1/9 It is indeed a great explanation, but only if Argentina exists in the world of Econ 101, where capital is scarce and always flows to its most productive use, foreign and domestic governments are unable to distort the economy, and trade always balances...
ht @jorge_guajardo
2/9 according to comparative advantage. That's when cheaper textiles from Pakistan would allow Argentina to relocate workers into sectors in which it has a comparative advantage. In that world, both Argentina and Pakistan are better off because Argentina can sell to Pakistan.
3/9 But what if we live in a world in which Pakistani textiles are competitive mainly because Islamabad is trying to expand textile exports by imposing measures that directly and indirectly prevent wages in Pakistan from rising with productivity?
4/9 In that case, Pakistani exports will rise but its imports will not. This means that the Argentine textile workers that are left unemployed by Pakistani imports will not be able to find other jobs, unless Argentina encourages a rise in household debt, because the total...
5/9 consumption available to drive Argentine production will have contracted. In that case Argentina would probably have to choose between allowing unemployment to rise, thereby reducing its total production, or forcing production to be driven by rising debt.
6/9 By imposing tariffs, however, Argentina would be able to retain those workers, and so it would have either more production, or the same amount of production with less debt. That would be a better outcome.
But economics is less a science than an ideology, which means that...
7/9 practitioners must decide either that tariffs are always good or that they are always evil. That is why the main form of disagreement with this thread is likely to be in the form of angry counterexamples in which tariffs have clearly repressed growth.
8/9 There are many such examples, but I'd propose that there have been cases historically in which tariffs have positively affected growth and other cases in which they have negatively affected growth. Rather than choose a side, it would be much more helpful to...
9/9 work through the range of conditions in which tariffs are likely to boost growth, and the conditions in which they are likely to suppress growth, and then see which set of conditions more closely applies – not to Econ 101 but rather to the world in which we live.
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1/5 Klaus Baader: "There seems no evidence of a shift to deglobalisation. And while strategies such as nearshoring or friendshoring are being pursued in various economies, they imply geographic shifts in cross-border trade, not deglobalisation."
2/5 Baader is right. For all the talk of global trade conflict, retaliatory responses have merely shifted bilateral trade, with little to no impact on either total trade or on overall trade imbalances. Persistent surpluses and persistent deficits are as big as ever.
3/5 But this doesn't mean that global trade won't be affected in the next few years. As these deep imbalances continue, and as their costs continue to be borne, especially by workers and businesses in the deficit economies, policymakers will try to reverse them.
1/6 Very interesting FT article. It notes that some economists claim that average hourly pay in US manufacturing relative to the rest of the private sector has been falling for decades, whereas others disagree.
2/6 Even if it is true, however, to suggest that this implies that the US should de-emphasize the role of manufacturing in the overall economy as a way of boosting wages may have the argument backwards.
3/6 The manufacturing share of the US economy has declined steadily over the years as the manufacturing share of other advanced economies has risen, largely, I would argue, because the latter have boosted manufacturing by directly and indirectly suppressing wages.
1/8 Good article about the source of China's excess capacity – the very transfers that subsidize production also reduce the ability of the Chinese to consume what they produce, hence the need for surpluses.
2/8 As long as the US (and other similar countries, like the UK) are willing to accommodate beggar-thy-neighbor policies around the world, it would be foolish for countries that want to expand their share of global manufacturing not to take advantage.
3/8 That's because by granting unfettered access to the US capital account, the US agrees to absorb unlimited amounts of global excess savings, which is just another way of saying that it agrees to act as global consumer of last resort.
1/7 No one has ever accused Josep Borrell of having an especially sophisticated understanding of trade, and so when he recognizes that rising trade conflict is now unavoidable, and even says it is "in the logic of things", it shows just how...
3/7 The problem is that the major deficit economies have decided – for both political as well as economic reasons – that they will no longer absorb the cost of accommodating the huge and growing demand deficiencies of the major surplus economies.
1/6 Here is an old article (July, 2018) by Andrés Ortega that applies Dani Rodrik's globalization trilemma to EU politics. Like the US and other democracies, countries in the EU are finding it increasingly hard to integrate if...
2/6 that means losing control of their domestic economies. That's because by definition greater global integration means giving up control of the trade and capital accounts. If every country does the same, the world is better off and free trade maximizes global production.
3/6 The problem is that if some countries continue to retain control of their trade and capital accounts, they can force the countries that don't to absorb the external consequence of their own domestic industrial and trade policies.
1/9 German exports in the first half of 2024 declined by 1.6% year on year, while imports declined by 6.2%. The result was a 28.7% surge in Germany's already-high trade surplus to 138.8 billion euros. destatis.de/EN/Press/2024/…
2/9 When Germany's trade surplus dropped sharply in 2022 to 1.97% of GDP (from 5.4% in 2021 and nearly 6.5% over the previous five years), many argued that this much needed adjustment represented a major rebalancing of the German economy and good news for the rest the EU.
3/9 But this was typical of the incremental thinking that regularly muddles our understanding of trade. In fact we need to understand trade imbalances as the result of underlying imbalances in income distribution.