Thread by @InaHPKvam

@The_Lookout_N @auonsson That’s assuming an MD scenario in which damaging the Andøya installations is the only primary objective, to be fair. There is a difference between dangerous goods passing the NOR coastline in general, much of it carried by Putin’s ageing, uninsured and ill-maintained ghost fleet,

@The_Lookout_N @auonsson … and having one of them, loaded with ammonium nitrate, at anchor ivo critical CIV/MIL infrastructure. Not simply Andøya, but Naval Special Operations Command in Ramsund, Coastal Ranger Commando in Trondenes, F-35 QRA/P-8 MPA from Evenes, CG HQ in Sortland. This is quite the hub

@The_Lookout_N @auonsson Her utility as a poss fireship, either to inflict damage on the above bases or otherwise simply by "accidentally” blowing up, regardless of where, iot pull our limited ISR and MIL/CIV resources from other exposed locations more vulnerable to actual incursions, is iow quite broad

@The_Lookout_N @auonsson Meanwhile, our crews and platforms, which are not in excess and already significantly strained, are reprioritised from other critical missions to shadow her movements. Regardless of an MD sabotage mission, she – as Putin’s likely proxy – is thus already succeeding

@The_Lookout_N @auonsson Moreover, she gets to evaluate changes in our preparedness procedures + cross-sectoral safety/security dynamics, just like every RUS grey zone probe before her. Cumulated and combined over time, they supply priceless intelligence on most lowhanging fruits should shit hit the fan

@The_Lookout_N @auonsson I'm therefore more concerned with the creeping normalcy of allowing flagged vessels to operate in this manner, against the backdrop of heightened tensions and increased sabotage threat. The “boiling frog” effect is painfully obvious, and either way the signalling is unfortunate

@The_Lookout_N @auonsson (Unlikely to deter, anyway)