Thread by @michaeldweiss

New "Karl" analysis on the latest in Ukraine, with @holger_r: 🧵

"In Kursk, the UA offensive developed further (since last time we spoke), and in total UA managed to conquer as much territory as RU had conquered in eastern Ukraine since the beginning of the year. This was done in the first 2 weeks of the operation."

"Now there is talk of a possible RU counter-attack. It remains to be seen how strong it will be, but it will certainly come. My guess is that resources that RU currently has in the region will not be enough to kick UA entirely out of the area."

"It will probably be enough to prevent UA from further significant advances. It is unclear how much RU has already counterattacked, if anything. Hard to speak of the potential success or scale of the RU counterattack."

"RU is attempting to prevent UA from gaining control of the area around Glushkovo, between Seym river and UA border. UA has not tried to take the area in full force. This could be a trap for RU, as it is difficult to establish a good logistical link to it. Whether UA will use this area to trap RU and destroy their forces, will become clear in the next few weeks."

"Preliminary assessment [of Kursk op success]: UA has become under less pressure from several directions. RU has had to withdraw units from both the Kharkiv and southern fronts in preparation for the Kursk counter-operation. Possibly also from the direction of Chassiv Yar. It affected the Pokrovsk direction the least, as it has been the most successful for RU."

"Plus it is an unpleasant situation for RU emotionally and domestically. More than 100,000 people have been forced to evacuate inside their own country. In a way, this shows how weak RU is overall. It does not have much of a reserve in the region at the moment."

"The Kharkiv direction has mixed success for either side. There doesn’t seem to be anything overly dangerous for UA at the moment. The same can be said for Kupiansk and Lyman. Frontline is quite stable there with no significant movements."

"In the direction of Chassiv Yar, UA has managed to relieve the pressure, but it is not over. RU has now been trying to advance from the south. There was a claim that they got across the channel, but it seems they’ve been pushed out again. All in all, the frontlline hasn’t practically moved during the summer."

"In Niu-York, RU has been partially pushed out again, at least part of the city is back in UA hands. It goes back and forth."

"The most uncomfortable situation in Pokrovsk was a couple of weeks ago, with the pace of RU advance faster than ever. Now it seems that RU’s rapid pace of progress has come to an end. UA, in turn, has brought its reserves there. This is one of the reasons why the frontline has stabilized."

"Vuhledar direction south of Pokrovsk is even more dangerous, with RU having moved further from the east. Vuhledar is in a corner where the north-south front turns into a west-east front. If RU can advance north of Vuhledar, UA will have to fight an opponent from two directions."

"It is not yet dramatically dangerous for UA. It’s worth remembering that Vuhledar has been a multiple-times graveyard for RU. It has ended on several occasions with very heavy casualties and no practical progress for them."

"In the south it is quiet. At some stage RU had serious fears Kursk was a decoy and the main UA attack would come in the south. I don’t think UA would have that much in reserve. There are also very strong defense lines on both sides of the front."

"Politically, the maneuvering continues to get the US restrictions lifted or at least reduced. For the moment, it can be said that things are moving in that direction. The Brits have leaked to the Guardian today that restrictions on Storm Shadows have been lifted and the US has approved it."

"There is talk that the same will happen with US weapons very soon. But Bloomberg reported today that US is reluctant to do so until after the UN General Assembly."

"This is the next hurdle the US admin has come up with for itself. They don't want to show world leaders that they are helping escalation. The concessions that are coming are a combination of several things."

"1) It has turned into a sensitive issue domestically for Biden’s administration, as Republicans other than Trump have pushed hard to lift the restrictions. 2) Iranian missiles getting into Russian hands. 3) Intensified RU attacks on UA civilian targets."

"There are solid claims Iranian missiles have arrived in RU. They’re probably not yet used in combat."

"RU has been trying to spin that they would be ready to negotiate but with UA invading Kursk, they can’t. I am sure that until the US elections are over & it is clear who won and what the politics will be, RU won't be ready for any serious negotiations. As long as there is a chance for RU that western aid will decrease, they are not interested in negotiations."

"Regarding the Trump-Harris debate. There was nothing very surprising. Harris rhetorically repeated the current admin's views that in any case support must continue, Trump gave extremely eclectic and unclear answers."

"UA's drone capabilities are steadily improving in terms of range, strike and air defense penetration capabilities. There are days when UA has attacked RU with higher number of drones than vice versa."

"I’m not sure that the drone attacks against Olenya airfield were made from UA territory. UA has said about 1,800 km range, but Olenya is farther away. Though UA does not have to tell us the whole truth of their drones’ capabilities."

"Olenya hosts RU strategic bombers that carry out ballistic missile attacks against UA."

"UA's ability to counter RU drones with EW assets has improved significantly. Lately, 20-25% of RU drones have been taken out not by air defense but by EW. In this regard, there have been more cases of drones going into the territory of either the occupied Donbas, Russia itself or Belarus. BLR allegedly shot one RU drone down."

"The drone that crossed into Latvia was due to the same process, I think. It passed through Belarus and crashed in Latvia. I don't think RU would have deliberately tested Latvia."

"But it is more complicated when it comes to Poland and Romania. RU has clearly been using POL & ROM airspaces to direct their drones there and then bring them into UA territory."

"This is problematic in terms of POL & ROM sovereignty. Indirectly, they allow the use of their territory to attack UA. POL has clearly said on several occasions that their NATO allies have advised them to avoid shooting RU drones down. It is not hard to guess who that ally is."

"There are 4 main things to follow in the next weeks/months. 1) Whether RU pressure on Pokrovsk and Vuhledar remains the same. 2) How long and how difficult it will be for RU to liberate Kursk Oblast. 3) Increase in the UA's capabilities in RU direction + whether the US will eventually lift or significantly reduce restrictions."

"4) Whether RU will go for some kind of partial mobilization during autumn/winter. According to estimates, RU could offset their casualties by volunteer recruitment until this spring. Now it has changed so much that all losses can no longer be compensated by recruitment. RU has had to substantially increase the one-off signing fees paid to recruits."

"How much would lifting US restrictions help UA? It is one of a combination of things that help. Another is how to deploy the F-16s. They haven’t been massively used so far, probably due to 1 plane going down."

"UA’s mobilization has improved. Additional reserves have emerged, UA can get respectable units together. Although their motivation is not what it was at the beginning of the war. People don’t rush to sign up, they take it as just a need to go. It’s the same in RU." /END