We are releasing our investigation on Roscosmos, covering a nearly exhaustive sample of Russian ICBM producing plants. We have investigated both primary ICBM/SLBM producers in Russia, a major producer of launchers, manufacturers of parts and components.
Each material includes an eclectic collection of sources, ranging from the TV propaganda to public tenders, and from the HR listings to academic dissertations. Combined altogether, they provide a holistic picture of Russian ICBM production base that no single type of source can.
If traditional intelligence worked with the deficit of information, modern one must work with its hyper abundance. Our collection aims to introduce the media, academia and strategic community into the hyper abundance, depth and variety of sources on the seemingly impenetrable.
It is two companies within Roscosmos that are primarily responsible for the missile production. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) makes solid-propellant missiles, Makeyev Design Bureau – liquid propellant ones.
Of these two, the MITT is a far richer company.
We investigated five Roscosmos plants:
1. Votkinsk Plant is one of two key intercontinental ballistic missiles producers in Russia. It is the sole manufacturer of solid-propellant missiles, such as ICBMs Topol-M and Yars, SLBM Bulava as well as missiles for the SRBM Iskander.
Votkinsk has automated an unusually wide variety of its production processes, implementing the fully integrated turnkey solutions in forging (Danieli Breda 🇮🇹) and in precision casting (Shell-o-Matic 🇨🇦). In terms of machining, however, it tends to be relatively frugal.
The Votkinsk Plant machining park consists of a mix of:
a) Modern Western equipment
b) Soviet machines upgraded with modern CNC controllers & servo drives (= "modernization" in the Russian manufacturing terminology)
2. Titan-Barriady is a major producer of launchers, control equipment and electronics for the SRBM “Iskander”, ICBMs “Topol”, “Yars”, and SLBM “Bulava”. Like the Votkinsk Plant, it is also a part of the much richer MITT holding (= solid-propellant missiles).
Titan-Barrikady is a heavily-lopsided enterprise that heavily prioritizes CNC machining. It has more of the modern, sophisticated CNC machinery by the leading Western European and American producers compared to any other plant in this sample.
It's a machining-oriented plant.
As we finished with the MITT (solid propellant), we now go to the Makeyev (liquid propellant). It is much poorer, with more archaic & often physically worn out machinery. Its actually missile production is largely concentrated within the single plant - Krasnoyarsk Plant.
3. Krasnoyarsk Plant is one of two principal ICBM producers in Russia. It is the leading manufacturer of liquid-propellant missiles such as the ICBM Sarmat and SLBM Sineva. It is the most important and best funded enterprise of the (relatively poor) Makeyev company.
It operates with a mix of Soviet stock, mid-tier modern imports (🇨🇿 Czech, mostly), and a few ad hoc machines assembled from the Western European parts. Overall, its park tends to be of lower tier compared with the MITT plants, yet by far the best within the Makeyev structure.
4. Zlatoust Plant is a relatively neglected facility making parts and components for the liquid propellant ballistic missiles (Sineva, Sarmat). It is an example of what a competent management can do with a chronically underfunded military plant.
It will largely switch to the production of civilian goods, household appliances and, most importantly, aluminium extrusion. The competent industrial management kept this plant alive, even when totally neglected by state.
5. Miass Plant is a liquid propellant SLBM producer of secondary importance. A lower priority enterprise of the poorer Makeyev hollding, Miass has faced severe financial constraints. Like Zlatmash, it tried selling to the civilian market, but with considerably less success.
Miass business model included selling the oil storage equipment, brewery machinery, LED lamps and the electricity from its power plant. Overall, it is a military purpose plant which struggled with adapting to the post-Soviet market realities and has very much degraded.
Some takeaways:
a) The Russian ICBM production base is a mix of modern Western equipment & remnants of Soviet machinery
b) There is almost nothing "Russian" out there
c) And, more interestingly, almost nothing Chinese
This suggests the policy of Chinese exclusion, pre-2022
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This collection of sources serves as a technical appendix to our report How Does Russia Make Missiles? On our research methodology see pp. 33-44, on our conclusions pp. 45-46 of the cited report.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum