Thread by @NoeNicholas

Several deeply rooted analysts who've long believed another open war between Hezbollah & Israel was unlikely have (privately) come around to the stance that war is indeed likely,tho there's disagreement about when: roughly short term (coming months) or long term (coming years).1/

This emerging consensus seems based at a minimum on a shared belief that: 1) doctrinally, ideologically & historically, no Israeli leadership can "allow" a bordering enemy force to persist that durably & significantly restricts its ability to wage wide & decisive war...2/

...as it sees fit. 2)Nor can it long stand a massive buffer zone to persist on Israeli territory.3)After Oct. 7, returning to the status quo ante along the N. Border is-additionally-politically & militarily unavailable. Hezbollah has reached all three milestones after decades..3/

...of steadily degrading, with its allies & esp. senior partner Iran, Israel's Qualitative Military Edge. It is also very unlikely under any realistic arrangement to verifiably withdraw from the border areas (emphasis on the impossibility of verifying such a withdrawal - 4/

...which would very likely be demanded-in the unlikely event such a concession was even proffered). Adding fuel to the fire is another dynamic that seemed likely by the end of Oct. or so of last year: some Israeli leaders are trying to get Netanyahu et al. on board with a Gaza 5/

....ceasefire by publicly messaging that it's the best way to control the timeline & prep for the necessary & inevitable open war against Hezbollah. It is worth quoting the story in full: "A senior Israeli security official told Israel’s Channel 12 on Sunday that "the campaign 6/

in Lebanon is getting closer, although the exact timing has not yet been determined." According to the security source, Israel faces two scenarios: “reaching a deal (with Hamas over a Gaza ceasefire and prisoner exchange) or collapsing the negotiations and quickly entering a 7/

direct war against Hezbollah. According to the senior official, the first scenario is “reaching a deal, a situation in which Israel will be able to choose its preferred timing for future action against Hezbollah targets.” “Within this scenario, there is hope that Hezbollah 8/

will refrain from firing during this period, which will allow the IDF to complete its preparations in an optimal way and plan the next moves carefully. "The clear advantage of this scenario is the possibility of operating under more favorable conditions for Israel." 9/

“The 2nd scenario is the collapse of the negotiations. In such a situation, it's expected that Hezbollah will continue firing at the northern settlements,which may force Israel to enter into action more quickly, under less favorable conditions for it." 10/
naharnet.com/stories/en/307…

By this logic-evident in the months after Oct 7-the definitive collapse of a Gaza ceasefire leads to open war w/Hezb just not in an "optimal" fashion for Israel;if a ceasefire is achieved tho,this merely allows for better prep/timing for IDF to launch the same war in short term.