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SPACEX
September 18, 2024.
The Honorable Frank Lucas Chairman, Committee on Science, Space & Technology United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space & Technology United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
The Honorable Maria Cantwell Chair, Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
The Honorable Ted Cruz
Ranking Member, Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Chairs Cantwell and Lucas and Ranking Members Cruz and Lofgren:
For nearly two years, SpaceX and many in industry, legal practice, and academia have raised the alarm on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) implementation of its commercial space launch and reentry regulatory mandate, which is administered by its Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST). It has been clear for some time that AST lacks the resources to timely review licensing materials, mistakenly focuses its limited resources on areas unrelated to its public safety regulatory scope and has been unsuccessful in modernizing and streamlining its regulations.
Most recently, the FAA alleged that SpaceX violated its regulations and proposed a $633,009 penalty for these alleged violations. It is notable that these violations and penalties were announced shortly after increased scrutiny on AST by Congress for its failure to reasonably and timely execute its regulatory obligations. It is also notable that, in announcing these penalties, FAA's politically appointed Chief Counsel was quoted in the FAA's announcement on the matter. It is SpaceX's understanding that it is highly irregular, and perhaps unprecedented, for a Chief Counsel to be quoted on an enforcement matter. SpaceX forcefully rejects the FAA's assertion that it violated any regulations.
SpaceX is absolutely committed to safety in all operations. With respect to these matters, it is notable that in each instance, SpaceX provided AST with sufficient notice of these relatively minor license updates, which had no bearing on public safety. The fact that AST was unable to timely process these minor updates underscores systemic challenges at AST.
The FAA alleges three distinct violations: (1) that SpaceX utilized a propellant farm at SpaceX's launch site that FAA had not yet approved; (2) that SpaceX used an updated Communications Plan that the FAA had not yet approved; and (3) that SpaceX did not conduct a launch poll two hours prior to a launch. As it relates to the RP-1 fuel farm, use of the RP-1 fuel farm had been approved by our
SPACEX
September 18, 2024.
The Honorable Frank Lucas Chairman, Committee on Science, Space & Technology United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space & Technology United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
The Honorable Maria Cantwell Chair, Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
The Honorable Ted Cruz
Ranking Member, Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Chairs Cantwell and Lucas and Ranking Members Cruz and Lofgren:
For nearly two years, SpaceX and many in industry, legal practice, and academia have raised the alarm on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) implementation of its commercial space launch and reentry regulatory mandate, which is administered by its Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST). It has been clear for some time that AST lacks the resources to timely review licensing materials, mistakenly focuses its limited resources on areas unrelated to its public safety regulatory scope and has been unsuccessful in modernizing and streamlining its regulations.
Most recently, the FAA alleged that SpaceX violated its regulations and proposed a $633,009 penalty for these alleged violations. It is notable that these violations and penalties were announced shortly after increased scrutiny on AST by Congress for its failure to reasonably and timely execute its regulatory obligations. It is also notable that, in announcing these penalties, FAA's politically appointed Chief Counsel was quoted in the FAA's announcement on the matter. It is SpaceX's understanding that it is highly irregular, and perhaps unprecedented, for a Chief Counsel to be quoted on an enforcement matter. SpaceX forcefully rejects the FAA's assertion that it violated any regulations.
SpaceX is absolutely committed to safety in all operations. With respect to these matters, it is notable that in each instance, SpaceX provided AST with sufficient notice of these relatively minor license updates, which had no bearing on public safety. The fact that AST was unable to timely process these minor updates underscores systemic challenges at AST.
The FAA alleges three distinct violations: (1) that SpaceX utilized a propellant farm at SpaceX's launch site that FAA had not yet approved; (2) that SpaceX used an updated Communications Plan that the FAA had not yet approved; and (3) that SpaceX did not conduct a launch poll two hours prior to a launch. As it relates to the RP-1 fuel farm, use of the RP-1 fuel farm had been approved by our
U.S. Government Range Safety Authority for an upcoming National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program mission. The system has been safely used repeatedly ever since, because there is no public safety risk. Despite the Federal Range's approval, AST elected to involve itself and now proposes penalties against SpaceX because AST was unable to do its job in an efficient manner. The Communication Plan changes are entirely unrelated to public safety, and AST has no regulatory authority to require a T-2 hour poll. SpaceX responds in detail to each allegation below for your information and to the clarify the record.
