ππ΅οΈπ§βπ»π @Meta published its 2024 Q2 adversarial threat report, including on the Vietnam-proxied UK-/EU-/US-/β¦-targeted influence operation I and @marcowenjones investigated as "The Qatar Plot", painting it even bigger than we estimated β and disappointing in what's left out. 𧡠
𧡠Meta's report generally aligns with what we discovered on the Facebook platform β the use of the Vietnamese proxy and currency, the geo-targeted areas, the cross-platform and IRL presence, and *much* of the messaging on the hostage, secularism, and war issues. That's good. π§΅
𧡠Meta agrees that the operation was run from Vietnam, and names the "LT Media" proxy we identified, but doesn't offer further information, or identification of the sponsors/masterminds. This is alarming, especially given the actual spend (more on that in a moment). π§΅
𧡠Meta's descriptions of the geo-targeting of advertising is also lacking. Within the EU, they mention only France, whereas we found (from what little transparency was) smaller-yet-heavy targeting of Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Croatia, and Malta. π§΅
𧡠Somewhat surprising is Meta's note of the operation's Instagram presence of 49 accounts. We could not find these at the time. But Instagram infamously has even less searchability and fewer transparency features than does Facebook. π§΅
𧡠It seems that Meta's count of Facebook Pages involved (65) is about as many as we estimated (69, assuming they included the burner/sponsor Pages). We didn't have a window into how many actual accounts were involved, but they say it's 112 (βοΈ). π§΅
𧡠It's also not clear if Meta noted and has done anything about the many algorithm-gaming booster Page networks β the ones that were manufactured off a common template, and used to add inauthentic engagement to some of the posts from the operation's primary branded Pages. π§΅
𧡠What's really shocking is that, while we estimated spend at ~$100k-250k (from what we could find despite the Meta Ad Library's opacity and disappearing information, to be fair), Meta's own calculations put it at ~$1.2M (βοΈβοΈ) π§΅
𧡠Yes, 1.2 MILLION US DOLLARS. And this whopping sum was somehow shunted through "LT Media", into Meta's revenue stream, in VND/β«, and we *still* don't know who the sponsors/masterminds are (the involved people/organizations we *could* identify are *yet* keeping mum). π§΅
𧡠And while Meta does acknowledge the anti-Qatar messaging in much of the operation, it's disappointing that they leave out how a good deal of that messaging rode atop anti-immigrant/-Muslim fear-mongering and catastrophizing *content*. π§΅
𧡠This rebranded far-Right propaganda was targeted as Facebook ads to at least millions in the UK and tens of millions in France/EU leading up to respective elections, and not long before the #Southport-spinoff riots including attacks on mosques and asylum-seeker hotels. π§΅
𧡠That was just our estimate (41M globally) from what data we could dig up. Our estimate was conservative, based on what information we could find at what time we were able to get to the assets on Facebook (as we note in our report, transparency there is often ephemeral). π§΅
𧡠Now that we know that the actual spend was over four times as much as our upper spend estimate, we will likely have to revise reach figures upwards too β and consequently our estimates of the operation's impacts on the ballot- and street-level politics of the UK and EU. π§΅
𧡠From even the earlier spend/reach estimate, but especially with the new information, this has got to be one of the largest β if not one of the top 5 ever β influence operations in @Meta's history. π§΅
𧡠We'll keep an eye on the operation (assets of which are still active on Twitter/@X, @tiktok_us, @telegram, and @YouTube β props to @Meta and @Wikimedia on that note), and will hopefully be able to secure more data on the operation from Meta's stores through other avenues. π§΅
𧡠@Meta's full 2024 Q2 adversarial threat report can be found at [ ]. The operation-relevant section is on pages 14 and 15. π§΅transparency.fb.com/sr/Q2-2024-Advβ¦
𧡠My and @marcowenjones's detailed report on the influence operation, as we originally investigated it (update coming), can be read at [ ]. It includes our analysis of tactics on each platform, and countermeasure/transparency recommendations for each. 𧡠sites.google.com/view/theqatarpβ¦
𧡠Many thanks also to @AnujChopra, for helping us break this story through @AFP early last month.
[ ]. βοΈfrance24.com/en/live-news/2β¦
[ ]. βοΈfrance24.com/en/live-news/2β¦
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