so many of you will remember my reporting around "operation choke point 2.0" from the spring of 2023; TLDR, Biden's financial regulators, namely the Fed, FDIC, and OCC launched a crackdown on banks covering the crypto space...
the first casualty was Silvergate bank, which _voluntarily liquidated_. the common reporting around Silvergate was that they lent to crypto depositors, those depositors were flighty, when rates rose they suffered m2m losses on bond portfolios, and ended up insolvent
except... that's not true. silvergate weathered the storm, even though short sellers (cohodes) and members of congress like warren encouraged a bank run, based on rumors that silvergate had criminal exposure to FTX (they have since been totally cleared of those allegations)
they suffered huge redemptions after FTX but were still solvent and able to do business. only there was 1 problem: the Fed told them that they had to reduce their crypto exposure to only a nominal ("ancillary") part of their business...
this is like telling a dunkin that they cant sell donuts or coffee. silvergate was a boutique crypto bank that served the crypto industry. so after the Fed came out with this new informal guidance, their business ceased to exist, and they voluntarily liquidated
the bank's assets were also toxic as it became clear with SVB and Silvergate that any crypto related lines of business would NOT be eligible to be sold according to the OCC. this included SEN and Signet as well as crypto deposits at those banks
I broke the story in two pieces in @PirateWires in 2023 and since then "operation choke point 2.0" has become normalized in the discourse
one point i've endeavored to make is that Silvergate died by murder, not suicide. the critical point is that the Fed told them after the drawdown that they had to cut their crypto deposits to 15% of their book, dooming them. (this is obviously unconstitutional, by the way)
in my original reporting I thought this was the FDIC, but it was actually the SF Fed that was passing down this guidance. but it had the same effect - killing pro-crypto banks, and making crypto firms unable to get banking
ANYWAY, and the reason I'm writing this thread –
until now, we haven't had any actual evidence of the scandal at Silvergate, beyond statements made by bank executives on background to journalists.
most of my reporting on OCP 2.0 has been corroborated hundreds of times over by folks affected, but the Silvergate stuff has remained a mystery since they have been in wind-down mode and have been settling with the SEC and so on (there's another story here about the settlements, but that's for another day)
so what's new now is, Elaine Hetric, former chief administrative officer of Silvergate, filed a declaration as part of Silvergate's Chapter 11 filings... for the first time, it completely and totally corroborates what I wrote in my reporting. and it's all totally on the record
we have NEVER had a Silvergate executive able to go on the record and tell the real story of what happened. With Signature, at least Barney Frank was willing to talk. But because of the litigation and bankruptcy proceedings, Silvergate execs couldnt talk
Hetric's affidavit is fascinating. She first talks about the infamous Fed/FDIC/OCC "joint statement" in jan 2023 that was a first sign something was wrong
Hetric points out that Silvergate was able to weather the drawdown associated with rate rises and crypto industry balance sheet contraction - they were still solvent when the dust had cleared
This is the smoking gun: Silverage was solvent and able to operate, but the Fed had informed them they had to curtail their crypto business. Without a crypto business, they would have had to reshape the entire firm. It was _this_ that caused them to liquidate.
She also discusses the Signature receivership and points out further evidence of Choke Point (as I wrote at the time) coming from the fact that crypto-related bank lines of business were NOT included in the acquisitions
Hetric is very stark, writing: "This public signaling and sudden regulatory shift made clear that, at least as of the first quarter of 2023, the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies would not tolerate banks with significant concentrations of digital asset customers, ultimately preventing Silvergate Bank from continuing its digital asset focused business model."
so the Biden bank regulators made it impossible for banks servicing a particular legal industry to operate. and in doing so, they actively caused the collapse of certain banks, namely Silvergate and Signature. these banks did not die by suicide but by murder. this remains a gigantic scandal and no one has ever faced any responsibility for it – not does the press or the public really know the truth. and the Biden admin keeps denying its role in OCP2.0 even though the evidence is abundantly clear.