FAA Enforcement Action - Quick Facts
(1) Communications Plan
a) FAA alleges that SpaceX operated under an unapproved Communications Plan for the PSN MSF launch in June 2023. SpaceX denies this allegation.
b) SpaceX's only change to the Communications Plan was to change the location of the launch control center from one location on Kennedy Space Center to another. No communications procedures, networks, or personnel changed.
c) On May 2, 2023, SpaceX sent the FAA a revised SpaceX Falcon and Dragon Communications Plan (v.5.4, May 2023) (Plan v5.4) for incorporation into its launch licenses.
d) Each week after SpaceX submitted Plan v5.4, during weekly licensing calls between the FAA and SpaceX, SpaceX told the FAA that it required the plan by June 1 and asked the FAA whether it had feedback.
e) During a call on June 13, SpaceX again asked FAA if it had feedback, because SpaceX had a launch on June 18 that would use the new location of the launch control center. In response, and for the first time, the FAA told SpaceX that there were "too many" revisions in Plan v5.4 for it to be able to provide feedback on it by June 18.
f) As such, on June 15, SpaceX submitted a new version of a revised Communications Plan (Plan v5.3.1) that solely updated the location of the launch control center. This change to the Communications Plan that SpaceX operated under was clearly a continuing accuracy update, and therefore, per the regulations, did not require FAA approval.
g) On June 16, the FAA finally began its review of Plan v5.3.1, and minutes later, SpaceX responded to the FAA's questions and offered a call to discuss any further questions. The FAA responded stating it would not be able to complete its review of Plan v5.3.1
before the June 18 launch. The FAA stated that SpaceX had not provided it with enough notice even though SpaceX had told the FAA six weeks earlier that it required use of the plan by June 1, and the date was now June 16. Again, approval was not required under the regulation for this continuing accuracy update.
h) On June 22, 2023, the FAA sent SpaceX minor comments on Plan v5.4, and this same day, SpaceX sent responses to the FAA. Hours after SpaceX responded, on June 22, 2023, the FAA approved Plan v5.4 for incorporation into two of SpaceX launch licenses, but not in SpaceX's launch license for LC-39A.
FAA Enforcement Action - Quick Facts
(1) Communications Plan
a) FAA alleges that SpaceX operated under an unapproved Communications Plan for the PSN MSF launch in June 2023. SpaceX denies this allegation.
b) SpaceX's only change to the Communications Plan was to change the location of the launch control center from one location on Kennedy Space Center to another. No communications procedures, networks, or personnel changed.
c) On May 2, 2023, SpaceX sent the FAA a revised SpaceX Falcon and Dragon Communications Plan (v.5.4, May 2023) (Plan v5.4) for incorporation into its launch licenses.
d) Each week after SpaceX submitted Plan v5.4, during weekly licensing calls between the FAA and SpaceX, SpaceX told the FAA that it required the plan by June 1 and asked the FAA whether it had feedback.
e) During a call on June 13, SpaceX again asked FAA if it had feedback, because SpaceX had a launch on June 18 that would use the new location of the launch control center. In response, and for the first time, the FAA told SpaceX that there were "too many" revisions in Plan v5.4 for it to be able to provide feedback on it by June 18.
f) As such, on June 15, SpaceX submitted a new version of a revised Communications Plan (Plan v5.3.1) that solely updated the location of the launch control center. This change to the Communications Plan that SpaceX operated under was clearly a continuing accuracy update, and therefore, per the regulations, did not require FAA approval.
g) On June 16, the FAA finally began its review of Plan v5.3.1, and minutes later, SpaceX responded to the FAA's questions and offered a call to discuss any further questions. The FAA responded stating it would not be able to complete its review of Plan v5.3.1
before the June 18 launch. The FAA stated that SpaceX had not provided it with enough notice even though SpaceX had told the FAA six weeks earlier that it required use of the plan by June 1, and the date was now June 16. Again, approval was not required under the regulation for this continuing accuracy update.
