Ukrainian PATRIOT Remote Launcher Group with four claimed Launching Stations.

This is a real PATRIOT RLG as a M903 LS fires two PAC-3 rounds against an incoming Iskander-M. Effects are unclear, but the LS are likely damaged.

(Geolocation @klinger66)
1|6

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Neither an Antenna Mast Group nor Communications Relay Group and Electric Power Unit are visible.

The CRG acting as the RLG's Launcher Control Station plus AMG and EPU are emplaced at a different site. RL1 enables the CRG/LCS to communicate with LS up to 10 km away via VHF.
2|6
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Remote launchers optimize PATRIOT's defended area against tactical ballistic missiles but create dead zones for airbreathing threats.

Remoting launchers in this instance is unusual as the RLG does not have Dnipro within its defended area for TBMs with PAC-3 or PAC-3 MSE.
3|6

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Claimed Ukrainian PATRIOT fire unit with two LS and an MPQ-65 Radar Set.

Given its location, this cannot be the RS supporting the RLG as their separation is greater than 30 km allowed by AMG's UHF link.

(Geolocation @klinger66)
4|6


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It is likely this fire unit is a decoy based on its emplacement and the lack of certain equipment.

The LS are emplaced >80 degrees from the Primary Threat Line. This places them in a dead zone and the RS will be unable to establish missile communication at launch.
5|6

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Neither an Engagement Control Station, an AMG, nor an Electric Power Plant are visible. These provide power to the MPQ-65 RS and links to the M903 LS, as the RS cannot directly communicate with LS, plus C2.

This is wholly inconsistent with a correctly emplaced PATRIOT.
6|6
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More from @John_A_Ridge

Oct 7, 2024
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid Hi Lesya, as you may know I was a volunteer on Walter Report, later Mriya Report, from May 2022 to January 2023.

I have Mriya Report internal communications that detail continuous coordination between MR and the MA board from the creation of MR in July 2022 through January 2023.
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid Given the turnover in the MA since then, I’m inclined to assume you may be unaware of that prior history.

The assertion there was no coordination between MA and MR is, from my perspective, demonstrably false. I’m happy to provide excerpted communications to that effect.
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid “Joe” refers to Joseph “Yehuda” Friedberg and “B” is Alexander Bakus, then MA’s Director of Treasury.

MR forked off from WR on July 17. Alex was intimately involved in the planning of this split and coordinated it with MA alongside Yehuda. Image
Image
Image
Read 6 tweets
Oct 2, 2024
A brief round up of what we do actually know thus far about Iran's ballistic missile raid against Israel, named "Operation True Promise 2" by the IRGC.

Starting with the missiles, Iran employed 180-200 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), including Ghadr, Emad, and Kheibarshekan or Fattah-1.
A derivative of the Shahab-3, Ghadr is a liquid-fueled MRBM that ordinarily carries a single separable reentry vehicle (RV). These specfic missiles have been upgraded with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs).

Ghadr is one of the primary missiles Iran employed against Israel in April during "Operation True Promise."
A further development of Ghadr, Emad is a liquid-fueled MRBM that carries a single separable MaRV. Alongside Ghadr, is one of the primary missiles previously employed against Israel in April. Image
Read 13 tweets
Aug 30, 2024
Having read the PCL a few more times, some added clarification.

It does not appear *classified* defense articles were exported to China, Russia, or Iran.

Unauthorized exports of classified defense articles were made to Australia, Germany, Norway, Canada, Israel, and the UAE.
Image
Although defense articles designated as Significant Military Equipment were exported to China without authorization, that SME does not appear to be classified. Image
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The unauthorized hand-carry of defense articles, specifically technical data, to Russia, Iran, and Lebanon by RTX employees on personal travel with company-issued electronic devices likely only concerns unclassified defense articles. Image
Read 5 tweets
Jun 13, 2024
So what is S-500? S-500 is a long-range air and missile defense system operated by the VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces).

It is a direct derivative of S-300V, the principal long-range maneuver SAM operated by the SV (Russian Ground Forces).
1|23
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I won't detail the complete program history of S-300P/F/V as @ChungTzuW has already written excellent threads about them which I strongly recommend reading for context.

In short, all three systems emerged from a joint VKS/VMF/SV procurement program.
2|23
VKS/VMF requirements were focused on ABTs (air-breathing threats) while SV requirements were focused on TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles). This led to a divergence into S-300P/F and S-300V using radically different missiles and radars.
3|23
Read 23 tweets
May 24, 2024
Why is GLSDB more susceptible to Russian electronic warfare than SDB? A few thoughts.

SDB and GLSDB are identical and share a GPS/IMU set. The relevant differences are range and target selection.
1|5

(Repost due to typo)
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GLSDB has a range of >150 km while SDB has a range of ~110 km from a ~12 km release altitude and ~270 m/s release airspeed.

Position error due to accumulated inertial measurement unit drift is quadratically proportional to time of flight and range by extension.
2|5 Image
Per interviews with Ukrainian pilots, they are typically releasing JDAM-ER at ~8 km. As SDB's employment profile is likely extremely similar, this is going to bring its range to <100 km.
3|5
Read 5 tweets
Apr 4, 2024
I'd point out the Stunner interceptor used by David's Sling lacks an Attitude Control System like PAC-3 (CRI/MSE). It relies solely on aerodynamic control surfaces, which reduces its engagement ceiling.

Against ballistic threats, this translates to a smaller defended footprint. Image
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Stunner is certified to defeat 300 km TBM threats while PAC-3 MSE is certified to defeat 1,500+ km MRBM threats out to ~60 km. Should Iran directly attack Israel with ballistic missiles, David's Sling will likely be very stressed defeating 1,500-2,000 km ranged MRBMs. Image
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Israel will be relying on Arrow 2/3 for midcourse defense as the lynchpin of their defense against an Iranian ballistic missile raid.

David's Sling may be able to provide terminal defense in a small area to the most critical assets such as the Jericho IRBM base at Sdot HaElah. Image
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Read 4 tweets

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