Hetric's testimony is so important because it's direct, on the record, under penalty of perjury, evidence of what we have known all along, but no one has been willing to admit: the Biden admin directly forced Silvergate out of business, they did NOT die on their own due to mismanagement or bad trades. they were killed because the Fed said they weren't allowed to service crypto clients, as a bank. and when they liquidated, the crypto lines of business like SEN were tossed in the garbage, rather than being allowed to continue to exist.
and by the way, what the Biden admin is doing is blatantly illegal. Cooper and Kirk, the law firm that sued over OCP 1.0 under Obama, has pointed out that OCP 2.0 violates the fifth amendment
i'm still so fired up about this over a year later, because the popular narrative around silvergate and signature is "oh they just made stupid balance sheet mistakes" when the truth is they were taken out back and shot by their own regulators. the fragility of the crypto banks was worsened by folks like Sen Warren publicly calling for a bank run and making false allegations that these banks had criminal exposure to FTX. which proved to be a HUGE LIE. the fact that a sitting senator encouraged a bank run is completely insane, by the way!
and then the regulators took the outflows from these banks as evidence that crypto was indeed too risky for banks to deal with, and used that as an excuse to clamp down and install new rules making it impossible to be a crypto bank – dunkin banned from selling donuts.
the whole thing is such a maddening scandal, it makes my blood boil, which is why it's so important we get to the truth, and testimony like Elaine's is so important
if we let the Biden admin pretend they did nothing wrong and these banks just happened to die on their own, they will do it again. as I write, they are still actively engaging in the suppression of the crypto industry via the deprivation of banking. if you are an entrepreneur of have any exposure to crypto, you should be upset about this too. they are targeting your livelihood and making it impossible for you to operate normally, by making banking inaccessible/expensive.
i feel extremely vindicated - my original reporting has been 100% proven correct since it was published in 2023 (with small details wrong, like the Fed, not the FDIC imposing the 15% cap)
but i'm not happy, i'm upset because even though people talk about OCP2.0, no one really understands how bad of a scandal it was. the government destroyed several banks because they didn't like that they served a total legal industry, that's the plain truth of it. it's 10x worse than people think.
agreed. it can be fixed sans soft fork for anyone that's live on the network, but old/abandoned coins in vulnerable addresses (p2pk, reused p2pkh) are at risk. no easy way to fix. some quantum timelines have a break by 2030.
and yes bitcoin is more vulnerable than other systems that rely on cryptography, because they can be upgraded to post quantum encryption whereas there's millions of coins in old addresses (assumed lost/inactive owners) which are fundamentally at risk.
basically you have to make your peace with the fact that there's a 2-6m BTC (aka $200b-600b) prize waiting to be claimed by the first entity to achieve quantum supremacy. the other alternative is getting everyone to agree to pre-emptively burn/steal the coins which is unpalatable
unfortunately the yale academics are at it again and are trying to gaslight everyone into thinking that debanking crypto didn't happen. it did, everyone dealt with it, everyone knows it, and the evidence is excruciatingly clear. full treatment soon
1. Steven points out that Coinbase has banking. Yes. They actually have had struggles with banking and are only really around today because a16z had to intervene to ensure they had bank access prior to 2020 when they landed the JPM relationship. One of the reasons Coinbase emerged as the winner in the US is precisely because they had better bank relationships than others. It proves our point that banking is a weird thing that determines winners and losers in crypto, and it shouldn't be that way.
But that's not really what we're complaining about. Coinbase is the largest and most credible crypto firm in the US, they are publicly traded. Obviously they're able to get banking. It's everyone else that has suffered. Especially startups, who aren't able to easily make the case that they are a valuable relationship to a bank that's already leery of banking crypto / facing pressure from regulators. Coinbase being adequately banked is largely irrelevant.
2. Steven says the FDIC showed favoritism to crypto banks SVB and SBNY by making depositors whole. This is silly. First of all, there was a massive regional banking crisis going on, and the FDIC had to step in to stop the run. SVB in particular was systemic to US tech and startups. They had to be saved or most of the dynamism in our tech sector would have evaporated overnight. Saving them was the right decision. They also only had one (1) crypto client, Circle.