h) On June 22, 2023, the FAA sent SpaceX minor comments on Plan v5.4, and this same day, SpaceX sent responses to the FAA. Hours after SpaceX responded, on June 22, 2023, the FAA approved Plan v5.4 for incorporation into two of SpaceX launch licenses, but not in SpaceX's launch license for LC-39A.
i) On August 20, 2023, the FAA later approved Plan v5.4 for incorporation into the LC- 39A license, which was 110 days after SpaceX originally submitted the plan. During these 110 days, the FAA did not ask SpaceX for any additional information on Plan v5.4, the plan was not further modified, and therefore, the plan was the same as the one approved on June 22, 2023. It is unclear why it took the FAA an additional 59 days, and 110 days total to "review" and "approve," but the fact that the Communications Plan was approved demonstrates there was no public safety concern with moving the launch control center.
(2) T-2 Hour Polling
a) The FAA alleges that SpaceX should have conducted a T-2 hour readiness poll prior to the PSN MSF launch, per its Communications Plan, and that such a readiness poll should have been in SpaceX's launch procedures. There is no requirement in the regulations for a T-2 hour readiness poll.
b) Importantly, SpaceX conducts a poll prior to propellant loading, later in the count, consistent with safe operations.
(3) Rocket Propellant-1 (RP-1) Farm
a) The FAA alleges that SpaceX operated an unapproved RP-1 farm during the EchoStar 23 launch. Specifically, the RP-1 farm used during the EchoStar 23 was moved to enhance the public safety of SpaceX's operations. Specifically, the new RP-1 farm location and design increased safety to individuals both inside and outside of the LC- 39A fence line through multiple improvements. The RP-1 farm moved to a location that is more than twice the distance from the nearest publicly accessible area outside of the fence line, with an increase from 700 ft to 1600 ft.
b) SpaceX eliminated a hazard both inside and outside the fence line by moving the RP- 1 storage tanks away from a heat source that was near the old location. The old RP-1 storage tanks required additional hazard mitigation due to their spacing, and these mitigations were eliminated with the new location. The new RP-1 storage tanks are farther apart and the additional hazards associated with the previous spacing have been eliminated.
c) Prior to the launch, Federal Range Safety authorities reviewed and approved the new RP-1 farm's use.
d) On August 20, less than a month after the FAA issued SpaceX a license for the Echostar XXIV/Jupiter 3 launch, the FAA approved a waiver for the Crew-7 launch that allowed SpaceX to conduct the launch from LC-39A with the new RP-1 farm.
e) The waiver that the FAA issued stated that granting the waiver "would not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety of property, or any national security or foreign policy interest of the United States."
f) Since SpaceX's operations for the Echostar XXIV/Jupiter 3 launch and the Crew-7 launch were the same as related to the new RP-1 farm, it's not clear why the FAA made a positive safety determination for the Crew-7 launch, but could not do the same for the Echostar XXIV/Jupiter 3 launch.
(2) T-2 Hour Polling
a) The FAA alleges that SpaceX should have conducted a T-2 hour readiness poll prior to the PSN MSF launch, per its Communications Plan, and that such a readiness poll should have been in SpaceX's launch procedures. There is no requirement in the regulations for a T-2 hour readiness poll.
b) Importantly, SpaceX conducts a poll prior to propellant loading, later in the count, consistent with safe operations.
(3) Rocket Propellant-1 (RP-1) Farm
a) The FAA alleges that SpaceX operated an unapproved RP-1 farm during the EchoStar 23 launch. Specifically, the RP-1 farm used during the EchoStar 23 was moved to enhance the public safety of SpaceX's operations. Specifically, the new RP-1 farm location and design increased safety to individuals both inside and outside of the LC- 39A fence line through multiple improvements. The RP-1 farm moved to a location that is more than twice the distance from the nearest publicly accessible area outside of the fence line, with an increase from 700 ft to 1600 ft.
