Over the last 2 days at @covidinquiryuk the NHS has shown its dark & ugly side
There was never going to be an apology from IPC guidance authors whose guidance drove disproportionately high rates of death & COVID19 in non-ICU HCWs & huge rates of nosocomial SARS2, but…
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the level of obfuscation, evasion & incompetence on display from those tasked with keeping HCWs safe, is jaw dropping
I was one of the lucky ones: my NHS Trust ALWAYS provided HCWs with FFP3 when caring for those with COVID19 - my IPC remained precautionary
As a result…
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by Dec 2020 the number of consultant staff working on Covid wards testing positive was: 0
🚨The ONLY deviation from national guidance was universal FFP3!
The last & most vital line of defence - FFP3 - *is life saving* @SMHopkins
How does this compare with other units?
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Well, it’s a different staff group, but I know of 40 nurses redeployed to covid wards in Bournemouth after the IPC guidance downgrade, 13th Mar 2020
They got a surgical mask, as per IPC Cell opinion
🚨Of those 40 nurses, ALL 40 became infected with SARS2
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This is not OK
Infection at work IS NOT inevitable
These people were simply put to work facing an airborne biohazard with no protection at all
Why?
Because UK IPC leadership is ruled by those whose anti-airborne close-mindedness *feels like bullying* NHS-wide
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I was offended by Lisa Ritchie & what she said yesterday
She displayed off the scale incompetence, & no insight
The last thing she needs is those around her to turn a blind eye to her inability to grasp the basics of IPC: she & those under her spell need help!
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Yet what did we see from Lisa Ritchie’s SRO, Dame Ruth May?
⚠️Blame shifting
She refused to admit to wrongdoing & resulting harms. Instead, the former CNO for England told us how the IPC Cell never had final day on guidance
That, she said, was down to PHE [later, UKHSA]
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Cue @SMHopkins, Deputy Director of National Infectious Disease Service at PHE, 2020
What did we learn?
❌ Transparency/basic science failure 1
Prof Hopkins refused to define what *she* meant by droplet v aerosol
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❌ Failure 2
Despite telling us she routinely wore FFP3 for highly infectious patients encountered in her own practice during a >20y clinical career, Prof Hopkins refused to acknowledge that FFP3 provided any greater level of protection against aerosol inhalation than a FRSM
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❌ Failure 3
KC Carey then said:
‘OK so if FFP3 are no good, why did the IPC guidance recommend FFP3 for AGPs? What’s the point if they don’t work?
Prof Hopkins’ answer: word salad nonsense
❌ Failure 4
Despite being shown IPC Cell minutes from Dec 2020 where the PHE representative ‘CB’ suggested a move to FFP3 for all COVID19 care, Prof Hopkins refused to state the reasons this request was made!
🚨She didn’t want to say when PHE first knew it was airborne
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❌ And if I had to write all the failures displayed today I’d be writing a book, so I’ll leave it there
But it was a shameful display of cowardice in my opinion, considering how many died at the hands of IPC guidance authors & likeminded anti-airborne zealots internationally
On guidance oversight, lack of moral fibre was on display again
It seems true now that the IPC Cell is full to the rafters with anti-airborne zealots, unable/unwilling to accept the observable nature of reality
❌ But Hopkins et al at PHE failed to challenge this mindset
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There is ample evidence that ALL senior medical & science leads at SAGE, NERVTAG, PHE, DHSC, NHSE knew that early epidemiological data had proven beyond doubt that aerosols played an important role in transmission in real world settings, Jan-Feb 2020
We have the proof
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So the dark, ugly side I referred to at the top?
Every UK science leader, knowing what HCWs were set to face, failed to share their knowledge AND KEPT ON FAILING
And countless nameless people - carers working for what was the nation’s favourite service - were silenced at work
Bullied by an uncaring system into ‘accepting their lot’
They got infected in their tens of thousands: infections that amplified the UK epidemic & contributed to huge rates of nosocomial COVID19 death
All the while, our leaders remained silent
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Unless we challenged them @FreshAirNHS @LABailey @SafeDavid3 @TheBMA @ProfEmer @gallagher_rose @KGadhok 🙏🏻
In which case they pulled out some flaky research from a puppet IPC group (eg ARHAI) & simply pushed us aside
THEY were always right
WE were always wrong
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So
Not listening to staff raising concerns over patient safety: where has that got you Dr Ritchie, Dame Ruth, & Prof Hopkins?
It can’t go on you know
An apology would be a good place to start
How about it?
#COVIDisAirborne
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Now we've seen IPC Cell minutes from 22/12/2020 & the plea from 'CB' for wider FFP3 use because:
'Our understanding of aerosol transmission has changed'
🚨Would you like to know whether very late 2020 was when *all* 🇬🇧Gov departments knew of the importance of aerosol risk?
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Obtained via FOI request
🚨From the Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy
🦺Working safely during coronavirus (COVID-19)
10 July 2020 update
'You should ensure that steps are taken to avoid people needing to unduly raise their voices to each other...
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'This includes...refraining from playing music or broadcasts that may encourage shouting, including if played at a volume that makes normal conversation difficult. This is because of the potential for increased risk of transmission, particularly from aerosol transmission.’
TL/DR in evidence to @covidinquiryuk, CH stated SARS2 transmission is via large droplet & fomites
But:
Following peer review triggered changes 6 Jul 2022, CH's own work stated that SARS2 transmission is via 'fine aerosols & respiratory droplets, & to a lesser extent...fomites'
Why omit the empirical truth that SARS2 transmission occurs importantly via the airborne [aerosol inhalation] route?
Why do this, particularly as David Heymann's 13th Oct 2023 evidence to the PI clarified the @WHO position:
WHO knew SARS2 transmission was via aerosols, Jan 2020
'Arguably the most fundamental misstep in the UK response was the presumption that covid would be an unstoppable flu-like wave'
This
underpinned the early (Chris Whitty) position on T&T, & the Vallance view on 'herd immunity' (later air-brushed)'
Aside
Early SAGE minutes clarify the UK rationale for stopping community SARS2 testing: it was deemed unnecessary because with rapidly increasing case numbers there was no point in testing, as there were insufficient personnel to contact trace
Good to know whose plan this was
'But there was an alternative'
'This led us to question...though we found ourselves quietly dismissed as not understanding the science'
'Ironically, the pride in our science & our capabilities, slowed our ability to learn lessons from other countries'
In his capacity as co-chair of the 2016 pandemic respirator stockpile committee, where does JVT stand legally with this description of healthcare workplace protection 'logic' like this?
🚨Respirators only specifically recommended for ICU/HDU staff - i.e. AGP 'hotspots'
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DESPITE
🚨Stronger evidence of aerosol transmission since 2009
🚨His own 2013 review now already used by David Heymann at @covidinquiryuk M1 to describe optimal protection against aerosols - FFP3 mandated as per COSHH
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In his witness statement, JVT's logic rests on this concept:
🚨FFP3 is fine for MERS/SARS1 because of 'high case fatality rate & transmission to HCWs was well documented'
But what is unstated is the completion of this 'logic circle': I hope you don't mind me speculating?
By now 2 of you will have an email alert about my @PubPeerBot response to your Letter
UK Research Integrity Office (@UKRIO) teams suggested this route, on reading my detailed evidence submission pubpeer.com/publications/B…
To overcome an unexpected formatting issue on upload to the PubPeer site, below please find my correctly formatted letter expressing concerns & questions over your 'research behaviour'
[your letter, plus summary comments from 2 down this thread]