read 12 tweets
Feb 10, 2021
A rather important find, a 'new' milestone from the reign of the Abbasid caliph al-Saffāḥ. Here are my reading and translation of it, with some brief observations:
هذا ما أمر به ا
لمهدي عبد الله
عبد الله أمير ا
لمؤمنين على يدي
يقطين بن موسى
هذا على إثني
عشر ميلا من بريد
أسود العسارى‍
'This is what the Mahdī, the servant of God ʿAbd Allāh, commander of the believers, has ordered. Through the agency of Yaqṭīn ibn Mūsā. This is twelve miles from the postal station of Aswad al-ʿšʾry[...]'
Read 12 tweets
Oct 19, 2020
Political rivalry and propaganda in early Islam, a thread:

Last week I ran across this interesting quote by French semiotician Roland Barthes, which biblical scholar Elizabeth Clark has appropriated to describe the modus operandi in early Christian biblical exegesis: ‘what has
been said cannot be unsaid, except by adding to it’. Why? Because it’s not so easy to remove a passage that causes theological headaches from the scripture, but it can be explained away using allegorical exegesis. A similar tendency can be observed in Islamic tradition: there are
cases where prophetic traditions put into circulation to serve a political purpose are not dismissed by the opposing party as forgeries, but further material is added to them to neutralise their effect. I uncovered an interesting case of this practice in an article I wrote on
Read 15 tweets
Sep 6, 2020
I'm supposed to be on holiday, but somehow ended up in a vault full of books in the Austrian Academy of Sciences (long story!), where I ran across a copy of Mark Sykes's (of Sykes-Picot fame) memoirs of travels in Asia Minor, prefaced by then-Thomas A. Adams Professor of Arabic
at Cambridge, Edward Browne. Two things attracted my attention, the first the manner in which Sykes expresses gratitude to Browne in the acknowledgements: 'for his inspiring instruction in Eastern custom and mode of thought'. The second the condescending manner in which Browne
refers to Turks (forget about his distaste for Levantines): 'hardly any one... has remained altogether unfriendly to a people who, whatever their shortcomings may be, command the respect and esteem of even those who least desire the continuance of the Ottoman regime'.
Read 6 tweets
Feb 14, 2020
Did Muhammad really die after the onset of the Muslim conquest of the Near East? Part 2. After posting Part 1 of this series of threads, I began to doubt whether this is the appropriate medium for such a discussion given the depth, complexity, and number of the issues involved.
I have, for the time being, decided to go ahead with discussing the sources one by one, over the course of the coming weeks and months, so stay tuned. In response to the previous thread, @ProfessorGeorgy asked me if there was a political side to the depiction of Muhammad as
leading the conquests. The text I’m going to discuss today is one such case. It is known as the ‘Letter of pseudo-ʿUmar II to Leo III’, a fragmentary mediaeval Arabic composition which scholars have held to be a piece of Islamic anti-Christian apologetic. @ceci_pal_,
Read 13 tweets

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