b) SpaceX eliminated a hazard both inside and outside the fence line by moving the RP- 1 storage tanks away from a heat source that was near the old location. The old RP-1 storage tanks required additional hazard mitigation due to their spacing, and these mitigations were eliminated with the new location. The new RP-1 storage tanks are farther apart and the additional hazards associated with the previous spacing have been eliminated.
c) Prior to the launch, Federal Range Safety authorities reviewed and approved the new RP-1 farm's use.
d) On August 20, less than a month after the FAA issued SpaceX a license for the Echostar XXIV/Jupiter 3 launch, the FAA approved a waiver for the Crew-7 launch that allowed SpaceX to conduct the launch from LC-39A with the new RP-1 farm.
e) The waiver that the FAA issued stated that granting the waiver "would not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety of property, or any national security or foreign policy interest of the United States."
f) Since SpaceX's operations for the Echostar XXIV/Jupiter 3 launch and the Crew-7 launch were the same as related to the new RP-1 farm, it's not clear why the FAA made a positive safety determination for the Crew-7 launch, but could not do the same for the Echostar XXIV/Jupiter 3 launch.
g) Instead, it took the FAA several months after the Crew-7 waiver to approve the RP- 1 farm license modification, showing inefficiency and lack of public safety focus by AST.
h) The FAA has never asserted that the new ground safety configuration at LC-39A or the related ground safety analysis was not safe or did not comply with the regulations. Rather, when the FAA issued SpaceX a license for the Echostar XXIV/Jupiter 3 launch on July 26, 2023, the transmittal letter for the license said only that "the FAA cannot issue a positive safety review determination for the modification request, submitted on July 19, 2023, ahead of the Echostar XXIV/Jupiter 3 mission."
i) FAA is on console prior to launch operations and did not stop launch operations because of this matter, indicating no public hazard or public safety risk.
j) Finally, FAA intervened via letter that was delivered to SpaceX well into SpaceX's countdown procedures for the launch. The SpaceX Flight Reliability Team called the FAA to communicate that as an operator, SpaceX believed it was unsafe for the FAA to be sending these types of communications during operations and altering propellant operations for non-contingency scenarios, on the fly. The FAA leadership on the call agreed with this assessment and did not direct SpaceX to stand down or pull its license.
Again, SpaceX is absolutely committed to safety in all operations. For well over a year now, SpaceX has voiced its concerns with the FAA's inability to keep pace with the commercial space industry and the needs of U.S. Government agencies that rely on commercial space launch capability for national security and national priorities.
Respectfully,
/s/
David Harris
VP, Legal
Cc:
The Honorable Eric Schmitt
The Honorable Kyrsten Sinema
The Honorable Brian Babin
The Honorable Eric Sorensen
h) The FAA has never asserted that the new ground safety configuration at LC-39A or the related ground safety analysis was not safe or did not comply with the regulations. Rather, when the FAA issued SpaceX a license for the Echostar XXIV/Jupiter 3 launch on July 26, 2023, the transmittal letter for the license said only that "the FAA cannot issue a positive safety review determination for the modification request, submitted on July 19, 2023, ahead of the Echostar XXIV/Jupiter 3 mission."
i) FAA is on console prior to launch operations and did not stop launch operations because of this matter, indicating no public hazard or public safety risk.
j) Finally, FAA intervened via letter that was delivered to SpaceX well into SpaceX's countdown procedures for the launch. The SpaceX Flight Reliability Team called the FAA to communicate that as an operator, SpaceX believed it was unsafe for the FAA to be sending these types of communications during operations and altering propellant operations for non-contingency scenarios, on the fly. The FAA leadership on the call agreed with this assessment and did not direct SpaceX to stand down or pull its license.
Again, SpaceX is absolutely committed to safety in all operations. For well over a year now, SpaceX has voiced its concerns with the FAA's inability to keep pace with the commercial space industry and the needs of U.S. Government agencies that rely on commercial space launch capability for national security and national priorities.
Respectfully,
/s/
David Harris
VP, Legal
Cc:
The Honorable Eric Schmitt
The Honorable Kyrsten Sinema
The Honorable Brian Babin
The Honorable Eric Sorensen
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