SBNY are a different story. They had more crypto clients. But they were not shown favoritism. Arguably, they were executed for serving crypto. That's what the board member Barney Frank alleges. They were sent into receivership on a sunday night without being given a chance to raise capital and save themselves. Also, when they were sold to Flagstar, all their crypto related deposits and IP (Signet) were stripped out. The resolution of SBNY shows no preference towards crypto, only animosity. The refusal to transfer the crypto business was one of the most obvious signs in early 2023 that something was amiss.
Deepseek has completely upended the conventional wisdom around AI
- China will only do closed source / proprietary
- Silicon Valley is the global nexus of AI development, has a huge headstart
- OpenAI has an unbeatable moat
- you need to spend tens, maybe hundreds of billions for SOTA model development
- value will accrete to the models (fat model hypothesis)
- scaling hypothesis means model performance is a ~linear function of training inputs costs (compute, data, GPUs)
All these narratives, shaken if not completely undermined overnight. Stay frosty
All of that said, I don’t worry too too much about equity value in NVIDIA/AI datacenter companies (although I have massive bag bias here, am invested in several of the largest AI datacenters cos). Why? When a commodity gets cheaper, and it looks like even disregarding DS’ claims around training costs, factually speaking inference costs are down by a factor of 30 compared with OAI SOTA model, the use of that commodity increases. This is jevons’ paradox. So inference overnight became vastly more abundant. DS’ innovations will be rapidly incorporated by other model cos. So AI can be embedded cheaply everywhere. This probably shifts the ratio of training to inference in AI Capex in favor of the latter but I don’t believe it undermines equity value in the firms that produce the inputs for inference - GPUs, datacenters, etc. Just accelerates the transition from pre AI world to fully embedded world.
All of that said, the investor premise that the model cos - OAI, Anthropic etc - are where equity value will accrete has a massive hole in it now. I always felt and have said that I thought model cos would be capital incinerators due to high quality open source models and a race to the bottom, and I think that is more true now. But overall I don’t worry about the rest of the stack, whether it’s the producers (NVDA, datacenters) or the firms (mag7) that are actually bundling up compute and selling it to the end user in the form of better consumer experiences.
TLDR- for most of you no need to panic. Although I think it will take the market some time to digest and the ride will be bumpy in the near term.
Receipts on me thinking fat model hypothesis is bad / model cos as capital incinerators
Thanks to @iampaulgrewal and the rest of the team at Coinbase, the FDIC has now been compelled to further un-redact their "pause letters" to banks during 2022-23. We know know what the FDIC was asking banks not to do (thread)
For an introduction on what the pause letters were all about and the context, see this thread:
I've summarized the new batch of pause letters here. When I add 'suspected' that's me guessing what bank or product the redactions pertain to. Credit to @john_iller for making the USDF connection.
Longer thread on the FDIC’s 2022-23 “pause letters” to banks regarding crypto-asset activities in 2022 and 2023. Strap in
So we all know that banks have been stymied from doing crypto stuff for years: regulators installed 15% deposit caps on fiat deposits from crypto firms, cutting off bank access for the whole industry; the SEC used SAB121 to stop banks custodying crypto; and the Fed effectively prohibited banks from doing stablecoin stuff. But maybe the worst and most brazen was the FDIC unilaterally barring banks from doing any crypto stuff at all…
So recently, Coinbase made FOIA requests to the FDIC regarding their guidance to banks on crypto matters. Last month, the FDIC published summaries of these letters, without saying what they said exactly, or which banks they were addressed to. assets.ctfassets.net/c5bd0wqjc7v0/7…
@pmarca Pmarca claims debanking is targeting crypto founders, fintech founders, and conservatives. He says the CFPI and other financial regulators are responsible. Lee Fang and others say the CFPI is anti-debanking. Who is right?