A Thread on The Troubled Development of the Sapsan Ballistic Missile, Ukraine’s ATACMS. 1/19
I see a lot of people being confused when referring to this system, switching between Hirm, Grom-2 or Sapsan, hopefully this thread will clarify the situation. 2/19
Back in 2006 the National Security and Defence Concil of Ukraine looked for a system to replace the ageing Totchka-U ballistic missile with its 120km range. Design of that system was given to the Pivdenne Design Bureau known for their work on Soviet ICMBs and rockets. 3/19
The project was called Sapsan, peregrine falcon. Development was supposed to take 10 years with a prototype planned for 2010. A testing ground was supposed to be built at Zheleznyy Port. By 2008, 25 million Hryvnas had been spent with 2 billion more needed for a 2015 IOC. 4/19
However, with the 2008 financial crisis work was stopped before being terminated in 2013, citing a mismanagement of resources by Pivdenne. 5/19
Since 2011 an off-shoot of the Sapsan project was being offered for export, the Hirm-2, also referred to as Grom. In 2013, Pivdenne received funding from an unknown customer to fund the project. 6/19
As we now know that Saudi Arabia sent 40 million dollars to the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for the development of the missile’s solid fuel engine, it is more than likely that unknown customer. 7/19
With the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea priorities shifted and Pivdenne proposed to the Defence Ministry to restart work on Sapsan with the experience they gained on Hirm-2. The target was for trials to start by 2018. 8/19
Petro Poroshenko greenlit the project and the AM Makarov Machine Building Plant was designated as the missile’s manufacturer. By 2018 engine testing began, with 12 engines produced by September 2019. 9/19
In April 2019 two prototyped had been assembled, one for Saudi Arabia and one for Ukraine. In 2021 Ukraine agreed to fund a first test battery with 2 TELs, 2 mobile loaders and 2 control units. 10/19
On August 27th 2024 president Zhelensky declared a first successful test of a domestically produced ballistic missile. 11/19
I don’t have much to say on the design of the Sapsan itself since actual pictures of the current system are behind a wall of OpSec. Aerodynamically it will be similar to the ATACMS and Iskander with a set of four small tail control surfaces. 12/19
The Sapsan boast a range estimated to reach 500+km, more than the 280km of the Hirm-2 limited by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This would allow Ukraine to strike deep inside Russian territory independently. 13/19
The Sapsan would also threaten S-300PM1/2/3 and S-400 not optimized against ballistic threats as the poor performances against ATACMS have highlighted. Other systems such as the S-300Vs and S-500 would be able to intercept it more easily, however. 14/19
To guide its 480kg warhead precisely to its target the system uses Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) coupled with Inertial Navigation system (INS). Ukrainan officials mentioned terminal target acquisition capabilities, but details are unclear. 15/19
That be could an active radar or an electro-optical seeker as is used on optional warheads for the 9M720 Iskander. Such a system would greatly enhance the Circular Error Probability (CEP) of the system but is more challenging to manufacture. 16/19
Batteries are mounted on 10x10 trucks from the Kharkiv Transport Machinery Plant for the TELs, loader and engagement modules. 17/19
Rumors and declarations by Ukrainian officials have pointed to potential uses in attacks on the military airfield in Saki on August 9, 2022, and Feodosia on April 8, 2023, but with no defenitive photographic evidence. 18/19
Still, it seems that development is being prioritized to compensate for the firing restrictions imposed by some partner nations. Hopefully production will ramp up and we could be expecting some spectacular fireworks by next year if trials are conclusive. 19/19
🧵 Thread on France's Ramjet Powered Air-Launched Nuke That May Protect Europe🇪🇺: The ASMPA-R. 1/22
Historically France's deterrence relied on the classic triad of Sea (SLBM), Ground (SRBM/IRBM) and Air with the AN-11 and AN-22, analogous to the US' B61/83. 2/22
However, rapid development of SAM technology in the 70s threatened the use of gravity bombs, prompting the French Air Force to look for a stand-off alternative. 3/22
The Dragon Eye: Thread On Chinese Destroyers’ Type 346 AESA Radar. 1/17
Being the most important sensor on China’s first rank destroyers, equivalent to the US Navy’s SPY-1/6s, understanding the “Dragon Eye” is critical to correctly evaluate the capabilities of the Chinese navy. 2/17
The development story of the Type 346 is unique in how much we know thanks to the wealth of information shared in 2016 online by one of its key architects who emigrated to North America. It must still be taken cautiously but seems very likely credible information. 3/17
Drones and the Future of Warfare: Remembering the Lessons of the Jeune Ecole.
A Thread to better understand the issues surrounding the idea that drones are changing warfare, using the lessons learnt from the French Jeune Ecole. 1/15
Since the War in Ukraine of 2022, and to some extend the Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020, there has been prolific debates on how drones from the TB-2 to the FPV are changing warfare, making expensive legacy systems like tanks, jets or air-defense now obsolete. 2/15
These debates mirror the raging debates that took the French navy by storm in the end of the 19th century. Looking back at these debates gives us the benefit of hindsight and allows us not to repeat the same mistakes again. 3/15
Thread on the S-300P / S-400 Family: Part 5 Transporter Erector Launchers.
With its many iterations over the decades, the S-300P saw equally as many different TELs designs. From towed, self-propelled and connected ones, this thread will review the main evolutions. 1/11
A first overall comment is that S-300P TELs differ significantly from previous Soviet TELs with fully enclosed missile cannisters and cold-launched ejection. The disposition allowed for easier missiles handling, maintenance and 360° launch capability. 2/11
The initial TEL was the 5P851, a stop gap measure just like the system it equipped with, the S-300PT. Towed by a KrAZ-258 tractor, the trailer launcher can be deployed on an unprepared ground area with a slope of no more than 4º in the horizontal plane. 3/11
Thread on the S-300P / S-400 Family: Part 4 Target Engagement Radar. 1/14
As we saw in the previous part, in the S-300P systems threats are detected by the long-range radars transferring the tracking data to lower level dedicated engagement radar at the battery level. 2/14
These radars use PESA arrays to combine in a single platform target tracking, missile tracking, and depending on missile command types, sending information to guide the missile to its target. TThese radars usually use narrower band waves, typically X band or adjacent. 3/14
Thread on the S-300P / S-400 Family: Part 3 Long Range Radars. 1/16
Like older Soviet SAMs using the P-12/14/15/18s, the S-300P uses dedicated long range early detection radars. Due to their high price (command post + RLO was roughly the price of a full battery), they were only at the brigade/regiment level directing 2-6 batteries. 2/16
To reach long ranges these radars use larger band waves, making them unable to direct tracking and threat engagement. The central command post relays relevant information down to the dedicated individual engagement radars at the battery level to perform the engagement. 3/16